The various levels of European security and defense cooperation : Turkey's position in the emerging European security architecture by Akçakaya, K Taner
THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND DEFENSE COOPERATION : TURKEY'S
POSITION IN  THE EMERGING EUROPEAN
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATINAL RELATIONS OF BILKENT UNIVERSITY IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER
BY
K. TANER AKÇAKAYA
JULY 2001
ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst. Prof. Gülnur Aybet
Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya
Examinining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Prof.Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Director
iii
ABSTRACT
With the end of the cold war, developments in Europe mark a historical era which
require adaptation of national governments and institutions to the new environment. The
removal of basic constraints of cold war years, triggered new initiatives in political and
security fields by increasing the potential European role to a global level. Security and
defense are the critical fields and one should consider the US and NATO presence as a sine
qua  non for the European Security. Throughout cold war, NATO relieved European fears
and heavy burden of defense, but it also prevented the development of an autonomous
European military structure. However, from 1998 on, there is a considerable shift to the
‘Europeanist’ views which was relatively weak during the cold war years. Progress in the
integration process, bitter experiences in the Balkans, constituted the basic factors of this
change. The US desire to reduce its burden in defense field is an additional factor to give
more incentives for more autonomy in European power projection capabilities.
On the other hand, the concept of an evolving ‘European Army’ or an effective
military tool should not create high expectations since the process is at its very early stages
and there are many problems to be solved before any expectations. Additionally, there are
many variables and uncertainties in the international environment which may reverse the
positive feelings of  security cooperation in Europe. About the restructuring of a European
Security architecture, the institutional relationships between NATO and the EU in
particular, is in the process of definition.  In this process, inclusion of all possible actors will
reduce the challenges of an uncertain environment by providing a certain degree of
flexibility.  In this regard,  Turkey is one of the significant actors which may have direct or
indirect influence over these new formations with its membership in NATO, geographical
location or with its ties in the Balkans, in the Middle East or in the Caucasus.
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                                                                             ÖZET
Soğuk savaşın bitmesinden sonra özellikle Avrupa Kıtasında meydana gelen
gelişmeler, tarihi bir dönemecin geçilmekte olduğunu; hükümetlerin ve kurumların esen bu
değişim rüzgarları karşısında kendilerini yenileme ihtiyacında olduklarını göstermiştir.
Tarih sahnesinde Avrupa ülkelerinin ilk defa olarak bütünleşme adı altında birbirlerine bu
denli yaklaşmaya başlamaları dikkat çekicidir. II. Dünya savaşının ardından, soğuk savaşın
kısıtlamaları altında, sadece ekonomik anlamda bütünleşmeyi gerçekleştirmiş olan Avrupa
artık uluslararası alanda daha büyük bir rol benimsemiş, siyasi ve askeri alanda da
bütünleşme sürecine girmiştir. 1998’den bu yana; Amerika’nın savunma harcamalarını
azaltma amacı, Avrupa’nın bütünleşme sürecinde mesafe katetmesi ve Balkanlardaki acı
derslerin de etkisiyle, güvenlik alanındaki yeniden yapılanma ‘Avrupacı’ görüşlerin etkisi
altında kalmıştır.
Medyada abartıldığı kadar büyük beklentilerin söz konusu olmaması gerektiği
‘Avrupa Ordusu’, gibi kavramlar henüz daha doğum safhasındadır ve iddialı bir konuma
gelebilmesi için daha halledilmesi gereken pek çok sorun vardır. Bu oluşumları
etkileyebilecek uluslararası ortam, belirsizliklerin hakim olduğu ve çok fazla değişkenin
etkili olabileceği bir ortamdır. Yine aynı oluşumlarla ilgili olarak kurumların rollerini ve
birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerinin tam olarak düzenlendiğini de söylemek mümkün değildir. Bu
düzenlemelerde mümkün olan en fazla ülkenin iştirakının sağlanması ve yapılardaki
esnekliğin korunması, uluslararası ortamın belirsizliğine alınabilecek en iyi tedbir gibi
gözükmektedir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye direk veya dolaylı olarak bu oluşumları
etkileyebilecek bir ülkedir ve bir şekilde bu oluşumlarda söz sahibi olması kaçınılmazdır.
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1Introduction  :
In the period since the fall of the Berlin Wall, common understandings of some
notions like state, sovereignty, and security have changed in international relations
terminology. The most prominent changes, however, occurred in major security
structures of international system. Security structures, valid throughout the cold war,
required substantial changes to respond challenges in a turbulent period of transition.
The end of the cold war, effectively removed the immediate risk of a direct, large scale,
military attack on Western Europe. There was also a corresponding decline in the risk of
massive nuclear exchange on the continent. Yet, as the hard military threats of bipolar
rivalry diminished, there was a recognition that Europe still faced a host of security
concerns. Some of these had been overshadowed by the cold war and others were
created by the very end of the conflict. In general, these “new” challenges to European
Security can be divided into three broad categories; the reemergence of nationalism and
ethnic strife, the proliferation of WMD, and “soft “ security issues like migration and
human rights.1 In parallel, the establishment of inclusive mechanisms for addressing
security related issues, were required to respond these new challenges. Today, NATO’s
main purpose is not to defend Western Europe against military invasion, but to promote
stability in Central and Eastern Europe as a political-military alliance, while being held
in reserve for crises on Europe’s periphery.2 This dissertation deals mainly with issues
related with the transformation period of European Security structures and security
cooperation of EU member states, under the label of Common European Security and
Defense Policy (CESDP).
                                                          
1 Tom Lansford, “ The triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after the
cold war”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.22, No: 1, March 99, p.4
2 Robin Niblett, “The European Disunion: Competing visions of integration”, The Washington Quarterly,
vol.20, issue 1, winter 1997, pp.2.
2The objective of this study is to inspect for the progress in security field, whether
it constitute a qualitative leap towards integration. The motivations behind the progress,
and the effects of security cooperation in both short and long terms will be discussed
throughout the thesis with their potential issues of conflict. Arrangements under the
label of Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) , positions of the EU
member states, the improvements in military field to back these policies, and the
modalities for the inclusion of non-EU but NATO members3, especially Turkey’s
position, in these structures will be discussed in the thesis. The emphasis, throughout
the study, will be on ambiguities or potential sources of conflicts which may lead to a
false impression that Europe is capable of conducting a military operation without
American involvement, when, in fact, it is unable to do so.4  Nuclear issues, however,
will be taken as secondary issues to limit the scope of the thesis and because
considerable changes in this field except the strategic choices to use them are not
expected in European Security System. This will help, I believe, a better understanding
of security policies of European Union and its members as individual nations. For the
purpose of this thesis the level of analysis will focus on   international level, which will
basically cover international security institutions in Europe, involving also national
perspectives. The reason of following a mixture of levels is in the difficulty of isolating
the issue from national perspectives.
The neorealist analyses of international politics starts from the assumption that the
international system is an anarchical self-help system in which states must be primarily
concerned with their security, if they want to survive and protect their autonomy.5 As
                                                          
3 Six  NATO members who are not the members of EU are; Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and
Czech Republic. All of these six have different characteristics and interests in the security field depending on
their geographic location, military structure and economies.
4 Gordon Smith, US senator, holds hearing on “Emerging ESDP”, 03.09.2000, FDCH political transcripts,
Washington D.C. (http://globalvgw12.global.epnet.com/)
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1979, Theory of International Politics, Newyork, Random House.
3being the most dangerous part of the national autonomy, it is a difficult task to detect
the operability of mechanisms in security field. In most cases, they were tested and
approved by real cases. However, evidences help us to assess weaknesses and strengths
of  these new formations. By using descriptive analyses, as a methodology, I tried to
detect evidences for a better understanding of weaknesses and strengths in newly
developing structures with no claims of predicting the future shape of European
Security Architecture. The major question which I will search for the answer in this
study, is whether the European Union, in the field of security, has already made a
qualitative leap into a new phase of integration.
Although EU officials claim that the EU is not trying to loosen its ties with the US
and NATO, but strengthen them, not trying to create a European Army separate from
NATO, but an EU capability to act where NATO does not wish to become involved,
and not trying to go-it-alone without friends and partners who are not in the EU- but
preparing arrangements to ensure that ESDP is an inclusive –not an exclusive- process6.
However, it is possible to attain longer term ends for ESDP as a consequence of an
increase in cooperation which may go beyond the declared, as functionalism envisaged.
In this respect, the emphasis of which is on development of political cohesion rather
than agreement on final plans. The theory is that, momentum generated by bringing
disparate political groups together in pursuit of vague aims eventually locks parties into
agreement, once the policy finally becomes clear. As doctrine, it is the triumph of
process over precision.7
Ernst Haas defines the integration as the process of attainment of the qualities
which make up a political community. According to Amitai Etzioni, these qualities
include an effective control over the use of the means of violence, and a center of
                                                          
6 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, section II, articles 27- 28.
7 John C. Hulsman, “The Guns of Brussels- Burden Sharing and Power Sharing with Europe” Policy Review,
June/July 2000, issue 101.
4decision making which is the dominant focus of political identification for the large
majority of politically aware citizens.8 Integration can either be conscious or
unconscious. That is integration can either be pursued as an end itself by contractual,
purposeful agreements or it can evolve naturally as a side effect from other
developments which may have no direct relevance to furthering the process of
integration.9 Although, the increase in security cooperation signals positive feelings in
this concept, there seems a long way and much to be done to achieve a single European
voice in defense and security issues.
Chapter 1, provides a background to the cooperation in security field between the
European states, it commences with an overview of basic events of the cold war with
the intent of providing the reader with a better understanding of the circumstances
leading the idea of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Integration of
Western Europe appeared as an obligation after World War II. The need for economic
recovery, the imminent Soviet danger and the need to incorporate West Germany into a
Western defense system were the main external dynamics to shape the cooperation of
that period.10 As the perceived effect of the threats diminished, rivalry between the US
and the Soviet Union created a set of rules of engagement for military and diplomatic
relations-that is cold war stability- and economic recovery achieved; differences
between national policies of major European powers became more apparent.
The establishment of NATO, by providing the nuclear umbrella and the American
commitment on the continent, shadowed the progress in creating an independent or
more autonomous security structures in Europe. However, some traces of cooperation
                                                          
8 Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: a theory of societal and political processes, Newyork, 1968 cited in
Gülnur Aybet ,The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation,1945-91, 1997, Macmillan Press, London,
pp. 10.
9 Ibid., pp.3
10 For detailed information, see Gülnur Aybet The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation,1945-91,
1997, in her book, she argues about the external factors that affect the shape of European Security
cooperation in different periods of cold war. Macmillan Press, London .
5can be found in several different initiatives like the European Defense Community
(EDC) and European Political Community (EPC), although they have failed or have
limited success in achieving a common policy. This chapter focuses on cold war period,
and tries to illustrate the origins of creating a more independent Europe in security field.
Burden sharing debates, European involvement in strategic and nuclear planning,
détente and arms control initiatives were the prominent issues of this period.
The importance of the cold war comes from the linkages between the lessons of
that period  and their reflections on present policies of European States. As an instance,
we can see the origins of the idea of having credible military capabilities to back
political decisions, in the lessons of entrapment-abandonment dilemmas of cold war
years.11 The dependence on the US in defense would sometimes cause troubles for the
major powers of Europe. In this respect European Security and Defense Policies
(ESDP), in many ways, a far modest proposition than the European Defense
Community (EDC) depending on its gradual and organic evolution by the time.
The circumstances by the end of cold war and the resulting reluctance in
American commitment to the continent, confirmed the need for a European Security and
Defense Identity distinct from NATO. Different views over the scope and nature of the
European Pillar of the security constitute the subjects of  chapter 2. There were new
security concerns and risks, the enthusiasm in the beginning of 1990s, to realize the
perpetual peace12 in Europe and its periphery, was to diminish by the perceived inability
of the existing institutions in their responses to the crises as happened in the Gulf and in
the Yugoslavian cases.
                                                          
11 The essence of the dilemma is that the two types of costs themselves conflict. Each ally oscillates between
the fear of abandonment by its partners in a crisis- the cost of dependence- and the fear of being entrapped or
dragged into a conflict not of its own choosing- the cost of reduced freedom of action.  Jane M.O. Sharp,
“After Reykjavik: Arms Control and the Allies”, International Affairs, vol.63, no.2, spring 1987, pp.241.
12 “Perpetual Peace” of Kant, here, implies simply the democratization of newly independent states, and as a
consequence, expected peaceful environment.
6In response to a combination of a growing recognition of the need to develop
structures to deal with new risks and threats, and national interests, there were three
broad, yet conflicting, visions for the future security of Europe. These were represented
by three institutions, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)-it
turned out to Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe  (OSCE) and became
a permanent institution after the cold war-, NATO and the WEU. The emphasis in this
chapter will be on the WEU and the NATO rather than OSCE since its ineffectiveness
in decision-making and the relative power for influence seemed in a low profile.
The evolution of NATO and WEU on an institutional basis to respond the
changing circumstances, the linkages between WEU, EU and NATO will be covered in
this chapter. The question here is how these institutional relationships would result in, it
means, whether they complete or block each other. The flexible characteristics of
emerging security structures and a trend in the division of the labor, such as NATO, or
mainly the US, taking responsibility for ‘hard power’ with the use of force and Europe
taking the responsibility of ‘soft’ issues that require much less than using significant
military pressure, as declared by Petersburg Tasks’, were the critical debates to shape
new structures in last decade. The need for a flexible structure comes from the legal
commitments and identities of NATO and the WEU. NATO as a traditional collective
security organization had geographical limitations for operations with its article-5 of
Washington Treaty. The advantages and disadvantages of flexible structures will be
discussed with their implications for future cooperation.
One of the most difficult questions of the time, which is still on the agenda, was
whether enlarging in a geographical context by accepting new members, or deepening
the European integration process by internal arrangements. Although European context
appears to be in more economical framework, it has significant security implications in
both European and Transatlantic transformations after  the cold war. Although, the
7institutional framework for cooperation of NATO and EU in security field still needs to
be defined more clearly, to prevent the potential flaws in the face of new crises, the
scope of expansion in both EU and NATO has a weight to shape the features of security
cooperation in the continent.
Leaving aside the inter-institutional arrangements, chapter 3 will deal with the
organizational arrangements within the EU, during the absorption of WEU into its
organic structures. The WEU, in this phase, with its different membership statuses and
characteristics propose ambiguities which may, in turn, result in discriminatory
approaches. As the treaty on European Union was signed, WEU member states
reconstructed the organization. Countries that were simultaneously members of the EU
and NATO were to remain. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey, European Allies not in the
EU were given the status of associate members. Union members, not in the alliance
(Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) received a third status, that of observers for
which Denmark also opted for reasons of her own. Associate partnership envisaged for
especially Central and Eastern European (CEE) States was for the inclusion of these
states to a some degree in European Security System. All the differences in these
membership statuses reflects a type of categorization in the process of integration of
WEU into EU structures.
In the framework of Madrid Declaration and Amsterdam Treaty, the WEU could
act as the politico-military agent of the EU, while at the same time using NATO assets,
a unique opportunity to combine the best of two larger organizations, who for the
present can not link up directly.13 The Helsinki Summit of the EU went further to
provide goals in security issues in December 1999. Finally, the Nice Summit took over
the crisis management responsibilities of the WEU including the Petersberg Tasks.  The
focus, in this chapter, will shift to the ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘exclusiveness’ debates, since
8participation in security structures in Europe is one of the main issues of the agenda.
With its place in Western Block during the cold war, Turkey have organized its security
systems accordingly. The recent developments in Europe, however, drags Turkey to the
edge of a road distinction, causing distortions in its enthusiasm to cooperate. This
chapter will evaluate the security concerns of Turkey, its position among the associate
members and alternatives for its inclusion in new security structures.
On the military side of the process, material capabilities provide the real figures to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of emerging security structures which are the
concerns of chapter 4. States, national interests, and the international distribution of
power are seen as the primary determinants of national security, and this explains how
and under what circumstances states cooperate. Europeans needed material capabilities
and an intervention tool since without it a CFSP would be meaningless. Also,
Europeans realize the fact that the US will not always take the responsibility in crises
around Europe.
At the heart of the EU’s plans is the proposal to build an autonomous military
force supported by the necessary political and military apparatus. The plan envisions
three types of missions for this force; humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and crisis
management, including peacemaking. However, the emerging political will to develop a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) needs to be paralleled by significant
improvements in the force projection capabilities of the WEU member states in order
for a CFSP and future common defense policy to be credible. The current military
capabilities of many of the EU member states are still based on the cold war posture of
large scale standing armies for territorial defense. This is wholly unsuited to the
operations that may be required under a CESDP, or even within a NATO or the EU- led
                                                                                                                                                                               
13 Alyson J.K. Bailes, “WEU and NATO”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, special supplement 1998, pp.48.
9combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). These potential operations require modern force
projection capabilities, which EU member states do not currently possess. Intelligence
gathering, strategic lift capabilities, logistical support capabilities, high technology
precision stand-off munitions (for especially night operations) proved to be the main
fields that require significant improvements after the crises of Gulf and Yugoslavia.14
The different characteristics of National Armies, some formed from conscripts,
professionals or mixture, may create problems for the conduct of military missions
outside territorial defense. Equally important another complicating factor is the public
opinion against the use of national armies outside the national borders and to the
increase in defense spending  in Western Europe. Over the past years, however, defense
reviews in most of the European States to restructure their armies indicate a move
towards smaller, more mobile forces. Chapter 4 will encompass a detailed descriptive
analyses of defense spending and evolution of national armies to respond to the
requirements of post- cold war environment.
As a conclusion, the last chapter will summarize the findings of the previous
chapters and will also include an analysis about the issues related to the emerging
European Security Architecture.
                                                          
14 Alistair J.K. Shepherd, “Top-Down or Bottom-Up : Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU, a question of
political will or military capability?”, European Security, vol.9. no.22, summer 2000, pp.20.
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Chapter  1:  European Security Cooperation during the Cold War
The rapid changes in the international environment highlighted the inadequacy of
existing institutions which were created to cope with issues of cold war. The acceleration
in the integration process of  Europe with the collapse of eastern bloc is undeniable.
However, in the security and defense field , evolution of an independent European Policy
is much more difficult to achieve in short term.
There were external and internal factors which determined the scope of security
cooperation throughout the cold war. As the context of the environment changed, these
factors changed too. For a better understanding of emerging security structures in Europe,
the origins of the idea about creating an independent European Security Policy and the
evolution of the thought should be considered with their main lines. This may help us to
inspect the present issues under the light of the failures and  the successes of previous
attempts by giving us evidences and lessons for a better assessment. This chapter intended
to give the main lines of security cooperation in Europe, by emphasizing on basic points
which established the boundaries of cooperation.
The realization of the need for an integrated Europe was not the motive behind the
initiatives which resulted in security cooperation in cold war period. In most cases,
cooperation occurred as a response to the events which threatened the stability in Europe.
The lack of military capabilities to cope with Soviet military presence created complete
dependence on the US in defense. Reducing this dependence without causing the US
withdrawal from the continent was the main motive which appeared in almost every
initiative. Western Europe had the advantage that the integration process was relieved of
the heavy load of security and defense which is at the heart of the sovereignty of each
11
nation state, by being embedded in the Atlantic framework.15 Naturally, NATO became the
main forum to discuss security matters and the separation of the political and security
issues from the economic ones brought different speeds for each of these spheres on the
way to integration.
In the beginning of this chapter, the focus will be on factors which affected the scope
of cooperation between the European powers. Inspecting the international environment and
making comparisons with the post-cold war years will be sufficient in this respect.
Divisions on various subjects and tensions between the US and Europe will be covered in
this part. Then some initiatives like European Defense Community (EDC), European
Political Community (EPC), and the role of the Western European Union (WEU) in
creating the idea of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) will be
inspected together with the changes in Europe and the international system. Finally, the
developments after 1980s will be given to observe the transition in the context of European
cooperation in security field. The main objective in this chapter is not to cover all the
initiatives in security field, but to understand the main characteristics of the cooperation
efforts in security field. This will help us to create linkages with post-cold war initiatives
and by making comparisons, it will increase our ability to assess the real direction of recent
developments in this field.
1.1 The Determinants of  Security Cooperation after 1945:
It can be seen in the post war European identity that it was shaped by mainly security
factors  and from the outset Europe’s military weakness and inability to defend itself
without foreign assistance shaped the character of security structures. The emergence of
cold war and the division of Europe by the coup in Prague, the Berlin Blockade in 1948
and the outbreak of war in Korea created greater degree of European Unity than had been
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thought possible, and it also brought about lasting American involvement in European
Affairs. These developments were highly undesirable from the Soviet point of view and in
early 1950’s a stalemate prevailed international relations, the borders were frozen and it
was clear that, from now on the map of Europe could be changed only as a result of a
major war.16
At the initial years, the exhausted economies of the European countries, the need for
an effective control over German rearmament and its incorporation to Western security
structures, the emerging rivalry between the US and the USSR, and differences between
national priorities constituted the main factors which limited the scope of cooperation in
security field.17 Economy was the field which was suitable to the stakes of all parties
interested. As the economical recovery was achieved and the need for more autonomy in
Europe’s relations with the East increased, the context of the problems changed and
tensions between the US and Europe increased as well. Besides these main factors, the
allocation of responsibilities and costs in NATO or shortly burden-sharing debates,
struggle between the United Kingdom and France for leadership in Europe, consultation
and decision-making procedures in NATO were the important issues to have an impact on
security initiatives.
 1.1.1 NATO and differences in national perspectives:
The idea that there should be some form of Atlantic Union backed by America and
the British Commonwealth was pressed by British and Canadian leaders, whereas the
French from the beginning put greater stress on the European Character of such a scheme
and also emphasized the need for a closer political collaboration within in the framework
of a European Assembly. There were three main reasons behind the British policy
preserving a distance from Europe; First, its extensive links with non-European world,
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second; it was geographically separated from the continent and escaped occupation during
the war and finally; Europe’s continental problems, in a transitional period, were created
by the political and economical competition between the superpowers.18 These attitudes, in
a way, constitutes the origins of Europeanist- Atlanticist debates of  initiatives in security
institutions until mid 1990s.
The prospects of cooperation in the military field were not as good as the chances for
economic union, nor was there any reason to assume Europe would be able to defend itself
without American help within the foreseeable future. The groundwork for NATO was laid
in Brussels in 1948, and the treaty was signed in April 1949, its headquarters were
established in Paris. From the outset, Europe’s military weakness and inability to defend
itself without foreign assistance shaped the character of the treaty; it was an Atlantic, not
European Alliance, and this gave rise to doubts and criticism. America was a global power
with many interests in various parts of the world. Could it be taken for granted that Europe
would always receive top priority? Would America be ready to go war and risk using
nuclear weapons in response to a limited Soviet offensive in Europe? European decision
makers began to experience the fears about abandonment by these questions. These
arguments were countered by NATO planners, who were developing a “forward strategy”
aimed at defending Europe as far to the East as possible.19 With the end of cold war,
American stakes in Asia, for example the Caucasus and the China signals new areas of
interests, requires serious considerations from the European point of view.
At the beginning, in NATO, the emphasis was on joint defense planning,  and the
reequipment of European Armies with American arms. The real test, the unification of
command and the integration of forces came later, after the question of German
participation had been solved. It was the emergency created by the outbreak of Korean
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War in 1950 which transformed NATO from the original relatively balanced blue print into
a hegemonic alliance dominated by the US. President Truman took the advantage of the
Korean Crisis to deploy four US divisions to Europe, this was subsequently endorsed by
Congress on the basis of a resolution which insisted that the joint chiefs of staff “ should
certify that the European Allies were making a realistic effort on behalf of European
Defense”.20 Burden sharing debates began to appear between the two sides of the Atlantic.
We can detect similar arguments after the collapse of Communism and it is obvious
that, the main points of the debates, have not changed and they  still require serious
considerations. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the inability of the European powers to
react, has shown the still dependence of European Security system for foreign assistance.
This also calls for a real assessment of European military capabilities with the lessons of
Balkan case. However, the changing context of the threats in the international environment
and the rising national interests of the US in the Asia, for example; China as a rising global
player, required special concern in the field, consequently creates question marks for the
European planners. The question of the US priorities, which may change due to time and
circumstances, increasingly motivates the Western Europe for an independent security
structure after the cold war.
1.1.2 Tensions between the US and Europe :
American nuclear supremacy in NATO was one of the reasons of division. European
decision makers were always suspicious about the credibility of  the US nuclear guarantee
under a condition in which the US was not threatened directly. Dependence on the US
nuclear umbrella was not satisfactory to deter the Soviet conventional threat in case of a
limited strike in Europe. Britain and France set out two different channels for the initiatives
on defense matters. The US discriminatory approach by allowing Britain benefit from
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nuclear technology by the amendments of McMahon Act of 194621 pushed France pursue a
different policy which searched for German and Italian cooperation for a nuclear program.
However, by De Gaulle’s return to power in late 1950’s, France changed the character of
the program into a national one. Both  Britain and France got their independent nuclear
forces, in 1960’s.
1.1.2.1 French withdrawal from NATO Integrated Military Structures: It is possible
to detect the evolution of an infrastructure for future structures of European Security
System in 1960’s and 1970’s. French withdrawal from the military structures of NATO in
1966 was a political maneuver to weaken NATO. The decision based on the assumption
that there was a stable balance of power and France would in any case be defended in an
emergency by the Western Alliance.22 For De Gaulle, an independent Europe should
pursue an independent policy and it should have détente with the Soviet Union by their
initiatives. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to distance Europe from NATO and
should be added a defense and security dimension. There were reasons of establishing
French leadership and to distance Britain as a rival from this leadership by duplicating
WEU23.
These were not all welcomed by the smaller members of EC who had reservations
over the inclusion of defense and security dimension on the treaty and the French
dominance without British involvement. The deliberations of Fouchet Plan 24 failed due to
the dangers of loosening Transatlantic Alliance bonds. For Belgium and Netherlands, there
was no need to these kinds of deliberations since these might reduce the alliance
commitments. FRG ( Federal Republic of Germany) was abstantial about deep
involvement in these issues mainly for reasons of the US dependence on its defense.
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1.1.2.2 Nuclear Strategy Change in NATO: The question marks in the minds of
European decisionmakers increased by the proposal of the US Defense Minister, Robert
McNamara. He proposed a new nuclear strategy of  “flexible response” which was based
on both conventional and nuclear response instead of  “Massive Retaliation” . The USSR
had gained the capability of ICBM strike and it could cause considerable damage on the
other side of the Atlantic even if  it had to use its second-strike choice. The essence of
flexible response, “The Ladder of Escalation” which means, at the initial stages exchanges
could take place at conventional and tactical nuclear level, without necessarily escalating
to an all out nuclear war, created deep concerns on the European side. Europe could be the
battlefield and sacrificed by the US unless it feels the threat on the US territory.
De Gaulle’s opposition to “flexible response” and his repeated questioning of the
credibility of the American nuclear guarantee served a number of purposes. First, it helped
provide a justification for the force de frappe-French Nuclear Forces- for domestic
audiences, second plans for modernizing French industry and technology needed
development of a rational for the enormous efforts.25 However, the US convinced the allies
after the withdrawal of France and managed to adapt the new strategy. Adoption of
“flexible response” in 1967 enabled NATO to move away from an outdated “trip wire”
strategy while leaving the degree of commitment to a conventional defense ambiguous.
The very ambiguity of NATO’s strategy of “flexible response” was an initial advantage
contributing to the cohesion of the alliance.26  It was the base for NATO planners until
1991.
1.1.2.3 Burden Sharing Debates: Another problematic area was the contribution of
the European Members to their defense. Americans were not satisfied by the European
contribution to western defense and the Europeans were reluctant to spend more. The
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Mansfield resolution of 1966 called for a substantial decrease of the US troops in Europe
and growing support by the senate gave the incentives for European initiatives on the issue.
The establishment of EUROGROUP, which did not include France,  aimed to promote
coordination and collaboration in equipment and procurement programs. Europeans were
careful not to project an image of complete European self  reliance, for fear that this would
in itself produce a rationale for the reduction of the US troops in the continent.27
EUROGROUP achieved a degree of success by maintaining collaboration and initiating
programs like the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) and served to support
initiatives of NATO like Long Term Defense Improvement Plan (LTDP). In order to widen
the scope of previous efforts and to include France, Independent European Program Group
(IEPG) was established in 1976. It dealt with long term acquisition plans, opportunities for
collaborative developments and the legal managerial and industrial problems of
collaboration. The gap created by the lack of French contribution was filled by the IEPG.
The interesting point in the American desires to provide standardization in NATO is
not to create an independent and strong infrastructure for the Europeans but to decrease the
US spending and to maintain continuation of arms transfers to the continent. French
perceived the issue as an American attempt to deny, then right to construct a basis for
future military independence.28 EUROGROUP and IEPG faced with difficulties in
harmonizing different national industrial interests, and military technical problems limited
their successes. Europe could not achieve very much progress in this field until the end of
cold war.
Inspection of some cold war initiatives in Europe will give us some evidences
why Europeans were careful in their steps to create a Common Foreign and Security
Policy(CFSP) and CESDP after the end of cold war.
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1.2 The origins of the thought about European Army and Initiatives:
1.2.1 Failure of European Defense Community (EDC) and WEU:
The Security field had  difficulties in achieving close cooperation and the Korean
War signaled the potential dangers of a divided Germany in Europe. American pressure to
create an integrated force in Europe with the inclusion of Germany was countered by
French Plan which was called after the name of French Defense Minister Rene Pleven (
Pleven Plan or European Defense Community-EDC) in October 1950. EDC was the first
attempt for an integrated European Security Arm but it was discriminatory in nature.
Originally it was the French hesitations about the effective control of  NATO over German
Militarization that shaped the plan. At this period, integrated European Army was the main
concern  of the discussions. Britain’s military commitment –although it was out of the
project- in the continent and NATO guarantee against any aggression did not satisfy the
new French government and its colonial problems created new approaches in its European
policies. EDC proposal was defeated in France which it had originated in 1954. In this
initiative, it is possible to detect an apparent German distrust, in the French eyes, and a
desire to subordinate Germany in security structures.
The collapse of EDC  was a bitter blow to the European Movement, made worse the
fact that in October, after a crisis which threatened to rend the Atlantic alliance apart,
France accepted West German rearmament within NATO. It was the choice of France to
accept German rearmament rather than supranational authority over French Army. 9
Powers Conferences in London in 195429, decreased the problems by providing sacrifices
for all parties. Britain’s commitment for permanent military troops into Germany, German
promise never to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, US guarantee for its
commitment to Europe and French consent for German participation were all the sacrifices
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resulted in a consensus over German problem in European security structures.
Additionally, France agreed to join in a new, non-supranational organization proposed by
the British, called Western European Union (WEU). In fact the WEU marked the
resuscitation and expansion of the 1948 Brussels Pact. It tied together Britain and the six
and so provided a potentially strong European dimension within NATO.30 The WEU
served as a transitional organ to provide German membership in NATO until 1955.
The WEU never accomplished the functions to fill the European Security Gap. The
reason behind the WEU’s passivity was the military capabilities of European States. When
English Prime Minister tried to lead Western European Countries into a military alliance,
the Europeans (especially the French and the Belgians) wanted to see actual military
planning for war, pooled resources and British reinforcement of the continent. It was clear
from the start, however, that only America had the necessary resources to match the
Soviets, and the British Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to embark on co-operation with
Western Europe without American Support. Additionally, defense of the Middle East was
the main concern of British Commonwealth at that time.31 The WEU served as a
transitional organ for German NATO membership and the British EC membership, and
then it turned out to be a platform to discuss the unclear issues not handled in other organs
of European Institutions. Under the shadow of NATO, the WEU remained as a
supplementary organ in European Security environment until mid 1980’s, although the
expectations were much more.
The failure of EDC initiative marks the separation of economy from policy and
defense in the integration processes. The expectations for a spill over effect which would
cover all the fields taking the economic successes as the initial point, decreased by the
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blow of EDC failure. This was the reality of  cold war security structures and it was more
apparent then. Post-cold war years reflect a return to the similar expectations, converging
relationship between economic progress and the increase in the political weight of the
union. In this regard, caution appears to be the lesson for the Europeans while establishing
linkages between the pillars of European Union. Lack of military capabilities is the other
important issue inherited from the cold war years to the present. It is difficult to claim that
Europe achieved the military capabilities for an autonomous action. Decreasing Defense
budgets with the removal of an immediate Soviet Threat and the growing demand for an
independent European Security Structure constitutes the paradox of the post cold war
years.
1.2.2 The idea of a ‘European Pillar’ in NATO
The problems faced in the continent began to change by early 1960’s. The cold war
stability in the continent established common understandings between two blocs. Both
sides came to understand the borders and a search for dialogue especially after the death of
Stalin caused changes in the threat perceptions of the European allies. As the Europe
emerged as an economic power, and the context of the problems changed, debates
concentrated around the issues of nuclear sharing and burden sharing. Europeans were
reluctant for both complete dependence on  the US for nuclear deterrence and cautious not
to avoid the US contribution to their defense. This period witnessed serious flaws between
major powers of Europe in their alliance strategy and defense policies. In 1960’s, there
were three main issues that furthered security cooperation ; first Americans realized the
restlessness in Europe and began to look for ways to satisfy the European allies about
nuclear sharing.  Second, the idea of creating a “European Pillar”, the Western component,
in NATO began to emerge and the third, Franco-German close relationship appeared after
the failure of Fouchet committee by forming the base for further cooperation even for post
cold war years. NATO experienced the first transformation process as a result of the
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acquisition of the ICBM –Inter Continental Ballistic Missile- capability by the Soviets with
the launch of  SPUTNIK satellite in 1957.
1.2.3 European Political Cooperation(EPC) and CFSP:
The British, Denmark and the Ireland membership in EC promoted cooperation in
political field. There were three main reasons which required the coordination of foreign
policies. First; EC enlarged and increased its potential weight in international platforms.
The growth of the European regional and economic system unavoidably caused external
political consequences, justifying a common approach to deal with them. Furthermore, the
tendency of Americans to link economic and security issues and the trend in Third World
regions to create blocs through which they were either demanding political or economic
concessions compelled the Community to search for ways of developing a regional
common voice on those issues, or at least a coordination of their foreign policies.32Second;
smaller members of the EC relieved of the fears for French Domination with British
membership, and Third; new flexibility in German Foreign Policy by Ostpolitik pursued by
Willy Brandt.
 The Hague summit in 1969 set up a committee to prepare a report about political
cooperation under the chairmanship of Etienne Davignon. European Political Cooperation
process (EPC) was initiated along the lines of Davignon Report in 1970. The objectives
were being defined, in the Davignon Report, first to ensure greater mutual understanding
with respect to major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and
consulting regularly, and second to increase the solidarity between the member states by
working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action where
appears feasible and desirable.33 It was separate from EC, outside the formal structures and
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no firm commitment envisaged by the plan. Defense and security issues excluded to be
discussed in the alliance and was important for its evolutionary characteristics.
It was the declaration of “ Year of Europe” and “Atlantic Charter” by the Nixon
Administration by which EPC produced a cohesion and reaction from the European side
during this period. According to the Europeans, the security guarantee of the US would
require trade concessions. They were skeptic and security should not be conditional. EC
summit in Copenhagen (1973) published declaration on the US-Europe relations and it was
the first successful cohesion against the US policies. A second test took place in the Middle
East crisis of 1973. The views of Western Europe and the US were different due to their
different levels of dependence on Arab oil. EC, via EPC, pursued pro-Arab policies unlike
the US. It was the first political success of the EPC which produced a common reaction in
the Middle East. In this regard, Venice Declaration of 1980 recognizing the right of
Palestinian Homeland can be accepted as a success produced by EPC.
EPC can be accepted as the first attempt to coordinate  common policies among the
West Europeans. Although it is possible to argue that EPC constituted a background for
future initiatives in political field, a step on the way to CFSP, there are significant
differences between these two. First of all, EPC unlike to CFSP was not a formal structure
having binding commitments within the EC. Second, defense and security issues were not
the concerns of EPC and these were excluded since they were accepted as divisive in
nature under cold war constraints. Finally, flexibility of the EPC with no binding
commitments brought a degree of success by simplifying the governments’ cooperation
without creating problems in their internal circles.
The idea of a new political union for European integration including security and
defense together with the fiscal policies reappeared by the Tindemans Report of 1975.
Tindemans proposed a radical change in the nature of political cooperation. The political
commitment was to be replaced by a legal obligation. The report was discussed by the EC
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on a number of  occasions throughout 1976.34 It was rejected by Ireland and Holland, due
to their concerns about divisive nature of the security and defense in creating an intra-
organizational cohesion.
There was an apparent separation between political and economical issues in this
period. But EC-Arab dialogue, in a way, linked the policy and trade. EPC and the EC
worked together during the oil-crisis in 1973. EPC reports were sent to EC parliament and
the EC members of the parliament were allowed to question foreign ministers. It was the
EPC initiative which promoted the common policies and contributed to form a European
Bloc in international platforms like the United Nations, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 35
1.2.4 The Genscher-Colombo Plan :
Another initiative with a slight change in cold war premises like potential deals in
arms control and after new divergences between the US and Europe about the area of
NATO responsibility was the Genscher-Colombo Plan. The requirement for a separate
European Foreign Policy to calm down the rising voices in public against the deployment
of intermediate range nuclear missiles gave way to initiatives to strengthen EPC. In 1981,
the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher,  and Italian Foreign Minister,
Emilio Colombo suggested similar proposals to increase the political weight of EC and a
common security approach to be achieved by linking the issue of European Security to the
EPC process. Security was for the first time mentioned as a legitimate concern of EPC by
the London report on October 1981. It was formulated by the Draft European Act which
called for the coordination of security policy, a common foreign policy  and the bringing of
EC and the EPC processes under the European Council, as well as attributing greater
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powers to the European Parliament. It would formalize the EPC and broaden the political
cooperation including security.
However, the European Act could not achieve the expected and it was watered down.
The neutrality of Ireland, desires for flexible foreign policies, Greece in this respect, and
overambitious appearance of the plan were the reasons behind its failure. The final
outcome, Solemn Declaration on European Union was the statement of status-quo, in 1983.
However, it placed EC and the EPC under the aegis of the European Council.36Political
will to introduce incorporation of security into the EC was insufficient due to the
reluctance to change the status-quo and the risk of undermining NATO. Additionally,
foreign policy commitments could pose serious risks for some members like Greece in
their requirements for flexible policies. Until Maastricht 1991, a real CFSP never
materialized since both external factors and different national stakes limited the progress.
1.2.5 Reactivation of the WEU  :
The lack of a Western European Coordination in issues relating security, to make its
voice heard on arms control negotiations, forced major powers to search for new
initiatives. The establishment of Special Consultative Group (SCG) in NATO, to provide
necessary consultation before arms control talks, and the Franco-German coordination did
not satisfy the European Allies when the Reagan Administration abruptly rejected “Walk
in Woods “Proposal in 1982.37 Although the WEU had successes like the integration of
Germany into Atlantic alliance, restoring confidence among Western European Countries
by assuring responsibilities for arms control, establishing a forum for consultations
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between the European Community’s founding members and the UK, it was in passivity
between the periods 1973 and 1984.38
Resurrection of the Western European Union came with the adoption of the Rome
Declaration, at a WEU ministerial meeting in 1984. The Rome Declaration aimed to
strengthen military relations and harmonize the views on defense issues, arms control,
East-West relations and armaments cooperation. The WEU possessed several advantages
to enhance any claim that it could be the basis for an European Defense Entity (EDE). It
had a council, which meets at ministerial level, and its own international staff. Its treaty
gave it a mandate to discuss the whole range of defense issues. It also had a parliamentary
dimension through its assembly which is made up of nationally nominated MPs.39
1.2.6 WEU and IEPG contribution to the idea of CESDP:
Inspection of the WEU activities in 1980s illustrate that the idea of creating a
separate or more autonomous European Military intervention capability is an accumulation
of the lessons different experiences and evolved by the time. Not only the US desire to
increase the European share in security burden but the combined effects of different factors
brought the process of integration in security and defense field. WEU proved to be
insufficient to meet the requirements of EU to increase its weight in international arena.
 SDI was the first case for the WEU to prove itself in coordinating a common stance.
The US Administration, by the initiative, intended to create a space based    defense shelter
against ballistic missiles. This would mean the violation of 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM) for the Soviets and strongly resisted to the broad interpretation by the
Americans. There were several implications of the initiative for the European Strategic
Planners. First of all, if the ABM treaty was leaked, both the US and the Soviet homelands
would be secure against nuclear attacks by undermining the US incentives to retaliate in
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case the Europe was targeted. Second, it would require a change in the NATO strategy of
“Flexible Response” which was based on deterrence through the threat of retaliation with a
new strategy based on deterrence through defense. Third, British and French independent
nuclear forces would lose their deterrent value. Fourth, technologically Europeans would
be the subcontractors of the project.40
The WEU could not produce a coordinated response on the issue and was criticized
for its inability. On the other side, SDI initiative produced positive outcomes too. It helped
to the French initiative for the establishment of European Research Coordination Agency
(EUREKA) as a side effect. This civilian – oriented, high technology Research and
Development (R&D) program attracted interest although most of the West European
governments signed bilateral agreements with the US about the participation to the SDI
project under the condition of respecting the ABM treaty.
 The beginning of a new era in Soviet Union by Gorbachev and radical change in its
position at the INF negotiations in Reykjavik brought another opportunity for the WEU as
a platform to increase the role of Western Europe in the alliance. In 1986, superpowers
agreed to eliminate all land-based INF missiles targeted on Europe, British and French
nuclear forces were isolated from the bargaining deals. Gorbachev recognized the
distinction between permitted research and prohibited testing of the ABM treaty, thus
paving the way for an arms control deal.41 However, the agreement created serious
concerns for the Europeans. First of all,  the withdrawal of the INF missiles would leave
Europe exposed to Soviet short range nuclear missiles and would result in decoupling of
Western European Defense from the US; Second, Europeans would have to make drastic
improvements in conventional forces by the 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear
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systems. But the fears of conventional inequality prepared the ground for CFE treaty as a
psychological side effect.
“Western European Charter of Security Principles” proposed by Jacques Chirac
emphasized on “nuclear deterrence” and dangers of opting for space based defense at the
WEU assembly session in December 1986. The need for an independent European
Security Policy was the point that should be considered seriously. By this case, the WEU
proved to be a suitable forum and these developments between East-West relations were
critical to change the traditional approaches in defense related issues.
 Another catalyst which contributed to the revival process of the WEU was out-of-
area debates in NATO. The fall of Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 had caused divergent approaches in NATO about the formalization of out-of-area
operations. The US disappointment about the European support of the boycott and
embargo against the Soviet invasion  brought new proposals from the Carter
Administration. The establishment of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) which
would increase the reliability of alliance support in times of crisis was the most important
one. There would be a list of contributions for the Europeans ranging from automatic
access to overflight rights and granting the US local bases to peacetime military presence
in out-of-area regions.
Major powers in Western Europe, did not perceive the issue in the same way. For
Britain, informal bilateral cooperation would fit its stakes rather than instutionalising out-
of-area regions. In Falklands, for example, Britain could benefit from the flexible policies
without constrained by commitments. Also both Britain and France followed discreet
policies in the Middle East and in their perceptions, it was not the globalization of East-
West rivalry which required the legalization of out-of-area operations, as the US perceived.
Germany, on the other side, had constitutional constraints for its participation of these
operations. But it was the deteriorating situation in the Gulf, which forced Europeans to
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handle the issue immediately without risking it turning out to be an issue of East-West
conflict. The solution was found on WEU, which had no geographical limitations for its
operations. In 1987, the WEU member states assigned military vessels in the Gulf for
minesweeping tasks except Luxembourg and West Germany under the WEU flag which
boosted the importance of the organization as a security forum.
The imminent realization of an arms control deal in Reykjavik  by the superpowers
and out-of area issue accelerated the revitalization of the WEU which was largely based on
Chirac’s Western European Charter of Security Principles in 1986. In October 1987, a
WEU conceptual document was issued in the Hague reaffirming the European
commitment to do things together in security and defense fields and laid the first stone of
what later known as the “European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).42The
terminology of the platform stated the revitalization of the WEU was an important
contribution to the broader process of European Unification.
Not only the WEU as a European organization gained importance by the changes in
arms control field but the IEPG had also increased its importance in 1980’s. The IEPG was
established in 1976 in order to encourage cooperation in arms planning and procurement
between the European NATO allies (including France), and to promote transatlantic
armaments cooperation. Yet owing to the mounting costs of arms procurement and the
growing technological competition between the US and Western Europe, and Japan, it only
began to develop a more comprehensive range of activities after 1984.43 The US reduction
of reliance on nuclear weapons and the requirement to increase efficiency of the
conventional weapons gave incentives for further technological cooperation in the military
field. The Emerging Technology (ET) weapons, including the latest developments in
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microelectronics required high costs, and the IEPG prepared a list of approximately 200
ET weapon systems, some of which were to be developed as joint ventures in 1984.44
Cooperation in this field was the result of a desire to decrease the dependence on the
US and the introduction of a new cost effectiveness in the British Defense budget. The
Hague special meeting of IEPG, at ministerial level for the first time, in 1984 introduced
European Defense Improvement Study (EDIS) which was commissioned to harmonize
military requirements and establish cooperation in the field of research. The report of the
commission “Towards a stronger Europe” was presented in 1987 and called for a reduction
in bureaucracy to leave more for the industry and particularly the pursuit of a transnational
open competitive market in defense. The report sought to fill in the deliberate gap in the
Rome Treaty which exempts armaments collaboration from EEC rules. In this sense, the
report sought to make use of the EEC mechanism to promote greater collaboration in
European Defense planning and production.45 In November 1988, the IEPG defense
ministers adopted a plan of action for the stepwise  creation of a European Arms Market. It
aimed to increase the efficiency of the European Armaments industry through cross border
competition and intensification of technological competition, and to achieve savings in
procurement costs.46
 It is clear that IEPG contributed in a positive way to the process of development of a
European Defense Industry by increasing the prospects of cooperation. An additional
factor, which increased the activities of the IEPG was the expectations about the successes
of single European Market and European Monetary Union. Because neofunctional theories
envisages that intensified and deepened economic cooperation would inevitably spill over
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to the field of armaments cooperation, and the single market promised the provision of a
favorable environment in which defense cooperation could thrive.47
The 1980’s marked an era, for the Europeans, which produced opportunities to
increase the collaboration and institute revitalization to produce a coordinated European
voice in foreign and security affairs. The most significant feature, however, was the
attachment of a longer term goal in security initiatives about contributing to the European
Unification process. But the external factors, rather than intrinsic development of the
cooperation, affected the direction of the progress.
1.3 Changing Roles by the end of Cold War :
In late 1980’s, the basic premises of cold war and security systems in both East and
West which was based on stable defense formations began to change. There were
incredible policy changes in the Soviet side, consequently affecting the central and Eastern
European States. There were three issues that should be considered urgently by the
Western European states to preserve stability and to fill the power gap appeared in the
central and eastern parts of the continent. First was the potential instability in newly
independent states, and their transformation to democratic structures. Second, the
reunification of two Germanys and the third was the redefinition of the European Security
architecture. 1990 and 1991 were the years in which most of the post cold war shape of the
security structures appeared.
Not only the foundations of the European Union, new strategic concept of NATO
and reorganization of military structures took place but also some traditional
understandings like the inviolability of the national borders began to erode and new
approaches in inter institutional relations like “interlocking institutions” came into fora.
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The gradual evolution of a “security community” 48 began in Europe. There were three
different views, each of which supported a different institution as the main platform of
European security. These were; NATO, favored by the Atlanticist views, EC, by the
Europeanists, and the CSCE, as the favorite organization for the pan Europeanist views.
German reunification became the major issue in the beginning of post cold war years.
1.3.1 German Reunification  and Integration Efforts :
German reunification awakened the fears of France and Britain about its isolation
from the West. Throughout cold war, for France, relations with Germany were based on
mainly Germany’s subordination to France within Europe. A stronger and more
independent Germany implied one which would be increasingly reluctant to follow French
leadership.49 Additionally, the potential power status of Germany in the Eastern Europe
constituted deep concerns in France. On the other side, Britain was suspicious about its
role in Europe and the US support over German Reunification. Britain tried to keep the
roles in NATO, and France wanted to keep the status-quo by firmly embedding Germany
into EC structures. The inevitability of the unification speed up the French efforts in EC
platforms for integration. In Germany, however, there were different domestic
considerations about NATO membership. Germany had no intention of leaving the West
Europe aside but relinquishing the membership was one of the alternatives supported by
social democrats and instead of NATO, they favored a European Defense system.50
Germany showed its commitment to integration process to legalize its relations with
Eastern neighbors.
Franco-German cooperation in defense and security related issues which dates back
to 1963 Elysée Treaty, gained a new impetus. The creation of Franco-German Brigade
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stationed in West Germany in 1987 would constitute a base for future European initiatives
for a separate European Army.51
1.3.2 Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP):
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on political, economic and monetary union
convened in Rome in December 1990, searching for the institution which would be the
main forum for European security and defense. France, favored the EC, with the WEU as
its defense and security arm, Britain favored closer ties with Europe but maintaining
NATO, with the WEU serving as its European pillar, Germany favored maintaining NATO
and a US presence in Europe, strengthening the EC by giving a defense and security
dimension, with the ultimate goal of leading a pan European Security structure based on
the CSCE. The IGC on political union achieved to incorporate Common Foreign and
Security policy (CFSP). These were the main lines  which reflected the national priorities.
The motives behind the integration efforts, different from the previous initiatives,
were not the external threats like the Soviet military presence or the fears of the US
withdrawal but to respond the challenges produced by the changes in the eastern bloc. The
threatened stability in Europe was the main challenge which should be taken into
consideration with a decrease in defense spending and without causing troubles on the
Soviet side. Uncertainty over the future shape of the international environment prevented
the dismantling of security institutions but required amendments in their contexts. The
roles and tasks that should be allocated to these institutions were at the core of the post
cold war arguments.
1.3.3 The WEU as a Bridge Between NATO and the Union  :
The assessment of the WEU’s role,  should be linked with other institutions. The
prominence of the CSCE, in a relatively unrestricted environment, depended on its status
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between east and west. It reflected a pan European structure and dealt with primarily issues
such as human rights, economic and environmental cooperation rather than sensitive issues
like security guarantees or defense cooperation. It was a forum to carry out roles like
increasing transparency, confidence building, crisis prevention. “The CSCE’s Charter of
Paris for a new Europe” declared at the NATO summit in July 1990, to provide wider
political dialogue in a more united Europe, Established a secretariat in Prague and a
conflict prevention center in Vienna. (It turned out to be an organization and called
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE) Assistance for new
democracies in their elections was the initial task. Although the CSCE was a common
platform for all, difficulty in decision making limited its scope. NATO, at the same time,
with the “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance” in July 1990,
initiated a comprehensive review process. The new strategy of the alliance was on the way,
Strategy Review Group (SRG) and a military committee worked on it.
 The allocation of the specific tasks created divisions about the future prospects of
the WEU. What will be the role ? How would it be linked to the EC and to the alliance?
1991 Gulf Crisis demonstrated a lack of an exclusively European ability to respond such
crises effectively. There were two broad viewpoints on the issue; Some countries within
the EC, namely Italy, France and Spain emphasized on the need for European Foreign and
Security policy and supported the idea of a WEU-EC merger. Some others, Britain,
Netherlands and Germany were cautious over giving EC too much of a military identity for
not to undermine NATO. Italians proposed that the WEU could be put under the aegis and
authority of the European Council and article 5 of the Brussels treaty could be transferred
to the new treaty on political Union. A Franco – German proposal suggested an organic
link between the WEU and the EC, the directives and guidelines given by the European
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Council.52 The reservations of states like Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal were based
on the possibility of alienating the US. Similarly the US had suspicions on the proposal.
In June 1991, at the Copenhagen NATO summit, guidelines for the reconstruction
process appeared. This was the first acknowledgement of a European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) which must be developed within the alliance. The WEU would serve as a
European pillar of the alliance and established an inter institutional dialogue between EC,
NATO and the WEU. NATO’s core functions were determined as the provision of
stability, maintenance of transatlantic link, provision of collective defense between its
members, and preservation of the strategic balance in Europe.53 Partnership with the
countries of central and eastern Europe, Transparency and complementarity between the
organizations were the other issues emphasized on.
Disagreements about the role of the WEU continued with Anglo-Italian and Franco –
German proposals. Anglo- Italian paper which envisaged a bridge role for the WEU, in
forming the defense arm of the EC and the European pillar of the alliance, the creation of a
European Reaction force under the auspices of the WEU, to be used solely for out-of-area
operations demonstrated different national perspectives when Franco-German proposal
came into sight only a week later. Franco-German proposal suggested the creation of a
European Army around the existing Franco-German Brigade, exerting the French
leadership. This proposal, however, did not distinguish between the area and out-of-area
roles for the WEU which possibly would result in an overlap with NATO roles.
The Rome summit of NATO in November 1991 emphasized the need for
collaboration of the organizations to address the challenges facing Europe and a new
terminology “interlocking institutions” marked the complementary relationship between
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the EC, the WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe. The role of the WEU was
acknowledged as developing the defense arm of the European Union and as a means of
strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This was closer to the Anglo-
Italian views.
1.3.4 Maastricht 1991  :
The Maastricht Treaty on Political Union in December 1991 was flexible to
incorporate different perspectives. Maastricht marked a crucial shift in Western Defense,
from the US leadership within an integrated alliance towards an integrated Western
European pillar within the alliance. The European Union was empowered to request the
WEU, to elaborate and implement decisions  and actions of the Union which have defense
implications.( Article J-4,2) The WEU would be an integral part of the development of
European Union but the Common Security and Defense Policy had to be compatible with
the alliance.54 The future EU-WEU merger could be reconsidered by the evolution of a
common defense policy but avoided determining a precise time.55 Although there were
vague statements about the relationship between the WEU and the political union, the
autonomous position of the WEU was preserved between the political Union and the
alliance. All the EC members were invited to be members of the WEU to simplify the
inclination towards EU and this caused criticism from the non-EC  NATO members for
their marginalization in the security structures.
Despite the apparent determination to adopt a united front the French and Germans
did not succeed at Maastricht in getting the EPC brought into the EC framework, with or
without a security and defense dimension. Instead a three pillar structure was adopted with
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs forming
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intergovernmental pillars of the new EU alongside the EC pillar. Majority-voting in the
second pillar was restricted to carry through decisions of principle that voting would have
to be taken by consensus, and even then the majority –voting would only apply if all states
agreed to accept it in a particular task.56All the wording related to these issues were
carefully selected and demonstrated the sensitivity of the problem. It was the necessity for
the consensus which prevented the establishment of certain goals and definitions in this
period. Contentious issues relating European Security Identity were postponed until the
evolution of a common ground. The real cases like the conflicts in Yugoslavia would test
the emerging security architecture to give evidences for feed-back.
About the operational role, although the WEU appeared with no area limitations,
NATO broke its limits with direct participation in out-of-area roles such as operation Sharp
Guard and Deny Flight. The lack of real European capabilities to cope with the situation
was the dynamic which pushed the NATO intervention via the US press and the lessons
consolidated the desires for a separate European defense identity.
1.4  Conclusion   :
Although the basic assumptions of cold war collapsed with the collapse of Berlin
Wall in 1989 and new problems arose like the changes in geographical context and
changes in the traditional roles of security institutions, some of the problems transferred
from the cold war years. NATO, as the main security platform of the European security
throughout cold war, was designed to cope with specified enemy and provided collective
defense for its members.  It prevented the formation of an effective European Security
organization, by securing the continent with its nuclear shelter. Two paradoxes of the cold
war were important to obstruct the integration of security into the EC structures. On the
European side, a desire to reduce dependence on the US for its security contradicted with
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the desire not to cause the US withdrawal from the continent. As in all military alliances,
the benefits of shared resources and increased protection are offset by the costs associated
with dependence  and reduced freedom of action. The essence of the dilemma is that the
two types of costs themselves conflict. Each ally oscillates between the fear of
abandonment by its partners in a crisis- the cost of dependence- and the fear of being
entrapped or dragged into a conflict not of its own choosing- the cost of reduced  freedom
of action57. On the US side, the desire for equal distribution of defense burdens
contradicted with the desire to secure its dominance in the alliance and to keep its place in
European arms market.  As the cold war came to a close, a new definition of security and
new terms for intervention created additional problems.
In this regard, main problems remained unsolved from the cold war period can be
listed as; first, the US position with its military presence in Europe remained as a factor
which deeply affects the choices of decision makers in Europe. Second, the gap between
the political will and European power projection capabilities remain as an issue which
should be deemed seriously to prevent criticism about burden-sharing. Third, the
organization of military formations which were designed according to relatively stable
defense requirements needs to be reorganized to respond the new challenges with two strict
limitations, decreasing defense budgets and avoiding duplication of the scarce resources.
Fourth, inter institutional relations between NATO and the EU still suffer from the
hesitations which can be detected in most of past initiatives like a potential weakening in
transatlantic bonds and could not be clearly defined. Finally, hesitations of smaller
members about their national sovereignty, the major powers’ struggle for leadership with
the rise of German power after unification and the effect of the public opinions increased
the risk of potential flaws in new initiatives about the subject.
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On the other hand, cold war efforts to realize an independent European voice in
security issues produced not only problems for post cold war period, there were also
positive outcomes which simplified cooperation and contributed to the integration process.
When the internal dynamics began to push the Europeans for the inclusion of foreign
policy and security in the EC structures the established framework of the WEU and
existing military units of  Franco- German brigade were ready to form an infrastructure to
build on. They offered a framework for intensifying cooperation, balancing different
interests, and for binding national egoism.58 Additionally, standardized procedures of
cooperation in NATO throughout cold war contributed to cooperation and simplified
decision making with common understandings of the issues. It is possible to detect the
caution of previous failures in new initiatives.
With the passing of bipolarity, the world was likely to become an even more
turbulent place; that eurocentric themes of balances of power needed to be applied to
specific regions where Western interests might be vulnerable to challenge and that this
would not be achieved unless there is demonstrable military power, and the will to use it in
support of economic  and political interests. The demands for a security policy of the
Western Europeans had become much more pressing. From the security angle, it made
sense for the Western Europe to entertain joint efforts toward improving the security of
Europe in and outside the NATO area. Also, in a process toward a European Union,
needed a stronger dimension as well.59  Maastricht became the turning point, in this respect
and chapter 2 will deal with the progress in security field of European integration after this
turning point.
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Chapter 2: European Security Structures After the Cold War.
Although some divisions of the cold war transferred, the European Security
environment changed dramatically after the cold war. German reunification took place,
new states emerged and the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved. In the early 1990s, the
Western Institutions that had been shaped by the cold war faced the challenge of adapting
to a totally new environment. A new security architecture capable of embracing the whole
continent and based on transparency and cooperation had to be devised. France and
Germany advocated deepening European Integration and developing a common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) in the European Communities. The 1990 London NATO
summit welcomed these developments and supported the enhanced role of Europeans
within the Atlantic Alliance. In 1991, NATO summit in Rome adapted the Alliance’s new
role  and Maastricht Treaty formed the basis for WEU-EU relations in the period 1991-
1997. The treaty established a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which was to
“include all questions related to the security of European Union, including the eventual
framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”.
Article J.4.2 provided for the EU to be able to request WEU “ to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”.60 It was significant
because for the first time Europe achieved a means to implement its decisions in security
field.
By the “Petersberg Declaration” on June 1992, the WEU defined its operational role.
“Petersberg Tasks” (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peace making) and designation of forces
answerable to WEU (FAWEU) were the first steps to improve European capabilities to
respond new requirements of post cold war environment. Parallel steps have been taken in
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NATO to support the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
and to make alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU operations in 1994 and
1996. Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, creation of new mechanisms to include
newly emerged states in European Security system were the key initiatives in NATO.
By the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and St. Malo Declaration in 1998, the distances
between WEU, NATO and the EU have changed. WEU was drawn closer to the EU.
WEU’s role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability was confirmed,
the Petersburg tasks were incorporated into the EU treaty and the possibility of the
integration  of the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide, was
mentioned.61 Developments after 1998, basically intended to improve material military
capabilities of EU for an operation with or without NATO, but mainly by using the
organization’s assets.
This chapter will deal with the transition in European Security, comparing cold war
understandings with the contemporary ones, key security challenges and key issues which
constituted the ground for the new European order. In this respect, new security risks and
arms control agreements which changed the traditional understandings of security will be
discussed in the beginning of  the chapter. Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)
has a special weight since it removed the threat of a surprise conventional attack in the
eyes of West European decision makers.
In this new order, the durability of changes was uncertain and NATO appeared
inadequate to deal with all of the necessary functions associated with European security.
The activities and functions of NATO, WEU, OSCE, and the UN needed to be orchestrated
so as to make use of the specific abilities and qualifications of each institutions.62
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In the second part of this chapter, basic initiatives which created the “European
Pillar” in NATO or European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and its expansion as
the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) within EU will be
examined. The interesting point in these initiatives is, although they appeared as an integral
part of  integration process, in my point of view, they were responses to external
challenges. As an instance, a survey between top decision makers which includes elected
politicians, senior national servants, business, labor and media leaders in 1996, shows that
respondents were particularly concerned about the Union’s inability to act effectively in
Bosnia, and the need to participate in the reconstruction of ex-Yugoslavia. Most of the top
decision makers viewed defense and security as a major concern in this respect.63 The
common point between cold war and post cold war initiatives is the responsive nature
rather than being for a final goal of the “United States of Europe”.
The flexible nature of the post cold war organizations and arrangements to respond
the rapidly changing environment without rigid commitments constitutes the major
difference with cold war initiatives. In this regard, advantages and disadvantages of
flexible structures should be considered carefully.
One prominent change of this period was in understanding the notion “collective
security”. Collective security is an effort by states to manage security challenges by
organizing power on the basis of all against one crisis management. The goal is to create
an international environment in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than
competition. Violators of norms and principles will be punished through collective action.
In post cold war arrangements, conflict prevention rather than crisis management received
the priority. Inclusiveness in these arrangements enhanced the security of new states by
providing greater opportunity to learn about each other and their intentions. Also
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institutions, by adapting membership rules from restricted to conditionally open, affected
the behavior of states seeking to join these organizations, and became an important tool of
community building and environment shaping.64
A security community was intended by these arrangements in the structures of
European Security system. A Security Community, as defined by Karl Deutsch, is a region
in which there is virtually no prospect for war among group of states. Deutsch argued that
NATO might contribute to the evolution of a security community by developing its
economic and social potential to make it more than a military alliance.65 In the past decade,
the WEU, OSCE, and EU increased their roles to share the responsibilities of NATO.
2.1 The outlook of European Security in early 1990s:
With the removal of the threat of a large scale military attack which was supported
by an overstocked nuclear arsenal on Europe, NATO lost one of the most important
reasons of its existence. However, unpredictability in the process of shaping the central and
eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union and the proved benefits of the
US military presence prevented the dissolution of the alliance although it had experienced
considerable debates on the issue. The need to extend the institutional architecture of
European Security to encompass the newly democratic states of Central and eastern Europe
has been made urgent by the impact of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991 and the
developments in the Gulf illustrated the inadequacy of cold war mechanisms under new
circumstances. Intra state conflicts, indirectly affecting borders of another state required
institutional approaches beyond the threat or use of the military force. First of all, it is very
difficult to control these conflicts since there are many ethnic and religious divisions on the
continent which are experiencing postponed nationalistic feelings in a difficult social and
economic transition period. Second, any of the West European Powers had intentions to
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take risky  military undertakings or to carry heavy burdens of  a difficult military operation
within these problematic regions. Third, except the US, Europe does not have the
capabilities for such a prolonged operation.
On the other side, imminent requirements appeared to contain these conflicts in
Central and Eastern Europe forced West Europeans to create new approaches. Economic
aid or promoting democratization in  newly emerged states, establishing consultation
mechanisms and arrangements to include them in security structures were some of the
tools used in the last decade.
The difficulty in post cold war problems lies in a combination of geography, culture,
political difficulties, economic and military issues.66 Europe in this period, needed to make
use of all available instruments, not only military, but also political, economic and cultural.
For this purpose, innovative and creative use of institutions was indispensable.67
Consequently, within the EC, the move from the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to
the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1993 was a reflection of the changed
international circumstances, and the need to extend stability eastward.
2.2 New Risks and Challenges to Security :
a. Nationalism, ethnic strife and integration : New strategic understandings,
aspiration and the institutional capacity of the new European Security architecture have
been exposed to a broad spectrum of challenges since 1990. First and foremost, the
collapse of communism released nationalist and ethnic politics in the east. The scale of
fragmentation and severity of nationalist conflict varied. On the other side, in the west,
integration and institutionalization have challenged the nation state as the referent for
security. Both governments and societal elite have sought to mobilize support for the
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protection of their autonomy. At the same time, questions concerning the political rights of
national minorities and regions in Western Europe assumed new prominence in the ‘space’
by Europeanization. The dual process of integration and fragmentation in Europe leads to a
reconceptualization of security as the relationship of state and society is redefined.68 The
imbalance between east and west constitutes the real problem in coordinating the relations
between society and state, and the definition of European identity.
The challenge of ethnic politics and its potential consequences to the European
Security architecture contradict with the potential consequences of integration. The EU and
OSCE advocate protection of minority rights to enhance stability. On the one hand,
security of the state facing instability from within, and on the other is the security of the
ethnic group or minority for whom the state may be the source of threat. States who have
ethnic problems tend to increase the authority of the state. Interventions in ethnic conflicts
are difficult, as rival patterns of authority to the state challenge the role of international
community and invite enforcement in the absence of consent. In Western Europe, however,
the process of integration challenges the traditional security functions of the state. In
economic terms, the development of the single market and monetary union erode the
authority and control of state structures in EU member states. The development of CFSP
also embodies a direct challenge to the external security role of the state.69
Nationalism emerged as a security concern for Western Europe due to a variety of
reasons. There was concern that the end of cold war would lead to a renationalization of
West European states as the conformity forced by the bipolar system evaporated. The
reunified Germany, heterogeneous populations and disputed borders in the Central and
Eastern European states, potential reemergence of Russian imperialism were the main
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reasons for the expectation. The result of such ethno-religious nationalism has been wide
scale minority problems associated with self determination movements.70
b. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Terrorism : For
Europe, proliferation threats revolve around three main areas; the control and maintenance
of the nuclear stockpile and infrastructure of the former Soviet Union; the development of
indigenous means of production of WMD by rogue or pariah states; the sale of WMD
delivery systems capable of hitting Western Europe (such as ballistic Missiles).
Despite some progress in the dismantling of existing nuclear stockpile and the
collection of warheads from other former Soviet Republics, the Russian Federation retains
the World’s second largest nuclear arsenal. The deteriorating morale and low pay of the
state’s strategic rocket forces and loss of employment and prestige for the estimated 3000-
7000 scientists and engineers raises serious questions about the Kremlin’s ability to
adequately control its inventory.71
The possible transfer of nuclear technology and secrets is especially troubling since
several states in North Africa and in the Middle East have ongoing programs to develop
WMD. Pakistan, North Korea, India and Israel had already acquired nuclear capabilities
and some others like Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Algeria creates suspicions for their
potential in nuclear and/or Chemical Weapons (CW). Proliferation  concerns are
exacerbated by the transfer or sale of delivery systems. Algeria and Iran possesses ‘Kilo’
class submarines. In addition, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria have FROG-7 missiles, and
Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Libya have SCUD B/C missiles. Several North African states ,
including Algeria and Libya may have missiles or air delivery systems capable of targeting
all of the major Southern European Cities. The continued proliferation of WMD and their
delivery systems, especially in states with known ties to terrorist organizations, has created
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an impetus for collaborative defense planning and intelligence exchanges to counter such
risks.72
Proliferation is a threat that is hard to control, especially in a world moving towards
multipolarity. With widespread availability of technology and expertise, any state
determined to achieve nuclear status is likely to be able to do so. Criminal and terrorist
groups are also trying to acquire these weapons. In some cases, Chemical and biological
agents were used by these groups. 73
c. Unregulated Migration and human rights : In Western Europe, national security
has come to be defined less by concerns over the sanctity of borders and more by issues
surrounding the personal safety and well-being of individual citizens. With the end of cold
war, human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European Security as the
ethnic conflicts caused larger number of refugees. Unregulated migration is the fastest
growing business in organized crime. The scale of international migration, especially
economic migrants from the global south to the north, has dramatically increased. This
process of migration from conflict zones to the rest of the world is likely to increase. The
UN currently estimates the number of displaced persons and refugees at over 50 millions,
one out of every 120 person on earth has been forced to flee their home.74
d. Other threats : Drug production and trafficking is a major source of revenue for
terrorist and organized criminal networks. Many terrorist and guerilla groups, from the
Middle East to Asia, control territories where narcotics are cultivated or refined. Computer
crimes like insertion of viruses, hacking or disrupting computer systems may also create
considerable damages on computer controlled systems like transportation or weapon
systems. Environmental threats like the pollution, dumping of nuclear waste threatens not
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only quality of life,  but also global upheaval. Similarly, the rapid population growth in
developing or underdeveloped countries contributes to poverty, famine, disease and
terrorism.
Dealing with these problems, supranational and intergovernmental bodies such as
EU, NATO, UN, and WEU required to play significant roles together with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and national governments.
2.3 Arms Control and New Europe :
The importance of arms control deals in Europe was about their influence on the
process of change and the way they affected the perceptions of decisionmakers. They
contributed to a suitable environment for the Europeans to increase cooperation between
themselves.
2.3.1 Nuclear dimension :
Although the end of cold war did not mean the end of all weapons, there were
significant improvements in both nuclear and conventional fields to change the threat
perceptions. The destruction of all intermediate nuclear range nuclear missiles in Europe
with the INF has to be regarded as a success by any standard. It removed all the ground-
launched nuclear missiles with a range between 500-5500 km.75 The verification measures
and psychological effects of the treaty gave a valuable boost to East- West negotiations on
other questions. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Short Range Nuclear
Forces  (SNF) negotiations consequently contributed to the elimination of old strategies in
both East and West. At least, reduction of strategic weapons and acceptance of on-site-
inspections increased the transparency between the parties. However, due to the
frightening destructiveness of “nukes”, and continuing presence of them capable enough to
demolish Europe, the relative importance of these agreements was lesser. As the nuclear
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weapons remains the symbol of ultimate superiority, it will continue to be considered by
the others while making their policies. This was the impetus which forced Western Powers
to create special mechanisms in dealing with Russian concerns over security. It is possible
to detect, Russian tendency to use its nuclear potential as a leverage to keep its influence in
the system.76 Unlike the familiar multipolar world, each center in the emerging acentric
world is characterized by possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. Such a deterrent
obviates the need for alliances and rests on a strategy of nuclear deterrence. In June 1999,
after its helplessness in the face of NATO air war against Serbia, Moscow announced that
it was predicating any future defense on a “first use” policy, a readiness to use nuclear
weapons against any invading force or threatening its security.77
2.3.2 Conventional Dimension :
On the conventional side of the arms control agreements, Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty marked a real turning point. CFE treaty of 1990 intended to strip away the
Warsaw Pact’s large offensive potential and to leave a defensive strategy in its place. The
treaty required the Warsaw Pact Bloc to reduce by about 50 percent and the NATO bloc,
by about 10 percent thereby achieving equal force levels on both sides in the area called
Atlantic to the Urals area (ATTU zone).
1. The CFE treaty which limits five categories of weapons-tanks; artillery pieces;
armored vehicles; combat aircraft and attack helicopters- imposed four sets of legally
binding obligations on its parties. First, the parties to the treaty must provide detailed
information on their national armed forces; second, it imposes numerical ceilings on the
amount of military equipment its parties may possess (see fig.2.1); third, states must reduce
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a pre-determined amount of their TLE according to procedures set forth in the treaty; and
fourth, the treaty obliges its parties to receive on-site inspections of their military facilities
in the area of application by other parties to the treaty. CFE verification regime improved
and institutionalized transparency in European Military Affairs.78CFE inspections have
actually contributed to easening tensions during this period. The treaty proved particularly
valuable in assuring concerns about German Unification, and providing transparency on
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The treaty also played a role during
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, when Russia requested ‘Challenge inspections’ of NATO
air
Figure 2.1 National Ceilings in the adapted CFE.
SOURCE: http://www.osce.org
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2. The numerical limits and associated verification regime reduce the pressure for a
renewed arms race throughout the continent which helped to decrease defense spending in
Europe.
3. Conventional Deterrence is enhanced by expanding the ‘transparency’ states have
with each other’s military forces thus reducing the likelihood of an accidental conflict.
4. The strict inspection and verification regime insure compliance. This coupled
with information exchanges, ensures that all members have a great deal of predictability in
forecasting the military forces of their neighbors.
5. By requiring all sides to live up to stringent requirements to the treaty establishes
a clear momentum that may bear fruit in other areas.79
Although it is sweeping and complex, CFE should not be considered the solution to
European Security. It has serious flaws too. For example, the treaty places no restrictions
on small arms, the behavior of military officers or the production of new modern weapons
whose quality may overshadow the quantity. Russian restlessness on this point and non-
compliance with the treaty may result in a renewed arms race in Europe.80
2.4 From European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to Common European
Security and Defense policies(CESDP):
The Franco- German joint letter on April 1990 to the Irish Presidency of the EC,
calling on member states to engage in an intergovernmental conference on political union
which would progressively develop a common foreign and security policy, represented the
first official  declaration of a European intention to develop a relatively autonomous
foreign and security policy. On these days, the Key Largo meeting, between Miterrand and
Bush, revealed the Franco- German contradictions about the future of European Security.
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The US wanted to transform NATO from a military to a much more political
alliance, embracing collective security tasks and immediately restructuring NATO’s
military forces to reflect that new reality. France, wanted to maintain the alliance as a
strictly collective defense structure and to ensure that the politics of European
transformation should essentially be the responsibility of the EC in close cooperation with
Russia.81
The Gulf Crisis and War, in a year after Key Largo, decreased the French press for a
greater European role either in regional crisis and in continental collective security. Any
illusions which might have remained about France’s and Europe’s capacity to underwrite
the collective security of the continent were shattered in the Saudi Arabian deserts.82 The
Gulf experience also contributed to the rapprochement of France to NATO’s integrated
military structures by revealing the need to incorporate its military structures with NATO
for a coordinated operation.
The burden sharing debates between the US and Europe set the stage for the
development of ESDI by the Franco- German initiative at the Intergovernmental
Conference on political union during the early half of 1991. The Franco- German proposal
suggested the creation of a separate ESDI outside NATO and the realization of this through
the creation of an organic link between the EC and WEU. However, the idea received
lukewarm response from the US and the Britain.
To demonstrate the divergence in perspectives among key NATO members with
respect to fundamental questions of security, it is worth mentioning the views of the
French, the British and the Germans, who represent the Europeanists, Atlanticists and
Euro-Atlanticists respectively. For the French, the continued engagement of the US in the
European Security  through NATO provides an important hedge against the emergence of
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a unified Germany to dominate in Europe. But the French officials also hold the view that
European institutions must emerge to take the leading role in European security so as to
integrate Germany completely within Europe. Britain continued to view NATO and its tie
to the US as crucial to balance both the prospect of German dominance and the efforts of
the French to fashion an exclusively European security architecture. And Germany,
sensitive to the concerns of neighboring states, has followed a dual-track approach of its
own; maintaining the importance of NATO and the role of the US in European Security,
while expressing a visible commitment to steps taken for further integration.83 Alongside
with these different European perspective, the US and the Europe perceived outside threats
differently. For the Europe the main threat was coming from the regional ethnic conflicts,
but for the US; proliferation of WMD in especially “rogue states”, such as North Korea,
Iran and Iraq complicated the problems by bringing the US national missile defense
(NMD) into the fora.
2.4.1 The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI):
The answer to taking the responsibility for managing crises and achieving a strong,
comprehensive approach to security found in the development of an ESDI in NATO, EU
and the WEU. The concept of the ESDI developed as a result of several decisions taken in
London and Rome in early 1990s. It was framed in the context of Transatlantic link and
was portrayed as a complementary activity to CFSP with the overall objective of
strengthening the European pillar of NATO. Thus, the development of the ESDI within
NATO aimed at increasing the capabilities of the European Allies in contingency
operations, where the US may allow the use of NATO assets, but might not wish to lead
the operation.84
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The emergence of European Security and Defense Policy would lead to a net gain for
all. Practical measures are needed to ensure transparency between the process of giving the
EU defense dimension and strengthening the European pillar of  NATO so that they would
be mutually reinforcing.85 CFSP was more suited for conflict prevention, while the ESDI
would function better in conflict resolution.
2.4.2 Petersberg Declaration :
WEU ministers progressed in defining their operational responsibilities at Petersberg
in Germany in June 1992. The Petersberg  Declaration innovated in specifying the limited
tasks, apart from questions of mutual defense, for which military units of WEU members
could be deployed under WEU authority. These were for;
- Humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- Peacekeeping tasks,
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.
It established a policy planning cell and military units were assigned as “Forces
Answerable to WEU” (FAWEU)and including several multinational formations like the
EUROCORPS and several other specialized units.86 Petersburg declaration also affirmed
that it would support on a case-by-case basis, the effective implementation of conflict
prevention and crisis management measures, including peacekeeping activities of CSCE
and the UN Security Council.87 Three types of membership for the WEU- full members,
associate members and observer- and an associate status for the states of Central and
Eastern Europe were appeared at the end of meeting.
In 1992, the obsession with European integration came crashing to a halt with the
Danish and French Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, worsening Bosnian
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Crisis highlighted the inability of the EU to act without American Leadership. Meanwhile
since 1992 the German Government has made a major effort to ensure the development of
ESDI and CFSP was compatible with the Atlanticist emphasis on NATO. This effort at
compatibility resulted in “double hatting” arrangements whereby multinational and even
national forces could be assigned to both NATO or WEU units, depending on the mission.
If NATO was prevented from going out-of-area because of the Washington Treaty, the
same units could be deployed under the auspices of the WEU. This system would also
allow WEU access to NATO structures and capabilities.88 All these developments signaled
the emergence of a division of labor between the US and Europe on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
security issues.
2.4.3 The Combined Joint Task Force Concept (CJTF):
The CJTF was first introduced by Les Aspin during an informal meeting in
Travemunde in 1993. The concept was based on an understanding that NATO’s integrated
military structure remained primarily geared to article 5, but there should be sufficient
flexibility to undertake other operations.89 It would allow the use of NATO assets in out-
of- area operations without changing the Washington Treaty. The CJTF would also permit
these NATO resources for operations under the auspices of the WEU and with non-NATO
states, including Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. As such, the CJTF established the
relationship between the forces of NATO and the WEU as “separable but not separate”, it
allowed the WEU and PfP access to NATO resources, which alleviated the need for the
development of rival capabilities. A mechanism for the coalition of the willing, giving
those NATO states which do not want to be involved in specific out-of- area operation, the
ability to opt-out, formed the flexible nature of the concept. The CJTF contribute to ESDI
by endowing the WEU with assets and capabilities, but ensures American involvement
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through the NAC which approves each CJTF. This raised concerns over potential veto
power of the US. Further concerns were raised about the influence of the US, since
American Staff officers would have to be involved in CJTF exercises at various levels to
oversee the use of the US assets.90
2.4.4 Strengthening the WEU :
With the CJTF, it was widely recognized that the WEU needed to develop force
structures that went beyond the three existing bodies ( the EUROCORPS, the multinational
division, and the Anglo- Dutch amphibious Group) in order to allow the WEU effectively
control and staff future operations. At the Lisbon WEU Ministerial Meeting of May 1995,
ministers approved the creation of a situation center and intelligence section in the WEU’s
planning cell. More significantly, the WEU approved the creation of additional force
structures for the WEU. France, Italy, and Spain agreed to create ground (EUROFOR) and
naval reaction units (EUROMARFOR) in order to respond security concerns in the
Mediterranean.91 Soon afterwards, Portugal also agreed to participate in both forces. WEU
capabilities were further expanded by the creation of Franco – British Euro Air group
(FBEAG). FBEAG was created to enhance the capabilities of the two air forces to
undertake humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks. These gave the WEU
significant operational capabilities although they were far from being capable enough to
operate independently. The FAWEU included, with these additions, EUROCORPS,
EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, that Anglo- Dutch Amphibious Force, the multinational
division, the Danish Reaction Brigade, and the Belgian- Netherlands deployable air task
force. In Addition, in an effort to save the military industries and to establish autonomous
capabilities for the next generation of sophisticated weaponry, and thereby lessen reliance
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on American Products, the Western Armament Group (WEAG) was formed in 1992 as part
of the WEU.92
With the tendency to decrease the defense spending after cold war, the CJTF was
attractive to Europeans since by access to American assets, it reduced the need for the
WEU states to develop autonomous capabilities. The WEU also gained access to NATO’s
established Command, Control and Communications (C3) infrastructure and through the
‘duoble-hatting’ system, the CJTF allows forces to be answerable to both NATO and the
WEU. On the negative side, this maintained continued reliance on NATO resources and
the lack of an integrated military command gave the US, a veto right for WEU
operations.93
The development of the CJTF concept, as a result of dispute following the 1991
Franco- German proposal to establish a Eurocorps independent of NATO reflects the
constant struggle between the Europeanists and Atlanticists. The US insisted that
Eurocorps be integrated into NATO, while French and German resisted this effort. Thus,
the CJTF was the US proposal to allow a limited autonomy to some European Forces.94
The US advocated the CJTF, because in some situations American interests might not be
essential to low-intensity operations. By providing  simple, though US dependent, solution
to the operationalization of ESDI, CJTF can be seen both as a move to block European
Autonomy, and as a European recognition of the weakness of their military assets.95
In 1994, WEU ministers endorsed preliminary conclusions on a Common European
Defense Policy. Four levels of European Interest and responsibility were identified: (1) the
direct responsibility of the WEU governments for the security of their own people and
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territories; (2) the WEU responsibility to project security and stability throughout Europe;
(3) the WEU interest in fostering stability to promote security in the wider world through
peacekeeping and other crisis management measures; and (4) the WEU interest in fostering
stability in the Southern Mediterranean countries.96
2.4.5 The 1994 Brussels Meeting of NATO :
Although the Maastricht determined the scope of post cold war European Security
arrangements, relations between CFSP and NATO were not clear. In 1994, the Brussels
Ministerial meeting of NAC, constituted the initial step for ESDI which unleashed political
and military progress which eventually led to the CFSP. ESDI was initially conceived
largely as a technical military arrangements which would allow the Europeans to assume a
greater share of the burden for security missions through access to those NATO assets and
capabilities which European Member states did not possess.
“We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity [which]
will strengthen the European Pillar of the alliance while reinforcing the Transatlantic link” .... “ We therefore
stand ready to make collective assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North
Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common
Foreign and Security Policy”97
In Brussels, the idea of “separable but not separate”  capabilities was supported as to
avoid costly duplications of military capabilities within the WEU. However, there were
several reasons which brought two sides of the Atlantic closer in this process. First of all,
the US commitment to assist improving capabilities implies more defense spending by the
Europeans to decrease the burden of US. Second, by the mid 1990s both the UK and
France, in part as a result of their joint experiences on the ground in Bosnia, were arriving
at similar conclusions concerning the future security relations between the US and Europe.
Both were conscious of the marked and growing reluctance of Washington to continue
writing blank checks in favor of European Security. In France, for a variety of reasons, a
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politico-military consensus emerged in favor of moving closer to NATO. Among those
reasons were the requirements of interoperability, command and control procedures, and
the perceived need to share up the US commitment to Europe.98 From a military point of
view, ensuring operational compatibility to fight as a team, preventing competition for
resources which could result in a ‘zero-sum’ game, maintaining unity of command to
prevent ambiguous structures, and keeping the US forces in Europe were the reasons of
desire for a single operational structure in Europe, coordinating both the WEU and NATO
activities.99
In the Brussels meeting, NATO’s central role was further enhanced by the
announcement of Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was designed to forge new links
between the alliance and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE). The PfP had a
number of declared objectives including the facilitation of transparency in national defense
planning, ensuring democratic control of defense forces, the maintenance of capabilities to
contribute to UN or OSCE operations, the development of co-operative military relations
with NATO, and the development of forces that are better able to operate with those of
NATO.100 Plans for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) were also outlined.
The overall effect of the Brussels meeting was to place NATO at the center of European
Security and to offer a means of giving substance to CFSP. It established the conceptual
framework for ESDI.
2.4.6 Berlin 1996 and Madrid 1997:
It was the Berlin Meeting of NAC, which outlined the objectives of the ESDI more
coherently. Berlin Decisions clarified the use of NATO assets and combined WEU’s
Petersberg Decisions with concept of CJTF by enabling the WEU to undertake Petersberg
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type operations, an explicit linkage was made between the ESDI and CJTF.  Additionally,
it also enabled the NATO to launch joint operations with non-NATO members on an ad
hoc basis, within the context of CJTF and PfP. The establishment of IFOR in Bosnia was
the first CJTF operation in practice.101
NATO consolidated control over the use of its assets in Berlin:
“....The NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU led operations, keep
itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO military authorities and through
regular consultations with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review.”102
The important point in the evolutionary process of European Security System
appeared clearly in the terminology used in these initiatives. The flexibility of the terms
like “coalition of the willing”, “ on a case- by-case basis”, and “ separable but not separate
forces express the requirements of post cold war era. The CJTF, in this respect, was
intended to be one system capable of multiple functions. The variables were operations,
contributors, and contributions.
As NATO and clearly Washington became more supportive of ESDI, France moved
closer to the Alliance. In 1995, President Chirac endorsed French participation in those
Alliance Decision-Making bodies which “respected national sovereignty” (the Military
Committee and the Defense Planning Committee). French support for the ESDI was
balanced, however, by residual concern with the International Military Staff (IMS) and
political control of SACEUR. 103 One major problem was about a de facto veto power of
the US over WEU led operations, as a consequence of its status in NATO. Most of the
assets were in fact the US assets and command posts were occupied by American officers.
France sought genuine autonomy for WEU non-article 5 missions with access to NATO
assets.
                                                          
101 G. Aybet, pp.49, op.cit.
102 Declaration of the heads of the State and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,
Berlin, 3 June 1996, NATO Press Communiqué, M-NAC-1(96)63, para.7.
103 Fergus Carr, pp.68, op.cit.
60
The Madrid Declaration in 1997, although reiterated most of the provisions of Berlin,
a Deputy SACEUR was designated to have responsibility for ESDI related operations. The
DSACEUR would be dual-hatted under a WEU cover.104 However, it would not satisfy the
French. Also, the issue of which NATO assets and capabilities would be available was left
vague and NATO rather than the WEU would say the final words according to all these
arrangements.
2.4.7 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty of the EU:
Only one year after the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, at the Amsterdam
Council Meeting, the direction of the ESDI changed with the possibility of potential WEU-
EU merger. New British Prime Minister, Tony Blair vetoed the proposal, opposing to the
integration of the WEU into the EU structures and the consequent political subordination
of a common defense policy to the European Council. The WEU was the right vehicle for
European Defense cooperation since it was the only intergovernmental body in Europe
whose members share also commitments in NATO. A potential WEU-EU merger would
also create significant problems for EU’s neutral members and non-EU NATO members
such as Norway and Turkey.
Europe committed itself in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty to develop a CFSP, including
the eventual framing of a common policy, which might in time lead to common defense.
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty deepened this commitment, albeit unevenly, with new
political and bureaucratic structures designed to allow a more effective CFSP. It defined
the Union’s Common Defense Policy to include “humanitarian and rescue” tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including
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peacemaking. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU could avail itself of the WEU, a
defense club of 10 EU members which are also in NATO to carry out these tasks.105
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced majority voting for decisions concerning the
implementation of agreed policies, a procedure for “constructive” abstention so that a
country can dissociate itself from a decision rather than veto it; a central policy-planning
unit, to encourage EU foreign ministers to develop common analyses; and the post of ‘high
representative’ for foreign policy (generally known as Mr.CFSP) to act as a spokesman and
interlocutor for third parties.106 These changes brought some flexibility in the
implementation of decisions agreed unanimously. Such implementing decisions could be
taken on the basis of qualified majority voting, except when a state objects, citing
important reasons of national policy.107
Another new element in treaty of Amsterdam which had potential to improve
effectiveness of CFSP was the instrument of ‘common strategies’, designed to reduce the
unanimity requirements for decisions taken within CFSP. The ‘Common Strategies’ would
be decided at the level of European Council, which could not be easily ignored. It was also
a cross-pillar instrument binding on all EU institutions and, therefore had the potential to
produce more coherent and efficient policies.108
The significance of the Amsterdam Treaty comes from its provisions strengthening
CFSP. By the amended TEU, tendency to improve European operational capabilities to
have credibility in the conduct of crisis management  and Petersberg Tasks, increased.
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2.4.8 St. Malo: Turning point for CESDP:
With new developments in Balkans, in Albania and Kosovo generated new crises
which led the political leaders in Europe to refresh the relations with the US. The UK
began to change its traditional policy about European security structures. Blair abandoned
long-standing British policy of keeping EU out of defense for two reasons: One was the
sorry tale of the past years’ diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Kosovo. The incoherence
and irrelevance of the EU’s policies of Kosovo meant that Americans had every excuse to
manage the diplomacy themselves and the second reason was Blair’s ambition  for Britain
to become a more influential member of the EU. His decision for the time being-stay out of
the Euro makes it impossible for Britain to be a leader on a par with France or Germany.
So he looked for an area which Britain had inherent strengths and capabilities of exercising
leadership. Defense was the obvious choice; Britain and France were the only EU members
with the capacity to project substantial amounts of power outside the NATO area.109 In
July 1998, the UK’s Strategic Defense Review (SDR) spoke for the first time of the vital
role of the EU’s CFSP. In October, at an informal EU summit in Pörtschach, Austria, the
UK Prime Minister indicated that he would have no objections to the development of an
EU defense policy if it would be militarily credible, politically intergovernmental and
NATO compatible.110
On 4 December 1998, the St. Malo Summit between France and Britain advocated an
‘autonomous” political and military capacity for the EU. The Franco-British Declaration
on European Defense at St. Malo stated that the WEU would be absorbed into the EU and
that it will be placed under the second pillar of the EU structure which was the CFSP; and
that the collective defense provision of article 5 of the Brussels treaty would be retained.
Another significant aspect emerging from St. Malo declaration was that the EU could have
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two types of recourse to suitable military means; European capabilities pre-designated
within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the
NATO framework.111 St. Malo marked a revolution since the European pillar project now,
became something much more significant than a techno-military facility permitting the
Europeans to borrow vital NATO assets in order to carry out missions authorized by the
North Atlantic Council (NAC). Implicit in the St. Malo process was the gradual emergence
of an autonomous EU capacity112 . St. Malo reflected the deviation from the NATO Berlin
decisions, by allowing Europeans to carry out operations outside the NATO framework. In
these regards, St. Malo decisions broadened the vision of Amsterdam Treaty on CFSP in
which a WEU-EU merger left to a future European Council decision. ESDI had begun as a
NATO project but it was becoming a European one by turning into CESDP.
2.4.9 The Washington Summit: NATO’s new Strategic Concept:
The Washington summit in 1999 confirmed that the key elements of the Berlin
Agenda on building ESDI within the alliance had been completed.113 Alliance Heads of
States and Governments declared their readiness to define and adopt necessary
arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and
capabilities of NATO for operations in which the alliance as a whole, is not engaged
militarily. The Strategic Concept adopted at the same summit, acknowledged a
continuation of the Berlin Decisions, including the implementation of CJTFs and the
creation of CJTF nuclei Headquarters(HQs) and role of Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) in
overseeing the use of NATO assets, there was not a great deal of change coming out of the
NATO Summit. However, NATO summit documents did acknowledge that the EU might
at some point take over the role of the WEU in the existing NATO-WEU framework
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planning capabilities.114 With this summit, NATO enlarged its borders by accepting three
new members –Czech Rep., Poland, and Hungary- and defined new tasks such as
terrorism, proliferation of WMD and delivery vehicles, and prevention of drug trafficking
to respond the challenges of new world order. Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which
intended to improve the capabilities of European Allies, was a maneuver to increase the
incentives of European Allies in defense spending. In this frame, the objective was to
increase the defensive capabilities in multinational operations including mobility, effective
engagement, effective command, control and communications (C3) capabilities.
One aspect of the NATO enlargement was, it increased the US influence in CEE
states increasing the complexity in defining their identity about Europeanness. As the role
of EU in security matters increases, it may pose difficulties for those states which perceive
EU from an economic perspective and rely on NATO for the security. I mean, uncertainty
in the security guarantees of the institutions creates dilemmas for the national priorities of
CEE countries. In this regard, it is equally in the interests of both the EU and NATO to
ensure that ESDI and CESDP develop in harmony with one another.
2.4.10 Setting the Targets for Capabilities: Helsinki
After the Washington Summit, the desire for the ESDI was not accompanied in
defense budgets of the Europeans. This, in turn, gave incentives for the Americans
reconsider about their commitments.115 In Kosovo, costs of the operation and lack of
military capabilities of the European Allies increased the tensions.116 The EU Cologne
Summit of 4 June 1999 set the time limits  for decisions relating WEU-EU merger to the
end of year 2000 and formalized the ways in which EU could implement Petersberg Tasks.
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One would be by using the NATO assets, which was in accordance with Berlin Decisions
of 1996, and the other, implementation of EU led operations without recourse to NATO
assets and capabilities.117 The planning of an EU led operation without recourse to NATO
assets has been worked out in a French proposed concept of ‘Framework Nation’. Under a
Framework Nation operation, the EU could without recourse to NATO assets, launch an
operation under the leadership of  an EU country, which can organize the mission from the
basis of a national Headquarters (HQs) which can be deployed to the theatre operations. At
the moment within the EU, only Britain and France have the capability of national,
deployable HQs. Although under such a mission, because there would be no recourse to
NATO assets, the decision to act would not go through the NAC, but nevertheless, there
would be nothing to exclude NATO member states who are not EU members to also take
part in a framework nation type of operation. What is not clear was the consultation
mechanism in place between the EU and non-EU NATO member states. In fact, once the
WEU becomes absorbed into the EU, any consultation mechanism which existed for
Associate Members of the WEU would also disappear.118
The Helsinki European Council meeting of 10-11 December 1999 agreed a military
‘Headline Goal’, involving the creation of a European Armed Force capable of significant
peacekeeping, humanitarian or crisis-management operations. The main items proposed at
Helsinki were:
-the creation, by December 2003, of a corps level force (up to 15 brigades or 50000
to 60000 combat troops) capable of rapid deployment within 60 days and sustainable for at
least one year;
-this force to be capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg Tasks, and to be
militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence
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capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and as appropriate air and naval
elements.
-this should logically require an overall goal of deployable forces on a rotating basis
which will approach to 200.000 professional, highly trained troops.
-the resulting capabilities are intended to enable the conduct of effective EU-led
military operations, whether or not the EU has recourse to NATO assets, as well as
providing a full contribution to NATO-led operations.119
The US have hesitations over the Helsinki Plan which could jeopardize NATO and
the US leadership in Europe and emphasized on 3-D rule (No decoupling, discrimination
and duplication) which had been also stressed at the Washington Summit one year ago.
With these provisions, non-EU members of NATO could be dragged into conflicts with no
say in decision making and as a consequence of a potential deterioration in the operation.
In the evolution of European security system, Helsinki marks a significant contribution for
emerging CESDP. The EU’s intention to absorb the WEU in the near future, to create a
European Reaction Force by 2003, and to set up appropriate decision- making structures
(including a standing committee on political and security affairs, a military committee and
a military staff) illustrated the Union’s determination to become a serious actor in
European security. With the Helsinki, EU went beyond previous statements on ESDI and
1996 NATO Berlin Decisions.
In Feira, on June 2000, the European Council decided to create four ad hoc working
groups between the EU and NATO- on the security issues, capabilities goals, modalities
enabling EU access to NATO assets and the definition of a permanent arrangements for
EU-NATO consultation.120The emphasis for the consultation with non-EU NATO
members and candidates of accession would be in a EU+15 format-six non-EU NATO and
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9 candidates-but for the interim period twice yearly meetings would be carried out in
EU+15 and EU+6 formats to increase the transparency and consultation. The participation
of these states, for an EU-led operation without using NATO assets, would depend on a
Council invitation and they would have the same rights and obligations as the EU member
states in the day-to-day conduct of operation after deploying significant military forces.121
This did not satisfy, however, non-EU allies especially Turkey since it would be unrealistic
to carry out operations possibly relating its security, decided and planned elsewhere
without considering its interests.
There were four incentives which produced CESDP along with ESDI. The first was
the American decision to tip the balance US policy in favor of a greater autonomy for the
EU, primarily as a way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing, but also
in the hope that this would relieve the pressure on an overstretched imperium with
increasingly complex global responsibilities.122 The US policy on European security
experiences the traditional dilemma, too much European capacity might reduce the US
influence but otherwise US have to pay bulk of the burden. The second incentive was the
continuation of “Gaullist Pressure” from the French side for a relatively autonomous EU in
its affairs on security. The lessons of Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo brought France closer
to the NATO and a positive relationship with the US. The third one was about the change
in British Policy to end a fifty-year-old veto on European defense integration.123 Russian
attitudes in this period contributed to the formation of CESDP as a side effect since Russia
preferred the EU, with its Economic role, rather than the NATO.
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2.4.11 Preparing the Union for Enlargement: Nice Summit
The EU’s Nice Summit, on December 2000, was not a ‘great leap forward’ for  the
more integrationist-minded EU capitals who believed under French Presidency, EU would
open the way for effective decision-making. The aims of the Nice Summit –to bring
Europe closer to the people- by making European decision-making clearer has not been
achieved. The extension of majority voting into few areas (notably through hedged with
conditions, trade in services) and agreement on ‘enhanced cooperation’ allowing any group
of eight countries or more to forge ahead of the others if they are able and willing to except
notably in defense matters.124 The British, insisted that defense should not become an area
in which ‘enhanced cooperation’ applied. This reflected the increased sensitivity of that
topic after remarks made earlier by William Cohen, the American defense secretary,
suggesting that the US was uneasy about closer European cooperation on defense. When
discussions turned to defense in Nice, some ambitious French proposals for endowing the
Union with a broad measure of autonomy from NATO were watered down under strong
British pressure. Beating a tactical retreat, Mr. Chirac acknowledged that NATO would
still be the foundation of Western Europe’s collective defense efforts; and he denied that
‘independence’ from NATO had ever been one of France’s objections for Europe. But in a
carefully chosen phrase, he still insisted that the Union would acquire the military means-
in terms of both equipment and command posts- ‘to defend’ its interests and handle crisis.
Taken literally, this could mean that Union will aspire to act militarily in emergencies
which do not involve any threat to its members’ territorial integrity (that would still be the
NATO’s business), but which may nonetheless be quite serious.
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Since the Kosovo War, American enthusiasm for using NATO as an ‘out-of-area’
policeman has waned, in part because of the sheer incompetence demonstrated by
European Forces during the fighting.125 Departing Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
told the EU that continuos US approval would depend on having all planning for Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) operations done under joint NATO and EU supervision. And
spokespersons for the new Republican administration made it clear that the EU countries,
despite their reluctance and budgetary constraints must spend more on improving their
arsenals so that US will not have to shoulder the bulk of the military hardware burden,
even where its troops are not on the ground.126
French failure in attempts to separate NATO and EU defense relieved the NATO
supporters in Union and CEE countries which have suspicions over the Europe’s military
capabilities to defend them. However, EU took over the crisis management functions of
WEU.127 The vagueness in the inclusion of different types of membership categories in
these structures make the issue problematic. In the medium term, with these considerations
in mind, the Union may improbably step into the role cast by the French, because it will
take a long time to achieve the muscle and skills for this role.
2.5 Problems with the emerging CESDP:
2.5.1 The Flexibility in the security structures after the cold war :
Flexible arrangements look particularly relevant in the field of security and defense
because of the existing asymmetry of resources among the EU partners, but also because
the new strategic culture is fundamentally different from the traditional EC culture which
requires a much more adaptable and reactive institutional set up.128 Although flexibility
provides advantages, in times of rapid change, it also embodies uncertainty. A flexible
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system allows a range of responses and does not compel states to participate in actions, in
which they have no interest, avoid entangling commitments and reduce dependence.
However, it can lead to an undermining of trust among allies as a national consequence of
uncertainty. The current institutional system in Europe does generate a degree of
uncertainty. The mismatch of membership between NATO, the WEU and EU leaves ,for
example, uncertainty about security commitments to the neutrals. NATO enlargement and
ignorance of Russian sensitivities also have potential to increase the uncertainty. Opt-out
provisions and unclarified linkages between the institutions when faced with a challenge
may create divisions which in time lead to an erosion of trust. Also while structuring
Europe, the enlargement process, may establish new lines of division between ‘ins’ and
‘outs’ as well as between allies.129 Finally, flexibility allows states to refrain from risky
undertakings with a ‘no-casualties’ approach in an environment with decreasing defense
spending.
2.5.2 Asymmetries in National Interests and Positions of European States:
European Security system has to consider different interests of states on its
periphery, if we take the West Europe as a core to the system, there are four factors from
each direction which may have potential affects on security in Europe:
-From the West, the attitudes and interests of the US and Canada constitutes the
Western factor in the system. The US still remains the sole provider of security in the face
‘hard security’ concerns. The main threat, according to the US, comes from the ‘rogue
states’ and their WMD capabilities which gave the necessary incentive for the
establishment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system in formal language. The
insistence of the new Bush Administration on a NMD may destabilize the Europe by
decreasing the US incentives to engage in a lengthy operation in Europe and by creating
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the necessary environment for a new arms race in especially Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
systems.
-In the North, Northern States’ position between West Europe and Russia makes
integration in the security field complicated. Neutrality of Sweden and Finland, qualified
membership in NATO by Norway and Denmark, with no foreign deployments on their
territories, and threat perceptions of Baltic States from Russia obstructs the intended
environment in these regions. Russia has sought to decrease the attractiveness of the Baltic
States to organizations such as NATO and EU by prolonging unsettled issues originating in
the break up of Soviet Union. For example, though all outstanding territorial issues have
been resolved, Moscow still refuses to sign border agreements with Estonia and Latvia.
Additionally, Russian military deployment in Kaliningrad Military District (MD) affects
the security equations in the region.130
-In the East, newly democratic states of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states
experiences a transformation process and searching for their new identities. Internal and
Ethnic conflicts in the Balkans inflict different national interests from the EU perspective.
German, Greek and Italian interests in the region differ from the French or Spanish
interests. A number of states are expressing including Britain and Germany for a
concentration of attention on the situation in Eastern and Central Europe, and the
assumption that the Union’s best interests will be served by facilitating the soonest
possible admission of those states to the Union itself. Spain, Portugal and Greece are
joined by Italy and France in voicing similar concerns about the Mediterranean area and in
particular North Africa. There are therefore a number of cross-cutting elements which
suggest that in the future the member states are likely to be seriously divided on the issue
of foreign policy priorities now that the discipline imposed by the cold war has
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evaporated.131 The main problem in the East is how to transform East and Central Europe
away from the role of an impermeable forward defense shield and to integrate it into a
permeable buffer, which both insulates Western Europe and the Russia from each other.132
The potential Greek-Turkish confrontation has serious implications for the flaws in
European Security Institutions. Greece’s conversion to ‘Europeanism’ was to a very large
extent prompted by frustrations with NATO and to counterbalance Turkey’s edge in the
Atlantic Alliance. The expectations of the Greece from the WEU is more realistic. This
stems from a dual realization, first that the WEU, for want of political will, is largely a
defense organization without a nervous system and therefore, incapable of addressing like
those in Balkans today and second; even if the WEU did possess a real muscle, it is far
from certain whether it would be rushed to Greece’s side . The rescinding of article 5 of the
Brussels Treaty, where Greece and Turkey are concerned, in one swoop has virtually
nullified the security value of the WEU to Greece.133
The status of Ukraine in relation with Russia can be added to the list of Eastern
dimension when we consider their geographical position on the way of energy routes from
Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian factor in Caucasus and Central Asia remains to be an
issue for European security. It is obviously not in the interest of the EU to have poor,
aggressive and authoritarian neighbors who have nuclear weapons. Neither was it interest
to receive a flood of refugees, fleeing from countries in crisis. The EU’s support for
Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) aims to remove the threats coming from these
regions.
-The South, with the recent turmoil in the Middle East, radical Islamic movements
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and terrorism, drug trafficking and refugee flows constitutes another problematic area.
Although EUROMED established in 1995, aimed to better integrate the Mediterranean in
EU policy, EU does not have sufficient influence over the Middle East. Bilateral relations
between individual EU states and Middle East countries appear to be more valid than a
CFSP towards the region.
Problems faced during the absorption of the WEU:
When the absorption of the WEU in EU’s second pillar was decided after St. Malo,
there were problems which should be considered seriously. Main problems were;
- The absorption of different membership statuses of the WEU and the
incorporation of the rights of these membership statuses.
- The organization of a structured dialogue, and consultation mechanisms between
NATO and the EU.
- The EU access to NATO assets and potential risks of duplication especially in
planning capabilities.
- The lack of permanent military and political structures and the absence of a
strategic concept to determine the circumstances which may require intervention.
- Indirect security guarantees to the non-NATO EU members, in case the EU
operation require the intervention of NATO within the context of article 5
commitments.
These problems were discussed at the Nice European Council in December 2000, at
the NAC meetings in Brussels on December 2000 and in Budapest on May 2001. About
the first problem, the EU’s take over the crisis management responsibilities of WEU134,
brought disappearance of the associate membership but regular meetings with the six non-
EU NATO members and other candidates were decided to continue as a consultation
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mechanism. However, not a clear vision of the participation of the non-EU allies was
declared. NATO continue to stress on the Washington decisions about the participation of
non-EU allies;
“...We welcome the EU’s commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also
enable non-EU European allies to raise their security interests when they consider their security interests
might be involved. It is particularly important in this context that non-EU European allies can request
meetings with the EU and submit proposals for agenda items. Consultation and cooperation are particularly
important with the EU Political and Security Committee and the EU Military committee and, as appropriate ,
with the EU military staff, so as to ensure that the Allies concerned derive maximum benefit from them and
to enable the allies concerned to contribute effectively. In this context, in accordance with the Washington
Treaty, we continue to stress importance we attach to respecting the security interests of all allies and the
obligations which they have to each other as allies.”135
About the dialogue between EU and NATO, The US wanted formal discussions
between the two organizations to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation,
cooperation and transparency building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the
WEU according to the decisions taken at the 1999 Washington Summit.136 Paris, however,
have hesitations about the influence of NATO/US in shaping emerging  CESDP. After
Nice the creation of four ad hoc working groups on; Headline Goals, questions of security,
the transfer of NATO assets and permanent arrangements for consultation between the two
organizations, contributed to the progress for a structured dialogue between two
institutions. But permanent arrangements need time and consensus on issues not clearly
defined.
 “...Following the results of the NATO ministerial meeting and the Nice European Council, an
exchange of letters took place in January this year between the secretary General and the EU Presidency. Not
less than three meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU political and Security Committee
and not less than one ministerial meeting will be held during each EU presidency. Each organization may
request additional meetings as necessary. Both organizations are committed to stepping up contacts and
meetings in the emergency phase of a crisis.”137
Ad-hoc working group on the transfer of NATO assets deals with subjects like the
EU access to NATO planning capabilities, the presumption of availability of the EU of
pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations, and the
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identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations. The
essential of the developed CJTF was it could be achieved by an integrated planning and
operational staff. But the subordination of WEU’s established planning staff to the EU and
creation of new planning capabilities different from NATO may effect the compatibility
and coherence between NATO and EU planning. The Atlanticists stressed on the need to
use planning capabilities of NATO as the main source of EU planning. On the other side,
French who are not involved in NATO planning procedures struggles for the EU’s own
planning capabilities and around the French and British Combined Joint HQs facilities.
European operations will be better served by having the entirety of NATO planning staffs,
at their disposal, since their detailed knowledge of both European and North American
capabilities would make planning more comprehensive and adaptable.138
About the permanent political and military structures, Nice Council decided to the
establishment of EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military Committee
(EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS) to remove deficiencies in these fields.139 However,
the absence of any European strategic concept to guide decision makers and planners as to
whether or not, when and how to intervene militarily, or how and when to apply non
military instruments to looming crisis situations remain as an issue that should be
considered seriously. This tends to pit “pragmatists” against “ideologues” and the military
against politicians. Increasing numbers of experts continue to develop the CESDP, without
making a serious effort  to develop a strategic concept, similar in nature and scope to that
adapted periodically by the Atlantic Alliance.140
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Final problem may be the positions of neutral EU members who do not share the
same responsibilities within NATO. The problem may arise when the EU lacks the
independent ability to carry out the article 5 obligations in case of a deterioration during an
EU-led operation. This will require, a NATO support which will lead to a ‘back door’
commitments for the US/NATO for these states. On the neutrals’ side , the involvement in
military structures will require constitutional changes which may produce domestic
resistance given these states’ traditional values.
2.6 Russia in European security :
The Russian  Federation is nearly the size of the former Soviet Union (FSU), an
enormous landmass stretching from Finland to China has still important chips to play in
Europe: accumulation of political influence, early membership in the world’s nuclear club,
special geopolitical position, status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
special arrangements with the institutions of European Security and its military presence in
some regions have the potential to affect the emerging CESDP.141 Russia’s return to
nationalism with a threatening attitude will again force its neighbors to choose sides, to
become satellites or Western forward bases.142
One point for the significance of Russia to European Security is about its potential to
affect the enlargement processes of both EU and NATO. Russia’s main objective in the
CFE adaptation talks was to codify legally binding limits on the NATO military presence
in new member states as the alliance moved east. Moscow secured a pledge in May 1997,
NATO-Russia Founding Act that the alliance would carry out its missions by ‘ensuring’
the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcements other than
political commitments. Russian insistence that adaptation be completed before the new
members joined in March 1999 demonstrated the high degree of linkage between the two
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events in Moscow.143 There will be more intensive tensions in relations if NATO speeds up
its eastward expansion by incorporating the Baltic States. When Russian disappointment in
the context of  ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo is considered, Russia tends to perceive
Baltic States’ membership in NATO as a real military and political threat. In June 1999,
after its helplessness in the face of NATO’s air campaign against Serbia, Moscow
announced that it was predicating any future defense on a ‘first-use’ policy- a readiness to
use nuclear weapons against any invading force or force threatening its security. Russian
new military doctrine, published in Oct. 1999, reflected wider range of options which
Russia should resort to the use of nuclear weapons.144 As an additional factor, Ukraine with
its 15 millions Russian population within borders and heavy reliance on Russian fuel with
the cultural links constitutes an indirect gate for Russia in European Security affairs.
On the economical side, instability in Caucasus and rivalry on the Caspian Basin
affect the safety of energy routes to Europe. Russia, through a series of initiatives, such as
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)or strategic approachment with Iran, China
and India;  struggles for the diversification of its relations for not to be dependent on
Western capitals. Considering these main points, Russian Foreign policy remains
dependent on three key factors; economic recovery, reorganizing the state’s power, and the
Western approach to its periphery.
2.7 The Re-emergence of Germany:
After the unification, German Foreign and Security Policy undergoing a process of
normalization. This process is perhaps most visible in a limited consensus among German
Policymakers that the country must take on a more active role in support of international
security, especially through participation in peace support operations. The unification and
the restoration of full sovereignty have led to an increase in German power. And
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organizational changes in defense establishments145 have allowed Germany to exercise
military power more effectively and more in keeping with a ‘European Great Power’.
German Policy remains in a case-by case mode in which there is no automatic policy for
the employment of German troops in a multinational peace support operation.146
With suspicions on its policy during and after unification, Germany was careful for
not to invoke fears of a new hegemony in the continent. Germany assured its allies with its
commitment to integration, and remained a faithful member of NATO. With the exception
of larger parliamentary representation, Bonn refrained from any claims on its EC/EPC
partners which could have been based on the new size of the country. Bonn did not seem to
dream of a community leadership role and it did not enjoy a visibly greater influence
among the twelve candidates either. One reason for this is Germany had to invest on to its
new land, experienced recession and unemployment which limited the support for
international activities.147
However, Germany gained an important leverage for its future influence in European
politics with the new treaty, arranging decision making procedures and re-allocation of
seats in the Council, on December 2000 at the Nice Summit. Potentially Germany keeps its
status as leading power in European Structures.
2.8 France: Keeping the distance ?
Within the European Framework, France had secured the containment of Germany
through the process of integration, while striving to limit constraints which could have
affected her own status. Within the community, there is a tacit recognition of French
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Political supremacy balancing German Economic power, thus making France into a power
‘less’ equal than the others. The end of the division of Europe, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the return of German power have profoundly shaken the foundations of French
Foreign policy.148
For the French, development of an autonomous European defense capability will
satisfy two concerns; first, it will give the necessary means to be a global player which was
the apparent objective throughout cold war and post cold war, and second, by reducing the
dependence on the US, it will prevent reoccurrence of  ‘abandonment-entrapment’
dilemmas of cold war years.
The rapprochement between NATO and France, after the lessons of Gulf and Balkan
Crises led to a renewed participation in NATO’s military committee and its supporting
staff and meetings of defense ministers. But selective participation has also drawbacks.
First, France is a leading military power in Europe and beyond, but the current
arrangement will not produce leadership roles for France that are commensurate with its
capabilities. Second, the integrated military command produces tangible military benefits
which are denied to France. In Gulf War, French Forces lacked the common background
and problems arose in the conduct of operations. The third problem is about burden-
sharing. France contributed little towards the efforts to make NATO forces interoperable,
but benefits from these efforts. Each time France participates in a mission, other nations
have to make sacrifices in order to bring France into the political and military planning.149
In spite of these facts, France, in the medium term, appears as if it will keep the distance
depending on the continuous disputes between the US on the scope and organization of
CESDP.
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2.9 Post Cold War Dilemma: Widening or Deepening?
It is clear that Britain, France and Germany have fundamentally differing views (with
the smaller states equally but less significantly divided) about the desirability of
enlargement of the EU to the east and deepening of the Union as it is presently constituted
as well as about the relationship between widening and deepening. This is inherently a
matter of foreign policy. The British seem to believe that any enlargement is attractive
because it will lead to a weakening of supranational elements and federal ambitions. The
French shared the British view of the relationship between widening and deepening  but
have tended to come to the opposite conclusion about the attractiveness of further
enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe. This, however bring the French into conflict
with Germany for the Germans have never accepted the notion that wider means weaker
and have instead tended to perceive the question of enlargement towards the East as both
essential and as a welcome stimulus toward deepening the Union.150 There are two edges
of enlarging the Union which requires serious considerations:
On the one hand, institutions, particularly the EU and NATO, provide frameworks
for resolving conflicts of interests between the different states, and contribute to the
creation of a common identity that works to substitute the collective for national in
defining the interests.151 In this respect, although EU and NATO have a different meanings
in the eyes of candidates, EU and NATO have the necessary influence to shape the security
system. As far as the concerned states, keep their hopes about membership, it will
positively affect their commitments to the system, thus providing a more secure Europe.
On the other hand, the most important question is whether the EU can retain its
institutional integrity after expanding its membership from the current 15 to potential 25-
30 countries. The preparations to redesign decision-making with Nice Treaty remain to be
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supported, if the goal is to achieve an effective decision making and to prevent serious
flaws in the Union.
2.10 Conclusion  :
Although European Security Cooperation, after the cold war, appears as a result of an
inherent effort towards the completion of Integration process in a new environment, some
elements of the cold war disputes can be detected easily, although the context of the issues
changed dramatically. Among the most prominent ones are the burden -sharing debates
and differences between the Atlanticist and Europeanist views.
With the new security challenges on the one hand and the considerable deals in arms
control on the other, European security system experiences the most revolutionary changes
in history. The key stones of  European Security, International Institutions, are adapting
themselves to the new environment with new understandings in their roles.
Between these institutions, it was apparent that the wide membership of the OSCE
made  it too bulky and cumbersome to deal effectively with many of the conflicts which
were breaking out across Eastern Europe. Specifically, the OSCE, with its emphasis on
diplomatic measures and negotiations, found itself unable to deter or counter ‘committed
aggressors’, although it proved to be productive as a complementary organization for the
existing security structures of Europe.152 NATO and EU, on the other side, appeared more
active in security related issues. They have both experienced considerable changes in their
structures and strategies and struggled to establish norms for the creation of a ‘security
community’ and promoted stability in Europe.
The emergence of CESDP, beginning with steps taken in NATO, was a consequence
of globalization of the US interests and French designs to reduce the dependence on the US
military capabilities. As being in its embryonic stages, CESDP poses both advantages and
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disadvantages for Europe. Although it broadens the alternatives to deal with the crisis,
there are problems about the scope and practical use of intended European Rapid Reaction
Capability which still stands on unclear institutional linkages, insufficient material
strengths to carry out ‘Petersberg Type’ operations. Another tendency which threatens the
credibility of CESDP is decreasing defense spending in Europe. The lack of political will
with a ‘no-casualties’ approach does generate questions about the operability of this
mechanism on the ground.
In the last decade, the WEU which was the bridge between NATO and EU, came
under the EU in the flow of evolving CESDP, causing institutional problems such as the
inclusion of non-EU NATO  members and positions of the neutrals. For example, Sweden
and Finland wishes to see explicit statements that the goal will not be the establishment of
European Army.153 On the other hand an independent EU-led operation may have ‘de
facto’ consequences for the US and other non-EU NATO allies.
European decision makers have to face several external and internal constraints to
achieve a beneficiary CESDP.  In this respect, the main constraints are:
1. The US Attitudes and Interests,
2. The future of relations with Russia and its attitude towards these arrangements,
3. The expectations of newly democratic states and turmoil in these states,
4. Germany’s potential status with its increasing power in international activities.
5. Inter-institutional requirements to provide cooperation and coherence,
6. The lack of material military capabilities and political will to increase defense
spending
7. Domestic concerns over national interests, and public opinions,
8. The future of French relations with NATO/US.
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Chapter 3 : Turkey and non-EU NATO member countries in
                         European Security Architecture.
In the early stages of the change after cold war, debate in Europe focused on whether
to bring the WEU into the EU as the defense arm of the CFSP or whether to enhance the
WEU as NATO’s European pillar. The so-called Atlanticist versus Europeanist debate
came to center around the crucial question of whether NATO could develop beyond a
collective defense alliance in the post cold war era and whether it could undertake “out-of-
area” operations, which technically the WEU is not limited by  treaty to undertake.154 As
the time passed, a growing tendency in EU for a security and defense component in a
comprehensive integration process appeared. The complicating factor was the question of
inclusion of all actors. Will the EU create new lines of divisions or will it provide the
intended ‘security community’ in the continent? It is difficult to find out a certain answer
when the uncertain character of system and responsive nature of the Europe is considered,
this is the question in which the answer will arise as the Europe complete its integration
process.
This chapter focuses more specifically on Turkey’s participation in evolving EU
Security structures by considering also the positions of other associate members and
observers of the WEU. Turkey’s political and geographical position vis-a-vis EU is unique.
Turkey, with its different religious and cultural background, played a crucial role by
‘locking up’ 24 Soviet divisions which would otherwise have made an addition to the
direct threat to Western Europe in cold war. However, post cold war threat perceptions and
developments in security field have distanced Turkey from Western Europe in two
different ways. The proposed enlargement of the Union to include the CEE Countries is
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argued for in part as a means of strengthening European Security by including these
countries in the Deutschian ‘Security Community’ which has been established among the
members of the European Union. The ten candidate countries of CEE have taken priority
over Turkey in the queue for EU membership, and that has been inevitably one factor
which has distanced Turkey from Western Europe. The second factor of divergence has
been that, with the end of cold war, there has been a difference in appreciation between
Western Europeans and Turks as the nature of developments in Russia and the
consequences of a power vacuum in a geopolitical context.155 Turkey stood much more
closer than the West Europe to problematic areas ranging from Balkans to Caucasus and
the Middle East, with its historical and cultural ties in some of these regions.
Turkey played relatively an active role in his post cold war affairs with the
enlargement in its area of maneuver after cold war, but clearly refrained from unilateral
initiatives. For example, Turkish Military Forces were extraordinarily successful during
NATO operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo and stressed that other NATO members but
non-EU countries should not be compared to Turkey or should be compared in terms of
their contribution to European Security.156 There were several initiatives in which Turkey
posed a positive image like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or the
Multilateral Force in Balkans.
In the first section of this chapter, a general description of WEU “Associate
Member” status will be given by inspecting the differences between other membership
categories in WEU, with respect to their rights and obligations. Then Turkey’s position in
Europe will be discussed due to its problematic geographic location and post cold war
concerns which Turkey perceived as a stake or threat. Greek – Turkish attitudes in
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emerging security structures will be discussed in more details. Turkey’s position among
other associate members will be given in the next section for a better understanding of
Turkey’s insistence on participation in CESDP. Finally, alternatives for the inclusion of
Turkey in emerging security structures will be examined before the conclusions.
3.1 Associate Membership in WEU:
When Maastricht Treaty gave right for full membership to all EU members in WEU,
WEU’s bridge role between NATO and EU began to shift towards EU. Within the
emerging structures, first initiated by the Maastricht and then continued with Petersberg
Declaration in 1992 and the Kirchberg Declaration in 1994, four types of membership
statuses were established in WEU. (see fig.3.1 and 3.2)
“Associate membership” is one of the four different types of member statuses in
WEU  which altogether constitute the “WEU family of nations”. Associate members,
namely the republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey,( then
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland after their NATO membership) obtained this status
through an invitation issued in the declaration on WEU attached to Maastricht Treaty in
1991. The Petersburg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Declaration on Associate
Membership signed in Rome on 20 November 1992 established the guidelines of their
status, associate membership became effective in 1995.157
Associate members were not signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty (MBT);
therefore, they were not endowed with the full membership rights designed by the treaty.
Their status consisted of only non- article V activities; meaning that they were neither
under article V guarantee nor held responsible for article V missions. However, they had
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the right to participate fully in the meetings of the WEU council, its working groups and
the subsidiary bodies under certain conditions. These conditions were :
- Their participation should not prejudice to the provisions laid down in article
VIII of the MBT;
- At the request of a majority of the member states, or half of the member states
including the presidency, participation may be restricted to full members.158
Associate members’ rights were  as follows:
Figure 3.1 : Memberships in NATO, WEU and the EU in 1990s.
- They have the right to speak and submit proposals but they do not have the right
to block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states. They are
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further associated with the planning cell through special arrangements, and they can
nominate officers to the cell.
- They take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations
(as well as exercises and planning) to which they commit forces. They can also nominate
Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) on the same basis as full members, the associate
members are given the right to have a say in WEU operations in which they NATO assets
and capabilities are used within the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).
This gave the flexibility to provide support from non-EU NATO members.
- Associate members are also connected to the WEU telecommunications system
(WEUCOM). They are involved in the activities of the satellite center, and they are
regularly informed about WEU’s space activities. Turkey and Norway also participates in
the Western Armaments Group (WEAG), and other working groups such as EUROCOM,
EUROLONGTERM and Western European Logistics Group (WELG) with decision-
making rights. In some of these working groups associate members  would have the
decision-making rights, especially in those which were transferred from NATO. After
Nice, some working groups like the WEAG preserved their statuses and Turkey continues
to participate the activities of these groups.
- Unlike to the observer and associate partners-except the operations which they
commit forces-, associate members are expected to contribute financially to the WEU
budgets.159
One aspect of Petersberg Declaration related especially with Greek-Turkish disputes
was about the security guarantees within the WEU. The Declaration stressed that the
security guarantees  and defense commitments in the treaties which bind the member states
within WEU and NATO were mutually reinforcing and would not be invoked by those
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who were the signatories to either the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) or the North
Atlantic Treaty in disputes between themselves.160 This provision especially intended to
prevent any exploitation of the security guarantee by WEU full members against  NATO
members. Greece was the most disappointed with this provision.161
Another important aspect of associate membership was that the Document on
Associate Membership which was signed in Rome on 20 November 1992, could not be
modified without the assent of associate members.162 Also provisions of associate
membership should not prejudice the rights and obligations deriving from existing treaties
or agreements. These were the provisions which partly constituted a legal base for
Turkey’s claims against a loss of rights in case of a WEU- EU merger.
Figure 3.2 : Membership Categories of the WEU on Map in 1990s.
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3.1.1 Erosion of Associate Membership rights after Amsterdam:
New trends after Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, included substantial provisions that
would shape the Union’s nature at the beginning of new century. The second pillar of the
Union, namely the Common Foreign and security Policy (CFSP), was one of the fields in
which member states made important amendments with ‘fundamental legal, political and
military implications’, not only for the EU itself but also for the WEU. The Treaty of
Amsterdam gave the CFSP a new scope and a wider framework, to include Petersberg
missions and take steps towards a common defense policy, and thus open the way for the
possibility of WEU’s future integration in the EU.163 Observers gained a new framework
under the Amsterdam Treaty in that Observers’ full participation in EU-mandated WEU
Petersberg operations is endorsed to simplify the integration of these two organizations.
There were vague statements for the involvement of Associate Members like ‘practical
arrangements’ or ‘in accordance with their status’ within the WEU.
Associate members’ involvement in WEU operations which would not include
NATO assets was questionable. Such operations could be conducted in two ways; either
WEU could act upon the EU’s request in which associate members would have no voice,
or WEU would decide to act on its own behalf. In the operations without using NATO
assets-although it was accepted as a remote possibility-, and EU mandated, observers
would have a better position in the WEU than associate members. The Erfurt Declaration
in 1997 by the WEU ministers included more clear statements for the conditions for the
participation of associate members in these operations.164
With the policy change in 1998, by the British Government’s European Security
Policy at St. Malo accelerated paces for two organizations’ integration. Problems arose at
this point for the associate members especially for Turkey. Once the institutions of WEU
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become absorbed into the EU, would Turkey’s legal acquis in these bodies cease to exist?
On the other hand, Turkey had also a political acquis within the WEU, as it has been sitting
in the WEU Council since 1992. From the Turkish perspective, the absorption of the WEU
into the second pillar of EU presented problems regarding the status of its legal and
political acquis of with the WEU, since Turkey has no participation in CFSP process. This
is why Turkey insisted on the absorption of the WEU into the EU to take place in a new
4th pillar, whereby the WEU would be absorbed as it is with all its acquis and with an opt
out clause for EU members who do not wish to participate, similar to European Monetary
Union (EMU) and the Shengen Agreements.165
The US support for the inclusion of non-EU NATO members in emerging security
architecture stressed on three conditions that the EU members should avoid decoupling,
duplication and discrimination in putting these initiatives into action.166 Additionally, the
NATO Washington Summit in 1999 which initiated the new strategic concept emphasized
that NATO and EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation,
cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and
WEU. Ensuring the fullest possible involvement of  non-EU European allies was given the
utmost importance in EU-led crisis response operations.
The Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999, set the time limit for the
completion of necessary arrangements in transferring the responsibilities for Petersberg
tasks to EU, it would be the end of year 2000. The demise of the WEU was openly
expressed. In this case, the alliance between the ten full members of WEU would remain
the foundation of the collective defense of its member states. Therefore, the collective
defense guarantee (article V) of the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) would not be
affected by this demise. The neutral status of some of the EU members would not be
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affected either, since the EU would only take on the non-article V functions of WEU that it
most performed in the area of crisis management, and thus Petersberg tasks. Concerning
the WEU associate members, the European Council only stressed that arrangements that
would allow the non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible
extent in this new framework. Cologne European Council put an end to the debate on the
establishment of a fourth pillar for European Defense. It demonstrated that any
arrangement, including those that would address the issue of participation of WEU
associate members that would be made in this field, would take place within the CFSP.167
The rapporteur to the assembly of WEU, Mr. Jacques Baurel has contended that the
EU did not provide associate members with any guarantee as to the full preservation of
rights they currently enjoyed within the WEU Council, its subsidiary bodies and the
Assembly. Since the European Crisis Management activities would be conducted within
the framework of the CFSP and since only EU members were entitled to participate in the
CFSP, there was no reason to believe that the EU would be prepared in the future to meet
for CFSP purposes in a configuration similar to that of WEU.168
WEU Ministers on 13 November 2000, with Marseilles Declaration, declared that the
transfer of Crisis Management functions of the WEU to the EU would be after the Nice
European Council and WEU would only fulfill the commitments of the MBT, particularly
those arising from articles V and IX.169 With respect to relations with third countries article
4 state that:
“Ministers acknowledged the importance of the dialogue and cooperation which WEU at 28 and 21
has developed with third countries over recent years. WEU will cease to carry out these responsibilities,
which it is intended will be taken up within the existing framework of political dialogue between the EU and
the countries concerned.”
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Despite the efforts of Turkey to preserve its acquis in the transfer of WEU’s
functions to the EU, the Nice Summit realized the principles set out in Feira, and did not
remove the ambiguities criticized within the context of relations with third countries.
Transfer of responsibilities for Petersberg type of missions was supported by the decisions
for the establishment of permanent political and military structures like the Political
Security Committee (PSC), the Military Staff and the military Committee of the European
Union.170 With the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU, EU took
over the responsibility for the multinational police element in Albania, and decided to take
on a mine –clearance operation in Croatia and achieved its goals to be finished upon expiry
of its mandate. Although some working groups and forums which provided consultation
between NATO and WEU ceased to exist and planned to be replaced by new ones under
EU structures; some others like Western Armament Group /Organization (WEAG/WEAO)
kept their statuses.171
One of the interesting points, in these developments was about the proposed military
contribution of associate members in the context of ‘Capabilities and Commitments
Conference’ (CCC) on 20 November 2000 in Brussels. This conference clarified individual
contributions of EU member states with the issued ‘Force Catalogue’. Analysis of this
catalogue confirms that by 2003, in keeping with the ‘Headline Goal’ established in
Helsinki, the Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, but that
certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order
to maximize the capabilities available to Union. These contributions set out in the ‘Force
Catalogue’ constitute a pool of more than 100.000 persons and approximately  400 combat
aircraft and 100 vessels, making it possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out
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the different types of crisis management missions.172 Unlike to the Forces Answerable to
WEU (FAWEU), EU accepted Turkey’s and Czech Republic’s offers as an ‘additional
force’ which reflected clearly the change in the statuses of Associate Members in new
structures.173
Turkish disappointment with these changes in her status and its veto against an EU
right for automatic access to NATO assets in case of a EU-led operation derive from being
spotted at the midst of a troubled region and different security concerns in these regions. It
is possible to increase the list by adding the different elements in Turkey’s national identity
which is experiencing a painful transformation process. The next section will deal with
especially the external security concerns of Turkey which make decision makers insistent
on the inclusion of Turkey in emerging security structures.
3.2 Turkey’s Security Concerns:
Like most of the European States Turkey’s Foreign Policy was deeply affected by the
dissolution of Warsaw Pact and as a result, with the end of cold war strategic stability.
Turkey’s strategic importance with respect to a Soviet threat decreased. Security
perceptions radically changed. Turkey’s understanding of national policy rests upon
protection of territorial and national integrity and defense of legitimate rights and
freedoms.174 For Turkey NATO reflects the security dimension of Westernisation and the
EU reflects the socio-economical dimension.175 According to Turkish Decisionmakers
NATO should have overall priority in security arrangements. NATO’s role, its
effectiveness, coherence and solidarity are at risk because of the EU initiatives recent
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years.176 There is a strong feeling in Turkey that its veto right- as a natural consequence of
NATO membership-over European defense arrangements is a card that can and must be
played, as the only way of asserting Turkish interests in the face of and EU defense plan
that might be harmless in the short run but could seriously damage Turkey’s interests in a
few years’ time. Instinctively, Turkey dreads the idea that the EU, which has kept it at
arm’s length for nearly 40 years and includes its historical rival Greece, should play any
role in matters of defense.177
Turkish Foreign policy pursued relatively active and a more capable role in the post-
cold war period. Turkish participation during the Gulf War and after, its reaction to the
deployment of Russian supplied S-300 missiles on Cyprus, its willingness to act against
Syria if Damascus did not end its cross-border support for PKK and expel its leader,
Abdullah Öcalan,178 Developing relations with Israel and new initiatives in Balkans and
Black Sea Regions clearly indicates the deviation from the traditional foreign policy which
was strictly under the pressure of cold war restraints. The main reason behind a more
assertive policy was the threat perceptions of Turkey. Unlike to the most European
Countries, uncertainties in its periphery made Turkey more than a front line country and
required the diversification of its relations in security field. Different from the tendency in
West Europe, Turkey is one of the exceptional countries which increased its defense
spending together with Greece.
Post cold war challenges of international system (see chapter 2) give us evidences
about the role of Turkey in the emerging security structures. Turkey is not a passage for
only the energy transfers from the East to the West or from the South to the North, but for
also unregulated migration, dual technology transfers, drug-trafficking and all sorts of
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smuggling. With its location at an intersection point, Turkey also constitutes the buffer
zone between the radical Islam- which is perceived as the most significant challenge by
most of the West European leaders-and Europe.
Another significant challenge, ethnic instability, around Turkey constitute a second
major concern for Turkish policy makers. Promotion or enforcement of a peace in multi-
ethnical regions is not an easy task for the organizations newly arranging crisis
management functions or with the organizations having disputes over their responsibilities
in these functions as we witnessed during the European and NATO responses to crises in
Yugoslavia.  NATO determined 16 planning situations and flashpoints, for its non-article 5
missions, 13 of which are reported to be related with the security of Turkey. (see fig.3.3)179
Turkey stands at a place which constitute the border between Europe and the East and as a
border country has to adopt itself to a new network of relations which requires
diversification in its policies for a potential exclusion by the West but by cooperating with
maximum possible actors.
3.2.1 Turkey’s Relations with the West:
3.2.1.1 US-Turkish relations: Turkey found itself living a ‘Second Golden Age’180 in
her relations with the US after the cold war. The lack of confidence by the Turkish elite to
Europe in security issues increased as a result of uncertainties in Europe’s policies towards
Turkey. In security field the US fit better to the Turkish stakes than the EU because of
three main reasons.
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Figure 3.3: Flash Points
According to the French Defense Institute and International Institute of Strategies in Switzerland, Flash
Points are the potential conflict regions which may affect the security of NATO, EU, WEU or European
Council Members with the spread of these conflicts or with huge masses of refugee flows.  Within this
definition, these flash points and Turkey’s concerns in these regions are as follows:
1. Bosnia Herzegovina:  There are Turks living in Bosnia and Bosnian originated Turkish citizens in Turkey.
Turkey’s historical ties also creates sympathy in the Turkish Public.
2. Sandzak:  Most of the Sandzak’s population consisted of Muslims that are ethnically Turks and Bosniacs.
3. Kosovo: After NATO’s operation , Albanians in Kosovo may have a desire for independence or integration
with Albania.
4. Albanian-Macedonian Border: There are border problems between these two countries and with both of
them Turkey have good relations.
5. Nagorno-Karabakh: Disputed territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey has good relations with
Azerbaijan and problems with Armenia.
6. Chechnya: Conflicts in this region creates political problems between Russia and Turkey.
7. Georgia-Abkhazia: Conflicts between central government and Abkhazian groups continue.
8. Georgia-South Ossetia: Similar to Abkhazia problem. Instability in these regions affects Turkish plans over
energy supplies from the Caspian Basin.
9. Northern Iraq : One of the major issues in Turkish Foreign Policy. Power vacuum in Northern Iraq simplify
the PKK exploitation of these territories and strengthens the possibility of an autonomous Kurdish State.
10. Iran : Iran perceived as an exporter of radical Islam in both Turkey and other Western capitals. Cross border
PKK support is an additional issue for Turkish Security Elite. An internal confusion is possible in Iran.
11. Syria: The potential spread of conflicts in Middle East into an all out war, deeply affects Turkey’s security
plans. Turkey has problems with Syria on PKK and water issues.
12. Cyprus: Another fundamental issue in Turkish Foreign Policy, sometimes increasing tensions with Greece
and with other Western Capitals.
13. Vojvodina: In the northern Yugoslavia and Turkey does not have direct security concerns in the region.
14. Privlaka: Southern Croatia. Turkey does not have direct security concerns.
15. Belarus: Potential problems with Russian population. For Turkey, secondary concerns over the region.
Notes: * Flags in the map do not point the exact places but the regions
           **It is possible to increase the list by adding other conflict prone regions, this is a simplified sketch to
illustrate the problematic regions around Turkey.
SOURCE:  Cumhuriyet daily newspaper, “Türkiye’nin Çevresi Ateşten Gömlek”, 17 December 2000. This
map is produced by the author depending on the article mentioned above.
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First of all, the US is the only power which has the material capability  to provide
Turkey a defense shelter especially in case of a WMD attack. This is a crucial factor for a
country having neighbors with significant nuclear arsenals or WMD programs some of
which  were labeled as ‘rogue’ by the international community. Secondly, Turkish and the
US national stakes converge in the Middle East, in the Caspian Basin and in Balkans. In
each of these regions, Turkey’s cooperation is crucial for the achievement of broader
American strategic objectives. Finally, the US, considering the strategic importance of
Turkey, behaves more consistent than the Europe on policies towards Turkey. The US
consistently support Turkey’s EU membership and its participation in security
arrangements, supported Turkey’s struggle against PKK, and seemed closer to Turkish
arguments in debates about energy transfers from the Caspian Basin.181
On the negative side, however, Greek and Armenian lobbies in the US Congress and
divergences in US policy on issues such as Northern Iraq and Iran policies have the
potential to shadow these good relations. Within this scope, Turkish-Israeli relations
proved to be beneficial to provide support for Turkey in the international arena.182 For
Northern Iraq, power vacuum in the region threaten Turkish borders in two ways: one is
the PKK bases and the other is the possibility of an autonomous Kurdish State which can
affect southeastern parts of Turkey. With the closure of oil-pipeline and trade linkages,
Turkish economy was the one most damaged by the UN embargoes. Iran, with its policies
in central Asia, with its cross border support for Islamic movements, and with its ballistic
missiles program when considered within the scope of Russian-Iran nuclear reactor deals
constitute serious risks for Turkey. A Russian-Iran rapprochement in especially arms
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transfers and nuclear technology will affect both the US and Turkish stakes. Increasing
relations with Iran especially on energy transfers and trade will help Turkey to create
necessary dialogue in other fields. Turkey should be careful for not to be entrapped into an
entanglement with Iran as a consequence of cooperation with US.
3.2.1.2 EU-Turkey Relations: Economic, cultural and political issues have become
more important in Europe’s relations with Turkey. Today, the main European concern is
not deterring the Soviet Threat, but creating an Economic and Monetary Union and forging
a Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This has highlighted Turkey’s
‘districtiveness’ and raised questions about where Turkey fits into the overall European
architecture. European efforts to create a distinct European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP),threaten to increase Turkey’s isolation from Europe, as well as deepen discord
with the US.183
The EU busy with internal debates, in sum, does not wish to see Turkey “import”
complex foreign policy involvement into the Community which could then involve itself in
these unstable security problems184, as well as the heavy burden of a country with
population more than 70 millions. Another significant reason why Turkey is being
excluded from EU is the relations with Greece. Greece exploits its membership to maintain
a Western Pressure on Turkey and to provide international support for its arguments in
disputes between Turkey.
One of the most important hesitations of Turkey which lies behind its strong
objections to a guaranteed EU access to NATO assets is the potential transfer of disputes
between Greece and Turkey into EU structures. That may, in the long run create pressure
on Turkey and possibility of an EU operation in the regions critical for Turkey complicates
the minds of Turkish decision-makers. Turkey’s suspicions about the material capabilities
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of the EU and potential risks of undermining the alliance cohesion by unnecessary
duplications are some other points which Turkey uses in its arguments.
On the other hand, Turkish desire to have a say in the emerging security structures
derive from the desire to minimize the potential adverse effects of an EU operation around
its periphery rather than the desire to provide its security through these structures. With its
military potential and with its role as a regional player, Turkey’s inclusion in new
arrangements for security in Europe will produce positive outcomes. Turkey has already
proposed a brigade-level force in Capabilities and Commitments Conference (CCC) which
was more than most of the EU members. Security and Defense seem to be the most proper
fields for the cooperation of Turkey and EU since other field may be problematic for the
Europeans from a ‘European Identity’ point of view.185
3.2.1.3 Relations with Greece : Despite being NATO allies for nearly 50 years,
relations between Greece and Turkey have long been characterized by mutual suspicion
and hostility that has led them to the brink of war on more than one occasion. Every
government since 1955 has seen Turkey as its primary security threat and, in this respect,
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact did little effect on Greek Policy.186 There were already
considerable problems between the countries like the Cyprus issue, delimitation of the
continental shelf, territorial waters and the militarization of Greek Islands in the Aegean,
but in the post cold war era these problems increased like the competition in Balkans or
new dimensions with the Cyprus issue. Greece and Turkey are the countries which spend
most for defense in NATO.
The significance of Greek-Turkish relations for the emerging CESDP is in its
potential to create serious flaws as a barrier in the development of security structures.
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Turkey resist the idea of being isolated in Europe and Greece objects any concessions in
EU about Turkey’s inclusion in these structures. It threatens to veto the enlargement
process of the EU.187 Deep Greek support for a CFSP and CESDP (see fig.3.5) partly
derive from the desire to gain superior hands against Turkey in bilateral issues. Isolation of
Turkey, in this regard, may create serious divisions in both EU and NATO. Preservation of
the balance is required for the sake of stability.
In 1993, Greece adopted a new policy of deterrence, in which Cyprus was brought
within the Greek Security perimeter and a new defense doctrine was adopted that declared
a renewed Turkish Military action on the island would constitute a casus belli for Greece
and constructed new military facilities for Hellenic Army.188 Greek Cypriot’s decision to
deploy Russian originated S-300 missiles alarmed Turkey since the deployment would
destabilize the balance by providing breakthrough capabilities and by broadening the target
sets. It would not only provide only an air shelter but also by reaching Turkish mainland, it
would affect the strategic plans of Turkey like the Baku-Ceyhan oil-pipeline. With the
pressure of Europe and the US, the missiles were deployed in the Crete Island. Cyprus is
the most sensitive area of Turkish Foreign Policy since its the only strategic asset for
Turkish security against a surprise attack from the Aegean Islands where Turkey has little
warning time. Turkey opposes the idea of bringing the Cyprus and Aegean problems into
the fora as a precondition for its EU membership. But with Greece’s efforts, EU appears to
be in a tendency in this way. Turkey will be more pressed if the Greek Cypriots enter into
the EU in 2004.
Another post cold war issue between the two countries is the competition in Balkans.
Turkish interests stem partly from a Muslim kinship of sorts with various communities in
the region and spillovers to which Turkey could potentially be exposed due to refugee
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movements and political violence. More fundamentally, there is the potential for broader,
more dangerous geo-political competition between Turkey-Greece and Russia and other
actors for threats to the security of borders.189 Countering Turkey in Balkans was one of
the main objectives of Greek Balkan policy. The emergence of an independent
Macedonian State with possible territorial claims against Greece, the opening of prospects
for Turkish penetration into the Balkans and the possibility of a Greater Albania were the
fears of Greek decision makers which brought significant changes in Greek Policy after the
fall of Yugoslavia.190 Turkey pursued conservative and multilateral approaches and
different from the expectations, Balkans opened new spheres of cooperation between
Ankara and Athens. Both countries actively involved in the formation of the Southeastern
European brigade (SEEBRIG) and has participated in most of major Western
Peacekeeping operations in the southern Balkans, although Greece’s partisanship for
Serbia and dispute with Macedonia created problems within EU and NATO.
Both countries have significant modernization programs for their armies. From a
military point of view Greek depends on sea control for its defense since the islands
provide the country necessary depth for its defense. It can be seen from the existing
arsenals of the two countries. (fig.3.4)191
The emphasis on Greek’s latest defense program-Unified Medium Term Programs of
Development and Modernization (EMPAE) 2001-2005-  declared by defense minister
Tsohatzopoulos was on qualitative balance rather than quantitative balance with Turkey.192
Although there are significant improvements in the two countries’ relations after the
earthquakes like proposed Confidence Building Measures and a consensus over the
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removal of land mines from the borders, Greece’s defense spending likely to continue to be
the highest among NATO and European countries since Turkey suspends some of its
projects due to economic difficulties within the country.
Figure 3.4: Conventional Armed Forces
Greece Turkey Cypru European NAT
Average
Main Battle Tanks     1732    3867    296         829
AIFV/APC     2478    2529    472      2081
Artillery     1886    4274   824       852
Combat Ships        17        21       0         18
Submarines         8          16         0          9
Fighter Aircraft       335      464        0        264
Attack Helicopter         39        51       0        125
Greece never shared NATO’s view that the Soviet threat was the primary one in cold
war. The political left is hostile to NATO because of past Anglo-American interventions in
Greek political life.193 With EU membership Greece became one of the staunch supporter
of integration in especially security and defense policies, although it was disappointed by
the provisions in WEU about security guarantees between NATO allies. Greece support
CFSP without any desire for a supranational structure. Greek blocked financial assistance
to Turkey and its pressure on Cyprus will likely have a negative consequence in EU’s
future relations with Turkey. There is, possibly, a positive relation between Greece’s
security concerns against Turkey and its support for an autonomous European voice in
security matters. It can be clearly detected from the surveys that support for a common
Foreign Policy and support to a common defense/security policy in Greece appears to be
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among the top and neutrals appear to be less supportive as shown in the following results
     of Eurobarometer 54.
Figure 3.5 : Eurobarometer 54 (Autumn 2000)
                         Support to a Common Foreign policy   Support to Common Defense/security Policy
Belgium                                       73 (%)                                                          84 (%)
Denmark                                      52                                                                 56
Germany                                      72                                                                 79
Greece                                          80                                                                 83
Spain                                            68                                                                 76
France                                         72                                                                  79
Ireland                                         59                                                                  57
Italy                                              77                                                                  82
Luxembourg                                74                                                                  80
Netherlands                                  66                                                                  78
Austria                                          67                                                                  65
Portugal                                        57                                                                  71
Finland                                         45                                                                  47
Sweden                                          55                                                                  57
United Kingdom                           36                                                                  51
EU                                                 65                                                                  73
*These are the partial results of EUROBAROMETER 54 and includes only the results of questions 5 and 6.
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb/eb54
3.2.2 Turkey’s Relations with the East:
Turkey’s NATO membership receive different responses from the East. For the
Arabic Countries Turkey’s imperial past and close relations with the West create question
marks in mutual relations. On the other hand, newly independent states of central Asia
perceive Turkey as a gate in their relations with the West or Turkey may constitute a model
in their transformation process to democratic and liberal values. NATO membership is an
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advantage for Turkey in its relations with newly independent states who aspire for NATO
membership. In general, Turkey pursue westward looking policies and take the Western
system as a model for its development. Turkey’s NATO membership and its adherence to
Western values, in a way, provide a buffer zone for European security. In this regard,
Turkey isolate Europe from the problematic areas of the Middle East and from the
instability. This create a depth for the European defense for the threats which may come
from the East. European solidarity for a CFSP or CESDP would be questionable, if Turkey
had pursued Eastward looking policies. I do not mean that only Western Europe benefit
from the pro-western policies of Turkey but Turkish contribution to the stability in Europe
is undeniable.
3.2.3 Russia and Central Asia:
Despite all its problems, Russia is a key factor for Turkish Foreign Policy with its
potential to influence regional balances in Turkey’s periphery. Post cold war years brought
chances for both cooperation and competition between these two countries. Trade relations
increased considerably. Both countries benefited from trade relations like the deals Turkish
construction firms achieved in Russia or Russian natural gas exports to Turkey reached a
significant level including unregistered ‘luggage trade’. Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) also proved to be beneficiary as a facilitator in relations.
On the other side, Russia being restless about the increase in Turkish influence in
Turkic Republics of Central Asia, sought to institutionalize Russia’s leadership role
through a “carrot and stick approach”. The “carrots” were security under Russia’s nuclear
umbrella, domestic stability, territorial integrity dominated by Russian-dominated
peacekeeping contingents and economic largesse. The “sticks” were veiled threats of
economic sanctions against those who refused to participate and tacit support for
105
oppositionist and secessionist forces within particular republics.194 Also there is a linkage
between Turkish and Russian policies reciprocally on issues about Chechen and PKK
questions. Moscow used KPE (Kurdish Parliament in Exile) as a card in hand against
Turkish support for Chechens.195
NATO expansion also gave Russia reason to undermine Western policies in the
south. Moscow has already shown how it can upset critical balances of power by
transferring arms and technology. Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine and Black Sea Regions
are the places in which Russia can exert its influence easier than the Central and Eastern
Europe. 196In 1997, Russia deployed as many as 32 Scud-B missiles and associated
launchers on Armenian territory197. It concluded an agreement with the Republic of Cyprus
to supply S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and in 1996 sold Iran two nuclear reactors capable
of generating enriched uranium and plutonium. Tehran continues to receive weapon
systems.198 Turkey has also security concerns over the implementation of CFE agreement
and military installations in countries like Georgia and Armenia. Another area of
divergence with Russia which might in time lead to tensions is about transportation of oil
from Caspian Basin. Turkey being restless about the increasing traffic in straits searches
for an alternative way for the issue.
However, having difficulties in their economies and state structures, cooperation in
economic field fit better to national stakes of both countries rather than cooperation in
security field. This might in time, by creating interdependence, lead to better relations on
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other fields. Turkey suggested a Caucasus Stability Pact  that may help to promote
cooperation and to enhance security in the region. Turkish companies in central Asia have
significant investments.  By considering the present location of Turkey both geographically
and culturally, Turkey has potentially a key role for Eurasia dialogue and stability in
Central Asia.
3.2.4 Middle East:
From the beginning of its foundation, Turkish Republic turned its face towards West
rather than the East. There are reasons of having mutual suspicions between the Arabic
World and Turkey but like other parts of the world new prospects appeared after cold war
in Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East.
Iran, being a substantial competitor as an outlet for Caspian energy in world markets,
has significant nuclear and ballistic missile program with significant arms transfers. PKK
and Hizbullah support strained relations with Iran on more than one occasions. Ankara
takes relations with Iran seriously, because of Iran’s perceived regional weight and because
it is a producer and conduit for energy supplies important to Turkey.199
With Syria, after the expel of PKK leader, relations on various fields from trade to
military began to develop on a better ground.200 Syrian Foreign Policy appeared in a more
westward looking manner after the death of Hafız Eshad. However, there are still problems
with Syria including from claims on a Turkish province Hatay to access to water from the
Tigris and Euphrates. In the Middle East Peace Process, which seems to be suspended due
to the rising conflicts after Ariel Sharon, Turkey has good chips to contribute to the
negotiations as a mediator, and by increasing its relations on water issues with these
countries. It will be helpful since one of the main problems about the disputed Golan
Heights is the water resources. A Syrian-Israel deal in this process will have direct
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consequences for Turkish military planners in two ways. It will help to stabilize the region
but will increase the number of military units on Turkish borders.
In 1990s, Turkish Israeli relations improved significantly. Both countries needed to
diversify their relations due to a decrease in the US and European threat perceptions.
Terrorism, proliferation of WMD and radical Islam were the common threats and Israel
would be better for Turkish arms imports since some European countries and the US
Congress – with the efforts of Greek and Armenian lobbies- was creating problems about
the transfer of weapon systems by restricting the use of these systems in some regions or in
some operations. Another factor which contributed to improvement of relations was the
Jewish Lobby in the US. Turkey realized the importance of Jewish support to cope with the
hostile attitudes in international platforms. Economically, South Anatolian Projects,
telecommunications, Water trade and Tourism were the main areas while militarily
modernization of second generation fighters (F-4E), intelligence sharing, purchase of
advanced weapon systems and military training constituted the areas of cooperation. For
example Turkey integrated NTS (Night Targeting System) and TNS (Tactical Navigation
System) to its helicopters by cooperating with Israel.201 In future, air defense systems may
be another area of cooperation since Israel have a technologically advanced infrastructure
like the ARROW systems in this area.  On the other side, these improving relations cause
criticism from the Arabic neighbors despite Turkey’s efforts to balance these criticism with
its support for the Palestinians. Both Yaser Arafat’s and Simon Peres’ visits respectively
reflect that Turkey have the potential to affect both sides in negotiations.
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3.3 Turkey’s Position among other Associate Members:
Turkey’s position with respect to other associate members is unique. It is not
obviously part of Europe in cultural, ethnic or geographic terms, though it could
conceivably become so if it is ever accepted into the EU. In regional security terms it
forms the boundary of indifference where the dynamics of the European and Middle
eastern Security complexes stand back to back. Iceland and Norway have different
approaches on these issues. Iceland’s unique position-it does not have any armed forces-
gives it great flexibility in its approach to the issue. Furthermore, these two countries have
no intention to become EU members, for the time being. Special arrangements with the EU
give these countries an advantage for the economical relations. Therefore, in principle,
they are not keen on having relationship with the EU in that regard. A solution which
would- in a way- mean their entrance into the EU via the back door, so to speak, is not in
their interest.202 Norway, as being in the north, constituted the northern flank of the NATO
and was careful enough not to provoke Russia with its qualified membership policies like
Denmark. This qualified alliance policies included, sometimes referred to as quasi-neutral,
major restrictions on the peace time basing of both foreign nuclear weapons and
conventional forces on their territory. A key objective was to ensure that the country
remains free of foreign military forces unless a major emergency requires their presence.
Alliance was therefore firm on political level but qualified on the military one. The Nordic
Security Model ( a layered buffer zone which cover the full neutrality, qualified neutrality
and qualified alliance) in the North including newly independent states of Baltic region
will help alleviate Russian fears of a military restructuring in the region within the
framework of NATO expansion. With their variations on the themes of self defense and
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alignment, the Nordic Countries have avoided both the pitfall of being seen as weak and
the self defeating consequences of being as provocative.203
Czech Rep., Hungary and Poland, new members of NATO, deal mainly with the
economic side of the EU.  These states with the potential members of NATO perceive
NATO as the security guarantee and EU as their way to welfare. By setting their new
national and territorial ceilings equal to their existing treaty entitlements in CFE adaptation
talks, the three new NATO members as well as potential members, Romania and Slovak
Republic, assured Russia that even with NATO expansion, the weapons permanently
deployed  on their  territories would not increase. Moreover Poland, the Czech Rep.  And
Hungary also committed themselves in the final act to future reductions by the end of
2003.204
When the above mentioned security concerns of Turkey is considered, its insistence
on participation with equal rights in new security arrangements within the EU depend on
four crucial arguments:
1. Due to its geographic location and turmoil on its periphery, today Turkey became
more a flank country than the cold war years. Turkey will not be the consumer of security
if it takes place in EU structures. It will have to rearrange its legal and political
infrastructure to accommodate EU and as the integration progress, it will be easier to
control its borders which will reduce the illegal traffic-migration, drug, dual technology
etc.- to Europe.
2. Turkey proved to be reliable ally throughout cold war by reducing the pressure
on Europe and contributed to NATO more than any other associate member. When we
consider the present tendency in Europe which favors crisis management functions rather
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than collective defense tasks, Turkish Army has gained a lot of experience in dealing with
low-intensity conflicts and a degree of success was achieved in its struggle with PKK.
3. Turkey has the largest Army in NATO among the European Allies and this
means- when considered with its modernization and professionalization efforts- it has a
significant potential to contribute to the planned European Military Capabilities. It also
spends considerable amounts of money to improve its capabilities different from the
tendency arose in Europe after cold war. Turkey successfully carried out operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo as retired NATO general Klaus Naumann pointed out (footnote 162) in
one of his speeches about the lessons of Kosovo War. Turkey’s contribution will increase
the credibility of European Military capabilities.
4. In one way or another, Turkey has the capacity to have an influence in most of
the problematic regions which may have direct consequences for Europe with both its ties
or relations in new geometries and its internal stability which may well produce positive or
negative consequences for Europe. Europe will have an easier access to new energy routes
and  new markets via Turkey since it may be cheaper to have alternative routes for the
transportation of critical energy supplies in the long run. Additionally, by its membership
in NATO, Turkey can also affect the shape of European security arrangements.  The US
presses on Turkey to remove its veto over European access to NATO assets since ESDP
may go out of control if the EU generates its own potential to intervene in conflicts without
recourse to NATO assets.
3.4 Alternatives for the Inclusion of Turkey and other associate members in ESDP:
For the satisfaction of all actors and for not to create dividing lines within Europe,
ambiguities should be removed and strong linkages must be established between the
associate members of WEU and CFSP.  If we consider the transparency, inclusiveness and
indivisibility as the fundamental principles of security, arrangements without considering
the security interests of all actors may create serious problems in future. There is already
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an emerging tendency in Turkish decision makers that Europe is insensitive to Turkish
security concerns. This may in time lead to worsening relations with EU and unilateral
decisions may appear from both sides affecting the stakes reciprocally. Not only bilateral
relations but institutional relations between NATO and EU may be affected adversely
which will work to the detriment of Transatlantic Alliance. In many ways, one of the most
important issues of new institutional structures within the EU will be to find a place for six
non-EU NATO members as well as the candidates for accession to the EU.
When three types of military missions which are NATO alone, the EU using NATO
assets or the EU alone205, taken into consideration the most problematic operations will be
the EU operations without using NATO assets for the six associate members of the WEU.
Although, at medium term, it is a remote possibility for EU to find a case which have no
implications for NATO and at the lower end of the military spectrum , but as the EU
develops into a more autonomous and more capable actor it will inevitably marginalise the
US and NATO in Europe. Autonomy and dependence have an adverse relationship. As the
autonomy increases dependence decreases, it is difficult to speak about autonomy while
depending on NATO/US resources. If  EU talks about autonomy it should have
independent capabilities; to have independent capabilities Europeans must either pull out
their resources from NATO and allocate all of them for CESDP with additional
improvements or duplicate the same ones by spending extra money. In this regard there
seems a contradiction between the goal of European Identity on the one hand with the
imperative of Transatlantic solidarity on the other.
One of the ways will be the transfer of WEU associate membership to the EU
structures and arranging their inclusion in a similar way. This will not prejudice the
autonomy of decisionmaking since it will be possible to restrict the participation in the
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council, at the request of a majority of the member states. Associate members will have
representatives in subsidiary  bodies and may express their concerns while crucial
decisions relating also their security is being taken. This will help planners understand the
scope of an action in a more sensitive way and construct their plans on a better ground. It
will not create confusion since associate members have an experience on the procedures.
The objections which state that the EU is a very different body from the WEU and can not
accept the existing acquis as the last word on structured dialogue between bodies is not
satisfactory from the point of associate members. While we replace any part of a working
machine we have to put a new one which will carry out similar functions. It is also true for
institutions. Different degrees of participation may be discussed from an observer status
without having any say on council decisions to a partial involvement in decisions like
expressing their concerns or giving proposals in regular meetings. Regular meetings with
the ‘six’ may be the voice of associate members for issues on the EU agenda. It will not be
logical to expect any participation in decision-making in this option due to different
characteristics of the EU. However, associate members can contribute financially and
militarily which will help the EU to achieve a credible stick as well as carrots in the
maintenance of stability in turn for a degree of participation in security affairs. This will
also help ease tensions in NATO and increase the efficiency of a potential operation in a
positive way.
The second alternative may be taking all the candidates, 4 NATO members and 9
others, as a package and arranging their involvement in security structures for a transitional
period. This may work as a complementary measure to adopt these countries into the EU
structures. In this case, the differences between NATO member countries and non-NATO
countries in their military infrastructures and in their desires to be involved in security
affairs may require a “variable geometry” in these arrangements. This option will have a
more legal basis as all the states being candidates and by including a wider scope. As a
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consequence, special arrangements prior to accession can be considered and circumstances
for involvement can be specified in a more clear manner. In this case, Norway and Iceland
as having no desire for integration may have bilateral relations with the EU on issues
relating their security.
The final solution for Turkey may be a special agreement like the Customs Union
with the EU on security field. Since Turkey’s membership is problematic for EU due to
political, demographic and cultural issues, and EU wants to keep Turkey on the door rather
than refusing or accepting because of strategical reasons; a special agreement may be the
best way to meet both sides requirements. In this respect, Turkey may have permanent
representatives and  rights in subsidiary bodies, may attend the meetings on a regular basis,
contribute to military planning and structures like other members and contribute to
decision-shaping rather than decision-making. Jolyon Howorth emphasize on this point in
his ‘Chaillot Paper 43’ that Turkey’s membership is a distant prospect due to geographic
location of Turkey rather than strictures on human rights. He states in the same paper that:
“...With Turkey, the EU should negotiate a formal and institutionalized partnership, based not only on
intensive military and security cooperation, but also on joint projects related to all the areas under discussion
in a hypotethical resuscitated Confederation.”206
In the participation of Turkey all these options are mentioned to give a general
framework rather than determining technical details which is a difficult task and requires
more elaboration. But one interesting point in the transformation of European Security
system, for this student, is the shift from a flexible structure which allows participation of
more actors to a more rigid structure which restricts the participation to the members only.
Although flexible structures have disadvantages as we discussed in chapter 2, flexibility is
better in an environment with uncertainties. The rigidity in especially security structures
will make institutions more fragile and divisions on various issues may easily create
serious flaws  in  rapidly changing conditions. There are many divergences and
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uncertainties in the emerging CFSP and CESDP. Even the circumstances and the scope of
a EU-led ‘Petersberg’ type operation is not clear yet.  The EU needs time to solve its
problems in the spectrum of integration ranging from expansion to the definition of its
identity. Within this context, Turkey should be patient and in a cooperative manner without
ignoring its concerns. In any way, a European action without the consent of Turkey
relating its security will be a risky undertaking for Europe. Additionally, it is unreasonable
to ignore an actor which has a military potential to contribute to the military capabilities
more than at least 13 member of the EU.
3.5 Conclusion:
The European security initiative to implement CFSP and CESDP is ‘on wheel’ and at
the initial stages. The US desire to reduce its burden deriving from its responsibilities in
Europe has a tension with its desire to keep its influence on decisions about European
security. The US, as a result of this tension, supports both Turkey’s involvement in the
emerging security architecture of Europe to keep the issue on NATO track and support
Europe’s desire for an automatic access to NATO assets since in any case the US will have
a say in decisions as being the real owner of most of these assets. Because the US wants
the European to have military capabilities especially after Bosnia. The preservation of
CESDP in NATO track is possible by the prevention of development of autonomous
military capabilities by Europe. The US pressure for the removal of Turkish veto illustrates
the US fears of an uncontrolled EU having credible capabilities to carry out operations
without the US.
On the European side, although the issue remains to be a French designed initiave to
make Europe an independent global player, in the long run, Germany may be the most
beneficiary country with its increased political potential and with its powerful economy in
the EU structures. The change from ESDI to ESDP reflects the tendency in Europe and it is
not difficult to detect the deviation from NATO especially after ‘St.Malo’. The increasing
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rigidity in these structures is an additional factor to create divisions which may have
serious flaws in the Union.
For Turkey, cooperation with Europe is a crucial issue in the new structures. The
Turkish Republic, from the beginning, pursued a westward looking policy and tried to
reach a long term goal of  being a member of the European Club. However,  in the eyes of
the Turkish elite, Europe’s credibility reduced significantly because of its inconsistent
policies against Turkey and perceived ‘double standards’  for the membership like the
inclusion of Cyprus or Aegean issue as a precondition for its membership207. In security
field, Turkey remains to be relatively powerful actor to have a say in European security
architecture. Its geography, turmoil on its periphery causes significant hesitations for a
legal-based arrangement in the eyes of the EU decisionmakers but also it is difficult to
ignore its potential contribution to European stability if a common base for cooperation can
be created. Turkey deserves a special attention since its place in the security system is
unique. Turkey can be involved by either its associate membership status, by its candidacy
or by a special agreement with the EU in these emerging CESDP. Allowing the
participation of external actors in these structures will be crucial for the entirety and reduce
the negative effects of uncertainties.
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Chapter 4 : Military Capabilities of European Union for CESDP.
The political will to develop a CFSP or CESDP needs to be paralleled by significant
improvements in the force projection capabilities of the EU member states in order for a
CESDP and future Common Foreign Policy to be credible. The EU needs military
capability because, first of all without a military capability a Common Foreign Policy will
be meaningless and secondly, the US can not always take the military lead in Europe’s
peripheral regions of instability. An inspection of European power projection capabilities
for a better assessment of emerging security structures requires both an inspection of
national military structures and collective assets to be used commonly for an operation
either under a NATO or EU flag.
Improving EU capabilities, in this respect, to match the Petersberg Tasks require
both improvement of national capabilities and collective capabilities. Intended security and
defense integration in Europe will both balance some of military and financial burden
between the US and Europe which is becoming an increasingly irritating issue for many in
the US Congress208 and help to alleviate fears of European decision-makers about the US
dependence on security related issues. It is questionable that Europe will be a global player
by increasing its weight in international affairs and balance the US influence since there
are significant gaps between the US and EU in some areas like technology, investment and
procurement. Before a careful examination of the issue, it is important to note that, the
objectives of the current push for European Security Cooperation are based on
                                                          
208 Alistair J.K. Shepherd, “Top-Down or Bottom-Up : Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a question
of political will or military capability?”, European Security, vol.9, no.2, Summer 2000, pp.17.
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intergovernmental cooperation and are focused on member state capabilities being pooled
when necessary, not on the idea of a single European Army.209
In the beginning of this chapter, the differences between the US and EU power
projection capabilities will be examined by stressing on the deficiencies of Europe which
were highlighted by post cold-war operations, especially after Kosovo. Inspection of
defense spending will help us to have a general idea on the issue. Then, existing European
multinational forces, recent arrangements to identify national contributions, and the
functions of  Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military Committee, and Military
Staff under an EU label will be examined. The current changes in national militaries of
European major powers will be given to detect the scope of new structures and finally an
assessment of emerging CESDP will be made in the light  of these changes. The focus will
be on military capabilities rather than civilian aspects of crisis-management. Lord
Robertson-Secretary General of NATO- gives clues about why Europe needs to improve
its military capabilities, in a speech  at Barcelona on 10th May 2001;
“...We must avoid any division of labor within NATO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the
logistics, the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers- What a NATO
official once called ‘a two-class NATO, with a precision class and a bleeding class.’ This would be
politically unsustainable. We must ensure that the burdens, the costs and risks are shared equally... If Europe
is not delivering as promised we will have two gaps: a transatlantic capability gap, and a European credibility
gap...”210
4.1 The US and European Military Capabilities :
There are many areas in military field in which Europe lags behind the US.
According to Lord Robertson-Secretary General of NATO;
“The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European Allies had become on US
military capabilities. From precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops that can get to
the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate logistical support. On paper, Europe has 2 million men
and women under arms-more than the United States. But despite those 2 million soldiers, it was a struggle to
come up with 40,000 troops to deploy as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Something was wrong and Europe
knows it.”211
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210 Speech by the Rt.Hon.Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, Centro Caixo, Barcelona, 10 May
2001.
211 Lord Robertson, “Rebalancing NATO for a Strong Future”, remarks at the Defense Week Conference,
Brussels, Belgium, 31 January 2000. http://www.nato.int
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 Before a detailed examination of these areas it will be better to inspect factors
contributing to gaps between the US and Europe.
First of all, the federal government structure of the US makes the central planning of
national requirements and organization of military much more easier than the Europe.
Intergovernmental characteristics of the EU prioritize the national choices and to achieve
an integrated whole in defense and security issues will take a long time since these are
critical issues and integration process is in its initial stages. Secondly, public opinion plays
different roles in Europe and the US about investment on defense. The US authorities had
very strong even unreserved support from American citizens for a powerful defense system
capable of deflecting any actual or potential threats by means of technological superiority
in all areas, whereas European Governments had to contend with societies that were more
concerned with social welfare than military threats, a fact reflected in the budget priorities
of European countries.212 Finally, the US has the historical advantage of being in a position
as a superpower since the end of World War II. It played a global role during the cold war
and when the cold war came to an end, the US was already having its military
infrastructure to project significant amount of forces to a place where it deems necessary
all around the world. To Balance the Soviet supremacy in numerical strength and
conventional arsenal,  gaining technological superiority was one of the main considerations
of the American decision-makers. On the other side, Europe organized its forces according
to a scenario of cold war assumptions which was relatively stable and without requiring
sending troops at great distances for prolonged operations. Additionally, the lack of
considerable investment on Research and Development by Europe, gave American
companies a leadership role in military technology.
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report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee to the WEU Assembly, Document
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The main requirements of contemporary conflicts are characterized by stealth, speed,
range, accuracy, lethality, strategic mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and
ability to prevail.213 Not only material superiority but also doctrine, organization, training
and individuals remains as the essentials of modern armies. Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo, as the most recent post cold war operation, highlighted a number of basic
problems from a European point of view. While non-US aircraft carrier carried out over
15,000 sorties, about 39% of the total, US aircraft delivered 80% of weapons.214 Certain
capabilities were provided only or almost entirely by the US, including offensive electronic
warfare, airborne command and control, all-weather precision munitions, air-to-air
refueling, and mobile target acquisition. More than 70% of combat support sorties for
refueling, command and control, and suppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD), 95%
NATO’s intelligence requirements were provided by the Americans.
Also the Kosovo operation revealed that information systems pose great
interoperability challenges. As in many areas, the problems derive from the rapid pace of
US innovation and modernization compared to that of the other allies. According to one
expert, ‘the biggest complaint of the allies’ was the reduced reliance of US armed forces on
previous methods of communications-encrypted voice and teletype messages. The US shift
to electronic transmission of schedules, maps, images, etc., via the Secret Internet Protocol
Reuter Network (SIPRNET), a US only secure communications network, was seen as
excluding the allies.215
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As for specific technology gaps, Lt. General Charles W. Dyke mentions in a panel
discussion the following:216 Secure Communications links (examples: Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS), Global Command and Control System (GCCS),
battlefield digitization, reconnaissance/intelligence aircraft (such as the specially equipped
RC-135 reconnaissance and surveillance series of aircraft or the Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS)), the Global Positioning System (GPS),
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and, in particular, micro-UAVs and rotorcraft (e.g. the vertical take-off
and landing V-22 Osprey). Cryptanalysis and cryptography, ultra-high frequency
components, hardened components, aeronautical engines, smart sensors, directed energy
weapons or more generally information and micro-electronic technologies can be added to
the list. But rather than concentrating on specific systems a more general approach,
considering the main lines of capabilities gap will be useful to understand the present
efforts on the way of a credible CESDP.
4.2 The Main Capabilities which need improvement in Europe:217
 Airlift and Sealift:  Europeans lack the necessary lift capabilities for an operation
which requires rapid deployment of forces to the field. The UK short-term lease of C-17s,
and the signature of a declaration of intent concerning the Airbus  A400 M airlifter
program by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom will
improve the airlift ability. However, there is not significant plans to improve sealift
capabilities except the modernization programs and the UK’s plans for replacing its aircraft
carriers with bigger ones.
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121
Logistics Systems and Procedures: As a natural consequence of lacking air and
sealift capabilities, European military authorities are not well equipped to sustain
substantial armed forces in regional operations for an extended period of time. But this is
also partly a result of failing to develop procedures and information systems capable of
amassing, tracking, moving and distributing supplies over long periods of time and
distance. This problem appears to be easier to be fixed by an increase in lift capabilities
and by an increase in cooperation with the time.
large-scale Command and Control/Battle Management Capabilities: This is an
operational problem and for now the UK and France have deployable HQs sufficient to
carry out an independent operation without recourse to NATO assets. CESDP has the
potential to develop these capabilities rapidly.
Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) :  Some European Countries (UK and France in
particular) have acquired stocks of laser-guided munitions, but they have relatively few
aircraft able to employ them, as they lack night vision systems, data links, sensors, and
other equipment needed to provide accurate targeting information. Additionally, European
nations lag behind the US in their ability to use PGMs that rely on guidance systems like
GPS, millimeter wave radar, infrared and acoustic sensors. They can be used in only clear
weather and proved to be problematic in Kosovo operation.
Advanced Reconnaissance/surveillance/precision targeting systems: Some European
nations do operate satellite reconnaissance systems, but these do not provide data of
sufficient quality for precision targeting. Their UAVs are useful in conjunction with other
systems (e.g. JSTARS). Additionally, most of the European tactical aircraft lack data link
systems to gain access to digital targeting information.
                                                                                                                                                                               
Systems. Since Arnau Navarro’s report covers all the areas in this regard,  I chose them to explain the issue.
For detailed information on technical details see the afore-mentioned report.
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Secure Communication: During operation Allied Force, not all the European aircraft
were equipped with secure links. NATO air commanders either had to broadcast “in the
clear” to some European pilots and risk the Serbs gaining intelligence windfalls, or had to
have no contact with them and accept less effective performance on their part.
Navigation Systems: Europeans are dependent today on the American GPS, but are in
the process of developing a similar system known as Galileo 55.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Capabilities (SEAD): Europeans are entirely
dependent on the American EA-6B for radar jamming. Moreover, in contrast to the US
(whose airforce has the specially equipped F-16CJ aircraft), they have relatively few
systems dedicated to destroying air-defense radars.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Europe does not perceive a missile threat from rogue states
to justify developing costs of a missile defense systems. They are involved in some
programs of theatre missile defense systems with Americans and nuclear states keep their
adherence to nuclear deterrence for a potential threat.
Low Observability (Stealth): Eurofighter will introduce a small measure of low
observability, but nowhere near the degree offered by American F-117, B-22, F-22, and
Joint Strike Fighter.
4.3 Investment on Defense : Defense Budgets:
One clear way of assessment of military capabilities is inspecting the defense
spending.(see fig.4.1) Although  there are ambitious European steps for an autonomous
action capability, defense budgets of the European countries decreased considerably after
cold war. There were several reasons behind this reduction. First of all, there is no
sentiment of being attacked on a large scale in Europe. New challenges do not require an
all-out war and huge military formations are unnecessary. Instead of this, smaller but more
mobile, sustainable, technologically advanced, interoperable military units are required
together with civilian efforts for crisis management. However, creating qualitative
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formations to match the Petersberg Tasks is not an easy task with shrinking budgets.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a costly process which requires investment on
Research and Technology (R&T).
Second, the decline in birth rates and the decline in the number of workers relative to
the growing numbers of retired people receiving government pensions, and health care
demands of ageing populations will make it difficult for European Governments to
increase spending on defense.218
Third, Europe is also paying for the reconstruction efforts in CEE countries, for
deepening the integration process and for enlargement. These efforts burden economies
and limit the funds available for military capability improvements.219
Figure 4.1: Defense Expenditures as %of gross domestic product (GDP)
Country         Average         1995      1996      1997     1998      1999
                      (1985-89)
                                            Based on current prices
Belgium              2.8              1.6        1.6          1.5       1.5         1.5
Czech Rep.            -                   -            -             -          -           2.2
Denmark             2.0               1.7       1.7          1.7       1.6          1.6
France                 3.8               3.1       3.0          2.9       2.9          2.8
Germany         3.0              1.7        1.7          1.6        1.6          1.5
Greece                 5.1              4.4        4.5         4.6        4.8          4.9
Hungary                  -                   -           -             -          -           1.6
Italy                     2.3              1.8        1.9          2.0       2.0           2.0
Luxembourg        1.0              0.8        0.8          0.9       0.9           0.9
Netherlands         2.9              2.0        2.0          1.9       1.8           1.8
Norway                2.9              2.4        2.2          2.1       2.3          2.2
Poland                    -                   -            -              -         -            2.2
Portugal                2.7              2.6        2.4          2.3        2.2         2.2
Spain                    2.2              1.5        1.5          1.4        1.4          1.4
Turkey                  3.3              3.9        4.1          4.1        4.4          5.7
United Kingdom   4.5              3.0        3.0         2.7         2.7          2.6
NATO Europe     3.2              2.3        2.2         2.2         2.2          2.2
Canada                 2.1              1.5        1.4         1.2         1.2          1.2
United States         6.0             3.8         3.5         3.4         3.2          3.2
North America      5.6              3.7        3.4         3.3         3.1          3.0
NATO total          4.5              3.0        2.8         2.8         2.7          2.6
Another contributing reason is; European nations pay considerable amount of their
defense spending on personnel rather than new equipment.(see fig.4.2) Investment on
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technology takes longer time to produce results. It will be difficult to catch up in the
technological race with inadequate funding and without long term investments. Bigger
projects like the Eurofighter appear to consume most of the modernization budgets of the
European nations. Even a selective approach, for the most critical areas like advanced
surveillance and precision targeting systems will require an overall increase in defense
spending. It is unlikely to achieve a credible intervention capability with decreasing
budgets.
Figure 4.2 : Distribution of total Defense Expenditures by category
Country  Average 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
              (1985-89)
         % devoted to personnel expenditures
Belgium          63.4       71.1      69.0    69.3    68.5       67.3
Canada           46.2        47.8      45.9    42.5    43.2       46.1
Czech Rep.        -             -           -           -          -         46.6
Denmark        56.6        60.5      59.7    58.8     60.0      59.9
Germany        48.9        61.6      62.1    62.7     61.2      60.1
Greece            60.5        63.3      61.2    62.2     60.4      61.4
Hungary            -              -            -         -           -         47.3
Italy               57.8         67.4      69.2    75.4     73.3      72.9
Luxemb.        76.9         80.9      82.5    78.8     77.1      76.5
Netherlands   52.8         60.0      55.8    56.0     52.3      51.1
Norway          43.9        37.3       37.5   38.5     37.7       40.7
Poland              -              -             -        -           -          62.2
Portugal         67.7        77.8       80.7    80.0     82.8      78.8
Spain                -           65.7       67.3    66.1     67.5      66.6
Turkey           37.1        50.9       46.2    48.4     48.5      43.0
UK                 38.6        41.8       40.3    39.4     38.0      39.2
US                 37.0         39.8       38.8   39.1     39.0      38.6
Country Average 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
            (1985-89)
    % devoted to equipment expenditures
Belgium        12.1          5.4       5.3       6.2     5.9      5.6
Canada          19.7        18.5     15.6     12.9   11.0    14.7
Czech Rep.      -              -           -          -         -       15.9
Denmark       14.0         12.5    12.5     13.7   13.8    13.9
Germany        19.6        11.4    11.1     10.8   12.7    13.6
Greece           18.2         19.8    21.1     19.4   20.6    19.4
Hungary           -               -          -           -        -       19.0
Italy                19.7        15.0     14.3    11.3   12.4    12.2
Luxemb.           3.5          2.4       4.1      3.5     6.5      3.4
Netherlands    19.8        15.6     18.7    15.7   15.3    16.0
Norway           21.7        25.4     25.2    24.6   25.0    23.5
Poland                -              -           -         -         -         9.7
Portugal             7.6          5.9       6.3      8.2    3.8      9.4
Spain                  -           13.6     13.4    13.6   12.0   12.0
Turkey             18.2        29.7     30.8    27.0   20.6   27.5
UK                   24.8        22.0     23.9    24.9   26.5   27.5
US                   25.6         27.7    26.9    26.0   25.6   24.4
*Source: NATO Review  - Spring-Summer 2000 (Documentation 15-16)
Note : *For a general idea, I did not borrow the whole of the tables and reflected only last 5 years and   the
average of 1985-89, as the final years of cold war.
         **Highlighted countries illustrate the highest three spending in each table.
If we inspect the figures in US$, Europe spends220 half the amount the US spends on
defense (defense budgets: total for EU: US$ 131,601 million as compared with US$
252,379 million for the US). The gap between Europe and the US in overall defense
spending (twice as much in the US) is even wider for military R&D where it is four times
as much. In 1999 for example, the US invested  US$ 35,324 million in military defense
research as compared with US$ 9,001 million for 15 EU member states taken together. In
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addition, the US lead in private sector R&D investment is considerable. In 1997, US non-
governmental R&D investment nearly equaled the total R&D investments of its six closest
competitors (Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada). The volume of
procurement equipment in the US is one and half times greater than in the 15 EU countries,
whose procurement policies are, moreover, disparate. In 1999, the US earmarked US$
47,052 million for procurements against US$ 27,361 million in Europe In the US, there is a
strong emphasis on modernizing weapon systems, with a very big increase in the
procurement budget for the necessary equipment.221
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 give an idea about the threat perceptions of European
states, and their responses to the US offer about National or Regional Missile Defense
Systems, support the findings of these tables. There is also a clear linkage with EU desire
for an automatic access to NATO assets and their insistence on autonomy in decision-
making. In the short term it is unlikely that European countries will increase their defense
budget and providing the means via NATO assets will be a convenient way of gaining
smaller-scale power projection capability. However, the US support for ESDP aims to
balance the security burden with European Allies. If Europeans keep their position in
defense spending, a potential flaw in the support of the US may be expected. Additionally,
a resistance by the non-EU NATO members will be a natural consequence if they will have
no say in decision-making.
4.4 Improvements towards European Operational Capabilities:
Taking the principles set forth in St. Malo as a starting point. European member
countries decided in Cologne to give the Union a capability for managing the crises arising
on its borders. During a WEU ministerial meeting the French Minister identified seven
generic capabilities constituting a road map for countries committed to strengthening
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Defense Europe’s capabilities; strategic situation evaluation capability, operational
planning and command capability, ability to project an adequate volume of forces,
capability to engage in high-intensity combat when necessary, sustainability, appropriate
standardized training, interoperability at all levels.222 In the Cologne European Council,
‘Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense’ stated
that the EU member states would undertake efforts in line with the conclusions of the
ongoing WEU audit of European Defense. Since then, work in the European Union has
continued and in July 2000 it adopted a draft version of the ‘Catalogue of Forces’ that will
be necessary to meet the Headline Goal. Before the Nice European Council, Capabilities
and Commitments Conference (CCC) identified the contributions of each member by a
‘Force Catalogue’. Analysis of this catalogue confirms that by 2003, in keeping with the
Headline Goal established in Helsinki, the Union will be able to carry out the full range of
Petersberg Tasks, but that certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and
qualitative terms in order to maximize the capabilities available to the Union.
Contributions, set out in the ‘Force Catalogue’ constitute a pool of more than 100,000
persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels.223
About the strategic capabilities, the Union pointed out the importance it attaches to
the speedy conclusion of ongoing talks on access to NATO capabilities and assets in these
CCC talks. The European Union Military Staff, which will acquire an initial operating
capability in the course of 2001, will bolster the EU’s early warning capability and will
provide it with a predecisional situation assessment and strategic planning capability. The
emphasis on improving the performance of European Forces, developing strategic
capabilities, strengthening essential operational capabilities in the framework of a crisis-
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management operation and the restructuring of the European Defense Industries (i.e.,
future large aircraft Airbus A 400M, maritime transport vessels, troop transport
helicopters(NH-90)) were all declared intentions of CCC.224
With the take over of crisis-management responsibilities from the WEU after the
Nice EU Council, EU have also gained operational bodies like the Political and Security
Committee (PSC), the European Military Committee (EMC), and the EU Military Staff
(EMS). PSC which would be made of national representatives of ambassadorial rank and
would be chaired by Secretary General/High Representative, will deal with all aspects of
the CFSP including CESDP. In the event of a military crisis-management operation the
PSC, under the authority of the Council, will have political control and strategic direction
of the operation. The EMC will be the highest military authority in the European Union.
Responsible for consultation and coordination between members, it will give military
opinions, make recommendations to the PSC and draft military instructions to the EMS. It
will be made up of fifteen Chiefs of Staff (CHODs) or their representatives. The chairman
will also attend the PSC and NATO’s Military Committee. Complementarily, EMS will
provide military expertise and support capacity to the EU’s CFSP. It has responsibility for
early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning of operations. The EMS will
work under the authority of a director, who will be subordinate to the chairman of the
EMC. It will consist of some 100 officers and a few civilian staff and will require full
connectivity with capitals, national and multinational HQs, and NATO. During crisis-
management situations, it will set up a dedicated Crisis Action Team (CAT) to undertake
military situation assessment, strategic planning and control of operations.225
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4.4.1 Relations with NATO:
In Feira, the fifteen approved a document setting out the principles underlying
EU/NATO relations: respect for EU decision-making autonomy: mutual reinforcement,
taking account, in the adaptation of EU/NATO agreements, of the different nature of the
two organizations: no discrimination against non-member or non-allied states. This
document also provides for a widening and deepening, in terms of stated needs, of informal
relations between the EU and NATO on an ad hoc basis. With this in view, four working
groups have been set up on issues over which contact is required between the two
organizations. These are on Security issues, Capability goals, EU access to NATO assets
and permanent arrangements.226
However, not a clear vision of relations between these two organizations have been
established due to the some divergences like the involvement of non-EU allies and access
to NATO assets. There is a clear distinction between EU operations using NATO assets
and operations without using these assets. For the first case, the so-called Berlin+
agreements reached at NATO Washington Summit in 1999, envisages making available to
the European Union its planning capabilities, an operation HQ and a CJTF theatre HQ. For
the second, the EU is to apply the principle of the ‘Framework Nation’. The Council will
choose a framework nation which will make a joint strategic operation command HQ
available, ‘multinationalized’ through the presence of participants from all the contributor
countries. The role of the non-EU countries in the committee of contributors in the day to
day conduct of operations is not clear and perceived unsatisfactory from the point of
especially Turkey. Additionally the place of any other representatives of the non-EU
European Allies in the EMS is not clear. These arrangements reduce the level of their
participation than that of the WEU associate status. 227 Within the context of relationships,
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Defense Capabilities Initiative is an additional reason for more cooperation and
coordination.
NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which was launched at the
Washington Summit in 1999, intended to improve the defense capabilities of the alliance to
ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of
alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus
on improving interoperability among alliance forces. Defense capabilities will be increased
through improvements in the deployability and mobility of alliance forces, their
sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and
command and control and information systems.228 Although, DCI set no deadline for
achieving the goals, there is a complementarity between the EU’s Headline Goal and the
DCI.229 They both argue that ground forces should have improved Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I), sustainability and strategic mobility. The DCI
differs from the EU Headline Goal in placing more emphasis on improvements in effective
engagement-that is, power projection and precision strike. Another major difference is that
the DCI highlights requirements that the EU documents generally do not even mention: the
need for defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles and against chemical and biological
weapons; and the need for improved electronic attack capabilities.230
4.4.2 Satellite Center and Multinational Forces:
One of the declared intentions of EU is to improve the satellite center’s operational
capabilities by increasing the number of image interpreters.231 Torrejon Satellite Center in
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Spain Which was established by a WEU decision in 1991 and became fully operational in
1997, carry out missions like general security surveillance, assistance in verifying the
application of treaties, assistance in controlling armaments and proliferation, support to
‘Petersberg Tasks’ and environmental monitoring. Both commercial and defense satellites
are used complementarily to respond the requests of WEU members including the
associate members. The most valuable source is the Helios Satellite, a cooperative venture
by France, Italy and Spain. However, Satellite center has the ability to employ other
sources of data like the French SPOT, Indian IRSIC, American landsat satellites, or the
European Space Agency and Canadian Radarsat Satellites for all- weather capability.232
Although it is a valuable asset, Torrejon Satellite Center needs to be more integrated for
the real time data flow to the forces on ground  and to be improved technologically.
As regards to the multinational forces which are also assigned to tasks of NATO
missions, Europe has the European Corps (EUROCORPS), the UK/Netherlands
Amphibious Force, Multinational Division Central (Airmobile), EUROFOR,
EUROMARFOR, German/Netherlands Corps and Spanish/Italian Amphibious Force. The
European Corps EUROCORPS has been operational since November 1995 with its
headquarters in Strasbourg and consisting of troops assigned from France, Germany,
Belgium and Spain. The Force mainly made up of mechanized and armored divisions with
a planned strength 60,000 personnel.233 The transformation of  EUROCORPS into a rapid
reaction corps was endorsed at a separate Anglo-French Summit in November 1999. At
this summit, the British offered up their Planning Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the
French their Center Operational Interarmées to command EU-led operations.234
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EUROCORPS will form the main body of especially ground forces for a potential EU
operation. Other forces like the Multinational Division and EUROMARFOR may serve as
the naval, amphibious and airmobile elements of a joint operation.235
4.5 Current Changes in Europe:
There is a process of change in Europe to adopt their militaries to the requirements of
new challenges. The most prominent tendency now in Europe is about suspending
conscription and reducing the number of their large standing armies. The reason for this
tendency is the traditional assumption that the conscript militaries are suitable for territorial
defense but are not appropriately trained for crisis-management or peace-making
operations236 in foreign locations. Having larger armies made up of conscripts entails high
manpower levels, leading to high personnel costs, which in turn leaves less financing
available for equipment procurement and R&D. In addition some countries like Germany
has constitutional constraints to allow their conscripts to operate outside of their
territory.237
Over the past few years, defense reviews have been held in most states and their
White Papers indicate a move towards smaller, more mobile forces. Several reform
programs have been underway in EU member states since the early to mid-1990s. The
most significant ones include : the German restructuring program starting in 1994, 1997-
2002 French reform program, the Spanish National Defense Directive of December 1997,
the 1998 British Strategic Defense Review (SDR), the Dutch Framework memorandum for
the 2000 Defense White Paper, and the current German Defense Review.238
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The main objective of examining the changes in national militaries is to detect
whether there is a parallelism between European political will and their military
capabilities. For this purpose, this student makes a distinction between the leading powers-
France, the UK and Germany- and the other members of the European Union. I do not
mean, only these three major powers try to develop an operational capability. For example,
the Netherlands intends to achieve a capability of participating in four peacekeeping
operations simultaneously and maintaining sufficient forces to support NATO defense. It
also moves to a voluntary army by emphasizing on rapid deployment, flexibility,
interoperability and sustainability of its forces. Spain by its decision to move a professional
army by 2003 or Italy’s structural reorganization are all within this context.239 However,
France and the UK, as being former colonial powers and the only EU countries to have a
nuclear status put particular emphasis on power projection capabilities. France in this
respect, traditionally keeps an independent approach in security and defense issues and
have ambitious goals to be a ‘big power’. Germany on the other side, an economic giant,
experienced considerable changes after cold war in military field which sometimes caused
stress on the French and British sides. Examination of the changes in these three major
powers’ militaries will be sufficient to understand the issue.
4.5.1 France:
 Although the resources committed by France to the defense sector have been and
remain above the average, French military expenditures fell by more than 10 percent
between 1985-1997.(see fig.4.1) The impression that the French Republic spends
considerably more on defense than many of its partners has to do partly with the fact that
in France, unlike in most countries, there are relatively strong paramilitary forces (the
‘Gendarmerie’) integrated into the national military organization and supported through the
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defense budget. The new defense program (loi de programmation) of France which
includes the years 1997-2002.prescribes drastic cuts in military manpower, transition to an
all-volunteer force, and major organizational changes.240 Included in the program’s four
major aspects of defense strategy is the concept of ‘projection’. Projection requires the
armed forces to be capable of deploying significant resources outside the national territory
and sustaining them there. The plan for the French Army is to be able to have a rapidly
deployable force of 50,000 men for operations within the North Atlantic Alliance or,
30,000 in a main theatre outside NATO and 5,000 in a second theatre.241 Additionally, to
give the French Army a more expeditionary role and allow a more active participation in
NATO or and EU military force, the Army’s nine divisions will be entirely restructured
around four divisions: an armored force an engineering force, a rapid reaction armored
force, and a balanced armored force using tanks and helicopters.242 The emphasis on this
programs appears to be on the flexibility of command and control, cooperation among the
services, and the ability to quickly assemble modular ‘force packages’ that are mission-
adequate.
For equipment/procurement, France intends to increase the qualities of its equipment
with a decrease in the numbers. For example, the fleet of combat planes is to reduce to 300
aircraft. The transport fleet will reduce from the current 86 air craft to 52; however, range
and payload are set to increase. The number of utility helicopters will decline from
approximately 100 to 84. Only the tanker fleet will grow in size by nearly 50 percent, from
11 to 16 aircraft. In the future the Navy may include 1-2 aircraft carriers (nuclear-
powered), only 81 other ships,  22 maritime patrol aircraft, and 60 combat aircraft. Some
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projects like improving its space surveillance capabilities (Helios II), the French radar
satellite program, and Rafale aircraft may have financial difficulties since the real costs of
the projects may exceed beyond the planned levels. Unlike the UK, France does not posses
its own AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control) system. France remains committed to
maintenance and continuos modernization of a relatively strong nuclear deterrent,
employing not dozens but hundreds of warheads, and with both air- and sea- based
elements. This will also absorb some of the resources.243
4.5.2 The United Kingdom :
 Britain, a staunch supporter of NATO and a special partner of the US, reduced its
military expenditures 22 percent between 1985-1997. In 1998 the British Forces had an
active strength of  211,000 uniformed personnel. Since the armed forces of the UK tend to
introduce conscription only in times of major wars, all recruitment is based on the principle
of voluntariness. The pool of trained reserves amount to nearly 320,000. This means that
even without conscription the British Forces have managed to generate a considerable
capacity for mobilization and personnel replacement. Although between 1985-1998 the
number of active personnel dropped by 35 percent, there is a tendency about increasing the
Army’s strength among other services. Labor Government’s Strategic Defense Review
(SDR) prescribe a more proactive posture for Britain than during the cold war, the SDR
suggests that in an increasingly dependent world “we must be prepared to go to the crisis rather
than have the crisis come to us” In this context, the Balkans, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf
are mentioned as current or potential crisis zones requiring special British attention.244
The UK’s foreign policy-led SDR resulted in some fundamental changes in the focus
and structure of the armed forces over the next 15 years. The SDR has significantly built
upon previous reforms that began the restructuring process earlier in the 1990s and has
                                                          
243 Lutz Unterseher, pp.14, op.cit.
244 Ibid., pp 18-21.
135
taken a significant step in re-orientating the focus of the British armed forces. It increases
the emphasis on ‘joint’ operations to enhance the coordination between all three services in
peacetime and in a time of conflict. The most important development in this respect is the
creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces will benefit from the second
major focus of the SDR, improving deployability. The speed and efficiency of deploying
these, and other forces, will be greatly improved by the acquisition of new strategic airlift
(four C-17s) and sealift capabilities (four roll-on roll-off ships).245 Clear evidence of the
shift towards force projection and rapid deployment is the plan to acquire two aircarft
carriers capable of handling up to 50 aircraft and helicopters, to replace three small carriers
now in service.246
Britain’s main contribution to NATO’s military structure now consists of her
participation in the Allied Commander Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The ARRC
commands 8 divisions with combat elements from most NATO countries. To this corps the
UK assigned two large formations (1 armored division stationed in Germany and 1
mechanized division in England, plus relatively strong corps troops. British Army
continues to emphasize mechanization and mobility. It is meant to be a multi-purpose force
with (counter) offensive capabilities at the operational level, but also with commando and
counter-terror elements.247
The British Forces already possess a satellite communications capability and their
modern fleet of airborne platforms for reconnaissance and electronic warfare is quite
impressive: 7 Sentry (AWACS), 25 Nimrod (maritime patrol), and 28 Nimrod (ECM). At
the theater-related level, the airborne ground surveillance system (ASTOR) has reached an
advanced stage of procurement planning. With considerable equipment and procurement
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plans, Britain’s force modernization is a very demanding process. For nuclear capabilities,
the remaining force of 4 subs (Vanguard class) with 64 Trident (D 5) missiles and reduced
numbers of warheads (48 for the one vessel on patrol at any given time and fewer than 200
altogether) resembles a last resort, minimum deterrent configuration.248
4.5.3 Germany :
  Like France and Britain,  defense expenditures and numbers of military personnel
as both uniformed and as reservists decreased in Germany.  In 1985 the FRG spent $50.2
billion on defense and by 1997 it has dropped to $33.4 billion. In 1985 the Bundeswehr
had 478,000 regular soldiers and 228,500 were conscripts who served 15 months. Between
1985 and 1998, Germany’s active strength declined by 144,500 soldiers or 30 percent.
Moreover, the conscripts’ service terms were reduced  to 10 months. During the cold war,
the Bundeswehr, with all its three services, was the only Western force fully integrated into
NATO’s structures: under alliance command even in peace time. Compared to the cold war
years , considerably fewer forces of Germany’s partner countries are now stationed on the
Federal Republic’s territory, although they routinely visit for joint exercises. There were
two factors which affected defense budgets of Germany after the collapse of Berlin wall.
First was the post-unification task of rebuilding the infrastructure in the new Lander
(states), which has required an annual transfer to the new states of $70 billion or more; and
second, the cost dynamics of Germany’s comprehensive welfare system, which together
with a marked increase in unemployment has placed a substantial demand on the nation’s
fiscal resources.249
In July 1994, as part of a major restructuring process, the German Federal
Government fixed the future peacetime strength of the armed forces at 340,000, including
up to 135,000 conscripts. The other very significant development in 1994 was the
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Constitutional Court ruling of July allowing (on a case-by-case basis) German participation
in multinational peace support operations. This was followed in June 1995 by a document
outlining the restructuring of armed forces into a main defense force (MDF), reaction
forces (KRK), and the basic military organization.250  KRK is better equipped with modern
weapons than the MDF. Establishment of a crisis reaction corps (KRK) with a strength of
approximately 50,000 men  when coupled with the court ruling, allows a potentially much
greater role for Germany in international security issues. 251
Today, out of a total of seven German ground-mobile divisions, six are integrated
with allied corps structures. German troops form five joint corps with Danish and Polish,
Dutch, American (2 corps), and French/Spanish/Belgian forces-this latter being the
‘Eurocorps’. The sixth corps with German involvement is the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC), NATO’s main intervention tool. The remaining German ground-mobile division,
which is so far non-aligned, potentially awaits partners in Czech Republic or even
Hungary.  In addition to the six German divisions geared toward multinational integration
there is also one airmobile division under national command. There is a German tendency
for cooperation with smaller neighbors and Bundeswehr is careful to keep their units as
separate entities when cooperating with the Americans.252
Although there are modernization projects in German Army, Luftwaffe, and the
Navy, there is not much emphasis on ‘jointness’ of services. There are only two initiatives
in this area and neither one really trespasses on traditional service preserves: first an
evolving national command structure for power projection (which is army-centered, but
interfaced with air and maritime command elements) and, second, a related project for the
development of an all-Bundeswehr system of satellite communications.253 Despite the
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changes after the cold war, Germany remained careful not to act unilateral and remained
tightly integrated in alliance structures to remove suspicions in the minds of its European
partners. Germany, however, has a potential to expand its leadership role from economical
sphere to the political and military spheres in the long run.
4.6 Conclusion:
With this very general overview of European capabilities for emerging CESDP, it
can be said that it is a delicate process and at its very initial stages. The deadline by 2003 to
achieve an autonomous capacity to act with/without recourse to NATO assets is a
demanding goal and questionable when one considers the real problems European Union
will have to face in this period. The risks and difficulties in this regard can be summarized
as follows:
1. There is a real technology gap between the US and Europe to allow the
Europeans to act alone in crisis situations which may require sophisticated weapons,
command, communications and intelligence gathering systems. Also transport capabilities,
and logistic support systems may limit the intended operation by reducing the credibility of
deployed forces. It is a remote possibility to act despite the US in the mid-term since R&D
spending in Europe demonstrates that this gap will continue to exist even at wider levels.
This brings us to the argument about the risks of a division of labor in NATO, which
implies a two-class organization, one ‘precision-guided’ and the other ‘bleeding’ (footnote
4). In short, the gap has significant implications for the conduct of military operations and
for Trans-Atlantic relations. There is no shortage of US members of Congress willing to
accuse the Europeans of being ‘free-riders’ and to deplore NATO arrangements that seem
to subsidize America’s economic competitors.254 As a natural consequence, the US will
continue to shape the autonomy of the Europe.
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2. The fragmented nature of the European Union in especially security related
issues slows down the process of identifying the military threats and agree on the
investments needed to meet those threats. Many EU countries have independent long-term
commitments to defense procurement programs which may not be particularly suited for
the envisioned rapid reaction force. For example, Britain plans to spend $25 billion
between 2002 and 2014 buying the EF-2000 “Eurofighter’ aircraft even though the WEU
audit called for more transport rather than fighter aircraft.255 It is unlikely that European
governments will increase the share of defense spending in their budgets and it will be very
difficult to achieve common goals with different national priorities.  Additionally, there are
ambiguities about that the all EU nations share similar objectives of acquiring the
capabilities to conduct interventions similar to Operation Allied Force. Indeed, some
expert observers, even in Paris, doubt whether the objective of pursuing such capabilities
would be endorsed by EU nations such as Denmark, Finland, Ireland and, Sweden.256
3. Without clarifying the scope of relations between NATO and EU, and the true
goals of the CESDP initiative, problems will remain with both the US and non-EU NATO
allies. Simplifying access to NATO assets by abandoning NATO’s consensus principle
seems improbable. If this principle was abandoned, an ‘easy access’ arrangement for the
EU could erode alliance cohesion and lead to potentially risky situations-for instance,
European-led operations utilizing NATO assets without the full endorsement of all the
allies. If the contingency became an article-5 case (that is, if it threatened the security of
one or more members of NATO and therefore constituted a basis for action under the
mutual defense pledge in the North Atlantic Treaty), the European Allies would in all
probably expect US support.257 Another potential risk which may risk alliance cohesion is
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establishing a separate EU-defense planning process and command structure without
creating the mentioned coordination between NATO and EU.
4. There is a risk of leadership competition between France and Britain which
may include Germany on political and security priorities of the Union. These three
countries all have different national in different parts of Europe and the rest of the world.
Germany, for example, favors Central and Eastern Europe and will have more influence in
EU decision-making when these countries accepted as members. Without the balancing
effect of the US in Europe, potential flaws on different issues may reduce the efficiency of
declared CFSP and CESDP.  In this context, Europe needs to convince the public to the
necessity of having a credible military capability to intervene in the crises which may have
negative consequences for all in Europe. This may justify an increase in defense spending.
Another point which should be carefully taken by the European Union is;
“to establish formal relations with NATO and agree on terms of cooperation on the European
continent if they are to assuage the hesitations of the US and non-EU NATO allies. Among the questions that
must be resolved are the critical ones who decides whether a particular crisis is an EU responsibility; and,
should an EU intervention lead to an attack against one or more NATO countries acting under an EU-
mandate, are non-EU NATO countries obliged to defend the attacked NATO ally?”258
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CONCLUSIONS
The first step to understand relations between countries is to understand the motives
and reasons of their responses to the external changes. The main objective of this study
was to concentrate on the reasons of a change in European Security Cooperation and to
search whether the European Union , in the field of security, has made a qualitative leap
into a new phase of integration. While looking for the answer, we inspected the various
characteristics of European security cooperation and the circumstances in which Europeans
tried to cooperate in political and security fields in the period between 1945 to the present.
Certain principles like transparency, inclusiveness and flexibility appear to be relevant for
the success of initiatives in security and defense related issues. The inspection of Turkey’s
place in European security architecture should be considered within these principles.
Turkish case, as a potential flaw point, signal important clues for the future progress of
especially the CESDP.
In the search of this question, our first important observation was the linkages
between the cold war and post-cold war initiatives as a result of a shared history. Caution
in new initiatives reflect the lessons of past initiatives like the European Defense
Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC). It is not difficult, for
example, to detect that EPC promoted the common policies and contributed to form a
European pillar in international platforms, indirectly created a base for more political
cooperation, and helped to self-confidence building. Also the economic successes of the
European Community had a positive impact in the minds of decision-makers to encourage
them for furthering the integration process. New initiatives are the results of a cumulation
of feelings which were produced by common failures or as a consequence of the US
dependence like the feelings of abandonment-entrapment dilemmas.
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The establishment of NATO, by providing the American commitment and nuclear
umbrella shadowed the progress in security and defense field while providing a suitable
environment for economic progress. In this regard, one may argue that NATO constrained
the development of an autonomous European Force throughout cold war. It can be detected
from the roles played by the WEU. The WEU served as a transitional organ for German
membership to NATO, for British membership to EC, provided a platform to discuss and
coordinate some security related issues, and stood as a bridge between NATO and the EU.
Finally, it served as the interim European military wing for a while. WEU never
accomplished militarily demanding tasks. Obviously, NATO was a barrier on the way of
an independent European intervention capability, but equally it was the imminent Soviet
threat and inadequacy of Europe to cope with it, brought the NATO, not alone the US. Our
comparison between the cold war and post-cold war environment in Europe illustrates that
NATO continues to limit the scope of emerging European security system due to both
uncertainties in the system and internal dynamics of the European Union. For example,
decreasing defense budgets, national priorities to increase the living standards of citizens
with aging populations, or the public support for Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)
give us clues about the real strengths of appearing capabilities. Sustaining the political
cohesion to materialize the intended CFSP and CESDP appears to be the most important
requirement of achieving success, if Europe will have real muscles not on paper.
Until the St. Malo Declaration, Atlanticism vs. Europeanism debates remained
mainly within the borders of Transatlantic platforms. However, after the 1991 deepening
and widening arguments, including a tendency towards supranationalism for the sake of
effective decision-making, increased the prospects of an integrated Europe. The main
difference between the cold war initiatives and post-cold war ones is, integration efforts in
Europe, after World War II, was an obligation as a natural consequence of Europe’s
military weakness and inability to defend itself without the US assistance against a Soviet
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threat. But, now, rather than providing security through collective defense, providing the
stability through common crisis-management efforts and promotion of democratic values,
shaping the environment via setting membership rules or by economic ways proved to be
valid.  We see the attachment of longer term goals in security and defense related
arrangements, like completing the integration process in the fields other than economy,
without superpower squeeze and with much more capabilities.
Clearly, simultaneous experience of the integration process in Western Europe and
the fragmentation process in the East causes a gap which may potentially have negative
effects to coordinate the steps on the way of a ‘security community’.  Imbalance between
East and West, and redefinition of some notions like state, sovereignty, and identity will
require time delays for the realization of ambitious desires like having a ‘European Army’
capable to carry out ‘Petersberg Tasks’.
A careful examination of the dynamics of the European security initiatives since
1945 show that in the security and defense field, development of proactive policies, that is
longer term planning  and implementation to cope with the challenges of European security
will require time mainly because emerging institutions may have ability to create and
manipulate symbols which national governments had themselves used to strengthen
communal identities, after a period of time and after a shared history. At this point, it is
possible to identify a common point between the cold and post cold war security related
policies of the Western Europeans. Including the Balkans, almost every action of the
Europeans were responsive in nature and needed an outside provoker to step into crisis.
Yet, a considerable change after Kosovo and the St. Malo declaration in 1998, give way to
positive feelings about an optimistic thought that Europe may have the potential for
planning and implementation capabilities for at least ‘soft’ security issues, which may, in
the long run, turn out to be a credible capability for more complex issues.
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Besides the integration process, another factor which will shape the context of
CESDP is the US-European tensions on certain issues. There are significant differences
between the US and Europe which produce convergence in especially security priorities.
America, increasingly overstretched after the collapse of Communism, and as a global
player with different national interests in various parts of the world, put emphasis on the
development of a ‘Missile Defense’ system against potential WMD threats of so called
‘rogue’ states. On the other hand, Europe’s first priority appears to be the stability in CEE
and the success of reforms on the way of integration. Europe, once the fortress of the US,
lost its strategic value and the US interest shift to Asia, this is one of the main reasons of a
US support for ESDI259, which  will help to reduce burden in Europe.
Strong resistance for the Missile Defense issue from the Europeans, especially from
France can be accepted as a factor to affect the CESDP. From the French perspective, the
issue is divisive in nature and bears the risk of a renewed arms race with Russia or China
by reducing the credibility of independent nuclear forces of France and Britain. Bargains
on the scope of Missile Defense System and the autonomy of the CESDP may reciprocally
affect each other. On the other hand, arguments about the depleted uranium-DU munitions
used by NATO in Kosovo operations, possibly reflect  the tendency in European
governments to reduce the credibility of NATO in public which may justify the need for a
more European security structures.
Reducing the dependence on the US military capabilities, appears to be an important
incentive for security cooperation in Europe. Unless Europeans have their independent
power projection capabilities, the US will keep its influence over security related decisions
in Europe. The implications of the technology gap between the US and Europe give
evidences about the real intentions of planners in Europe. As the gap remains even in wider
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scales, autonomy for the Europeans will only serve to reduce the criticism in the US
Congress about the burden share in Europe. About this subject, there are some interesting
points which may seem contradictory with the declared objectives of CESDP. For
example, 3-D rules, avoiding discrimination, duplication and decoupling are the points on
which the US repeatedly stressed. However, without a degree of duplication or decoupling,
it is impossible to speak about autonomy. Without doubt, the reader should accept the
military presence of the US as a sine qua non in Europe and the mentioned autonomy
should be assessed within this context. It is clear that the boundaries of the European
autonomy will continue to remain within the political consent of the US, for at least a
decade or more.
Another contributing factor to the evolution of a security dimension in EU structures
may be the attitudes of Russia. Russian way of perceiving European initiatives in security
and defense fields constitutes a positive factor which increases the prospects of cooperation
when compared with Russian way of perceiving the NATO. Obviously, European
approach for security related issues will fit Russian stakes better than the US oriented
NATO approach.. The change in Russian military doctrine about resort to nuclear options
give clear messages to international community and especially to the US, about the
Russian disappointment in Kosovo.
While we search for incentives of CESDP, one should not forget the national
incentives of major powers in Europe. The Labor government in the UK, marked a crucial
turning point for European Security cooperation with its traditional policy change in 1998.
For Britain, Security and Defense is the most suitable sector in which it can play a
leadership role in EU structures. Yet, despite the change in traditional policy, British
resistance at the Nice EU summit for the enlargement of the scope of qualified majority
voting in more areas of the CFSP, illustrate that it is too early to speak about a European-
centered British policy. Britain keeps its status as the special ally of the US within the
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NATO. Germany, on the other hand, increasing its potential weight in both EU and
international structures, experience a transformation process after the unification. It is not
difficult to claim that,  Germany became the most beneficiary country of the changes after
the collapse of Eastern Bloc. Additionally, with its influence over the CEE countries,
Germany potentially have the capability to shape the organization of a European Security
structure.
Our consequent inquiry into the potential flaws and divergent points of the CESDP
revealed that, one must be careful not to have high expectations from the emerging security
structures. First of all, there are divergent points in the characteristics of the intended
European power projection capability. Flexible structures like the EPC proved to be useful
in intergovernmental structures and in uncertain conditions. There are transformation
processes in various countries of the Europe and potential flash points which produce a
degree of uncertainty. Russian internal reforms, as an example of national transformation,
or NATO’s enlargement, as an institutional transformation, can be listed as the most
significant ones. No firm commitments, opt-out provisions, inclusiveness and transparency
are some of the elements which make structures flexible and support for these kind of
structures is more than the rigid frameworks. As Europe defines its roles and rules in these
new formations, a more rigid framework will be inevitable. At least membership in the EU
appears to be the pre-condition to have a voice in these structures. As a natural
consequence of rigidity, fragility of the structure and divergent points like the access to
NATO assets constitutes the delicate side of the CESDP.
In this regard, the principle of inclusion of all actors in the organization of new
structures should be more logical as the uncertainty continues to be a factor in Europe and
on its periphery. The potential position of the non-EU NATO members and EU-NATO
institutional relations will be another main factor, to shape the future direction of CESDP.
Turkey, from a European perspective, has a different identity than the Europeans and it
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will be difficult to absorb  Turkey in the EU structures. Rather than accepting as a member,
Europe tend to perceive Turkey as a strategic partner like the Russia and Ukraine. Yet,
from a security angle, Turkey should be satisfied for its desire to be involved in emerging
security structures since it has the capability260, to have a de facto effect on issues which
Turkey deemed related with its security. This may be within the context of WEU associate
membership rights, candidate status or with a special arrangement. Turkey already has
special arrangements with EU in economical field and respect for the autonomy of EU
decision-making is the declared intention of Turkey in its involvement. There are signals of
consensus on divergent points like the guaranteed- access to NATO assets and geography
of the intended operation. An Alternative may be found on the determination of strategic
assets and allowing the use of these strategic NATO assets by NAC decision while
allowing the use of other ones automatically. Turkey has also hesitations about the
geography of operations and suspicious about Greece intentions on Cyprus and the Aegean
issues.
So far now, it can be detected there are many variables to shape the scope and
context of emerging European security architecture in Europe. Although, it can be claimed
that Europe need time to feel the results of the recent changes, developments in security
and defense field since 1991 marks a historical turning point for the integrationists in
Europe. Europeans, for the first time in history, came so close to each other and initiated a
process of gaining a common identity. Time and circumstances will show us whether these
reforms will result in a ‘security community’ whose members live peacefully in their
environment or something different than the intended.
                                                          
260 I mean not only the material capability but the geographic location and the ability to shape some decisions
with its membership in NATO and with its ties and influence in Balkans, Middle East or Caucasus
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